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Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from orders of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff-Appellant Samuel L. Boyd's ("Boyd") 
fourth cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, and dismissing Boyd's remaining claims with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Boyd filed this appeal in this Court, which has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1992).1 
Addenda K-T. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Although trial courts have broad discretion in adjudicating a 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, where there is an abuse 
of that discretion and a likelihood that an injustice has occurred, 
reversal is warranted. Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure 
Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
When considering a motion to dismiss with prejudice under Rule 
41(b), the trial court's discretion is constrained by several 
factors in addition to the mere passage of time. This Court has 
outlined at least five such additional factors: (1) the conduct of 
both parties; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move 
the case forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in moving 
the case forward; (4) the difficulty or prejudice resulting to the 
opposing party by reason of the delay; and (5) most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal with prejudice. 
Westinohouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul H. Larsen Contractors, Inc., 
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). In applying these factors, the 
trial court must consider the "totality of the circumstances." Id. 
Because evaluation of a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute 
is fact intensive, this Court should carefully scrutinize the facts 
underlying the present action in light of the factors set forth 
above to determine whether dismissal of Boyd's claims worked an 
injustice and therefore constituted an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Department of 
Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Meadow Fresh 
2 
Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) . 
In reviewing a trial court's adjudication of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Court reviews only the facts alleged in the complaint. Lowe v. 
Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). The Court 
accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
considers all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in 
a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 
764, 766 (Utah 1991) (citing St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)). 
With the foregoing standards in mind, appellant presents the 
following questions for review by this Court: 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, which 
abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's claims 
with prejudice and on the merits where the period during which 
there was no formal litigation activity was only twenty-one months 
long. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, which 
abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's claims 
with prejudice and on the merits despite the occurrence of 
settlement negotiations by the parties within the period during 
which there was no formal litigation activity. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, which 
abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's claims 
3 
with prejudice despite the availability of numerous procedures the 
trial court have used to move the case along that were less harsh 
and more equitable than dismissal with prejudice. 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, which 
abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's claims 
against Harmon City and the Harmons where Boyd had taken formal 
litigation action involving those defendants before the filing of 
the Harmon defendants' motion to dismiss. 
5. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that there is no private right of action under the Utah 
Securities Act, Utah Code Annotated §61-1-1 through -30 (sometimes 
referred to as the "Utah Securities Act"). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
This case was decided by the trial court on two types of 
motions to dismiss, a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute 
and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On the 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Rule 12, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure,2 is determinative. On the motion to dismiss 
for failure to prosecute, Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,3 
is determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the trial court's order imposing the 
draconian measure of dismissing Boyd's claims with prejudice solely 
2Addendum B. 
Addendum E. 
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because twenty-one months passed without formal litigation activity 
and notwithstanding the lack of any evidence of dilatory or bad-
faith conduct by Boyd. The trial court granted all of the 
defendants' various motions to dismiss with prejudice and on the 
merits even though Boyd had filed a request for a scheduling 
conference before defendants Harmon City, Inc. ("Harmon City"), 
Terry Harmon, and Doreen Harmon (the "Harmons") filed their motions 
to dismiss (Harmon City and the Harmons are sometimes hereinafter 
referred to collectively as the "Harmon defendants"). The trial 
court also disregarded the settlement discussions Boyd had with 
three other defendants during the period of alleged inactivity. 
In dismissing Boyd's claims with prejudice under Rule 41(b), 
the trial court failed to properly balance the need to control its 
docket and expedite the resolution of pending motions with the 
harsh penalty of dismissal with prejudice. The arbitrary and 
capricious nature of the trial court's decision is evidenced by the 
complete lack of any evidence of either dilatory or bad-faith 
conduct by Boyd or the extraordinarily long periods of inactivity 
that characterize the circumstances in which dismissals for failure 
to prosecute have been affirmed by Utah appellate courts. 
Furthermore, dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is 
particularly inappropriate when, as here, the trial court had at 
its disposal an array of less severe measures to police its docket, 
none of which it employed. Included among such less severe 
measures are entry of a scheduling order under Rule 16, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, issuance an order to show cause as required 
5 
under Rule 4-103, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, or 
dismissal without prejudice, among others. 
The trial court also dismissed Boyd's fourth cause of action 
because it concluded that Boyd had no private right of action under 
the Utah Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1 through -30. 
The trial court's dismissal of Boyd's claims under the Utah 
Securities Act is clear error as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The following facts are undisputed in the record from the 
trial court: 
1. In 1986, Boyd signed a contract with the Harmon 
defendants for the purchase of Harmon City, a grocery store 
business headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah.4 Citicorp had 
indicated its willingness to finance Boyd's acquisition of Harmon 
City. 
2. Shortly before the acquisition was to close, Boyd 
discovered a material non-disclosure relating to Harmon City's and 
Terry Harmon's mishandling of Harmon City's employees' 
pension/ERISA funds.5 A Partial Consent Judgment was entered 
against Harmon City and Terry Harmon in an action brought by the 
U.S. Secretary of Labor concerning such mishandling, which resulted 
in a $4,000,000 liability of Harmon City. The Partial Consent 
Judgment was not disclosed to Boyd.6 The Harmon defendants 
ARecord at 12-13, 396. 
5Record at 12-13, 396. 
6Record at 670-700 (Addendum W). 
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admitted this mishandling of such funds in their responses to 
Boyd's requests for admissions.7 After receiving notice of this 
problem from Boyd, Citicorp conditioned the availability of its 
financing upon a satisfactory resolution of the matter. The issue 
was not resolved and, consequently, the acquisition did not close. 
3. In the course of Boyd's negotiations with the various 
defendants for the purchase of Harmon City, Boyd incurred 
significant expenses and attorney fees. The expenses Boyd incurred 
were for investment banking consultants, attorneys, accountants, 
travel, lodging and related expenses, which expenses totalled 
approximately $50,000.00.8 Boyd initially filed suit in Texas 
against these defendants, but that action was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. Boyd has further incurred attorney fees and expenses 
exceeding $100,000.00, most of which were incurred in the Texas 
action, seeking recovery for his losses in the aborted purchase of 
Harmon City.9 
4. Boyd filed his complaint in this action on March 16, 
1992,10 and an amended complaint on July 10, 1992.u Boyd's amended 
complaint sought damages for breach of contract, promissory 
Record at 432-33, Harmon Defendants' Responses to Boyd's First Request for 
Admissions No. 6 (Addendum V). 
8Record at 396, 522; Addendum U. 
9Record at 39 6, 122; Addendum U. 
10Record at 1-9. 
nRecord at 18. 
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estoppel, fraud, and violation of the Utah Securities Act, Utah 
Code Section 61-1-1 through -30. The amended complaint also sought 
an accounting and imposition of a constructive trust.12 Defendants 
Matthew Hilton ("Hilton"), Brinton Burbidge ("Burbidge"), Kirton, 
McConkie & Bushnell ("Kirton"), Nielsen & Senior ("Nielsen") and 
Michael Gottfredson ("Gottfredson")(collectively the "attorney 
defendants") represented various parties to the transaction and 
were alleged to have been liable for the damages Boyd incurred as 
a result of the refusal of the Harmons to close the transaction 
with Boyd.13 
5. On July 31, 1992, the Harmon defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss Boyd's fourth cause of action for violation of the Utah 
Securities Act.1* On August 11, 1992, Kirton and Burbidge moved to 
dismiss Boyd's amended complaint in its entirety.15 
6. On February 23, 1993 and on April 14, 1993, the trial 
court issued memorandum decisions dismissing Boyd's fourth cause of 
action for violation of Utah Securities Act against the Harmon 
defendants, Kirton, and Burbidge and denying the motions to dismiss 
the remaining claims against Kirton and Burbidge.16 On May 27, 
Record at 10-18. 
'Record at 10-18. 
'Record at 38-40. 
'Record at 51-53. 
'Record at 223-228 (Addendum K); 257-260 (Addendum L). 
8 
1993, the trial court entered its Order dismissing Boyd's fourth 
cause of action as against the Harmon defendants.17 
7. On March 10, 1993, based upon the trial court's ruling on 
the previous motions to dismiss Boyd's fourth cause of action 
brought by Kirton, Burbidge and the Harmon defendants, Nielsen 
moved for partial judgment on the pleadings on Boyd's Utah 
Securities Act claim.18 On April 20, 1993, the trial court entered 
its ruling granting Nielsen's motion19 and on May 10, 1993, the 
trial court entered its order dismissing Boyd's fourth cause of 
action against Nielsen.20 
8. Shortly thereafter, Boyd was sued by Boyd's previous 
counsel in this case, David K. Isom.21 Isom subsequently was 
granted judgment on November 4, 1993, and Boyd appealed.22 On June 
2, 1994, Boyd's counsel filed his appellant's brief in this Court, 
Case No. 930598.23 On July 26, 1994, before the appeal was 
submitted to this Court, Isom and Boyd settled that case.24 
9. During the twenty-one month period between May 10, 1993 
and January 26, 1995, settlement negotiations between Boyd and 
17Record at 293-96 (Addendum O) 
18Record at 239-41, 
19Record at 261-62. 
20Record at 270-72 (Addendum N). 
21Record at 393, 
22Record at 393, 13; 400, 12. 
23Record at 400, 15. 
2 ARecord a t 394 , 18 (Addendum U) ; 400 , 15 (Addendum X) 
three of the defendants occurred. Boyd had settlement discussions 
with Nielsen, but the parties were unable to agree on terms.23 In 
February lrQ4, Jeffrey M. Jones, Boyd's present counsel, contacted 
Boyd regarding a meeting between Mr. Jones and Mr. Kay, counsel for 
Kirton and Burbidge, regarding this action. Mr. Kay asked Mr. 
Jones to provide Mr. Kay with a settlement offer from Mr. Boyd. 
Mr. Jones contacted Mr. Boyd, and Mr. Boyd authorized Mr. Jones to 
make a proposal to Mr. Kay. Mr. Jones then called Mr. Kay 
reaarding the settlement terms proposed by Mr. Boyd. Mr. Kay, 
however, never responded to that settlement offer.26 
10. On January 26, 1995, Kirton and Burbidge moved to dismiss 
for failure to prosecute.27 On February 1, 1995, defendant Hilton 
filed a similar motion.28 
11. On February 9, 1995, Boyd filed a request for scheduling 
conference with the trial court pursuant to Rule 16(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure.29 
12. That same day, February 9, 1995, Nielsen filed its motion 
to dismiss for failure to prosecute.30 
Z3Record at 810f 812-13 (Addendum Y). 
26Record at 804-805, 812-13 (Addendum Y at 7-8, 15-16); 393-94, 57 
(Addendum U); 400, f4(Addendum X). 
27Record at 297-99. 
28Record at 307-309. 
29Record at 327-28. 
30Record at 307-309. 
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13. On February 13, 1995, the Harmon defendants moved to 
dismiss .31 
14. On February 16, 1995, Boyd served extensive written 
discovery on all defendants.32 
15. On April 6, 1995, the trial court heard oral argument on 
all of the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute. 
After oral argument, the trial court granted defendants' motions to 
dismiss with prejudice from the bench.33 Thereafter, defendants 
submitted their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
Boyd pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
16. On April 27, 1995, Boyd filed Objections to Defendants' 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and a 
Motion to Reconsider.34 
17. In its Minute Entry of June 1, 1995, the trial court 
denied Boyd's Objections to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and denied Boyd's Motion to 
Reconsider without a hearing.35 On that same day, the trial court 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its Order 
dismissing Boyd's claims with prejudice.36 On June 16, 1995, the 
trial court entered its order denying Boyd's Motion to Reconsider 
3 1 Record a t 3 2 9 - 3 1 . 
3 2 Record a t 3 5 9 - 6 1 ; 4 4 3 - 5 7 9 . 
3 3Record a t 790-827 (Addendum Y) . 
3 ARecord a t 4 0 5 - 4 0 6 ; 4 1 0 - 5 7 9 . 
3 5 Record a t 711-12 (Addendum Q ) . 
3 6 Record a t 713-723 (Addendum R, Addendum S ) . 
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and Boyd's Objection to Defendants' proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment.37 
18. On June 29, 1995, Boyd filed his Notice of Appeal.38 
19. Boyd and his counsel indicated to the trial court that 
they would aggressively pursue discovery and the prosecution of 
Boyd's claims if given the opportunity.39 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
£a. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING BOYD'S 
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE, 
Although trial courts have discretion in adjudicating motions 
to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, dismissal with prejudice is a harsh and permanent 
remedy disfavored by this Court. Accordingly, Utah courts have 
instructed that the trial court must "balance the need to expedite 
litigation and efficiently utilize judicial resources with the need 
to allow parties to have their day in court." Meadow Fresh Farms, 
Inc. v. Utah State Univ. , 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
This Court has instructed that in conducting such balancing the 
crucial factor is the injustice that will result from the dismissal 
with prejudice. 
The record demonstrates that Boyd suffered a severe injustice 
by the dismissal of his claims with prejudice. Boyd had 
at 739-41 (Addendum T). 
at 742-786. 
at 396, 124 (Addendum U); 402, 119 (Addendum X). 
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Record 
Record 
Record 
meritorious claims involving a substantial amount of damages and 
significant equitable relief. That the injustice was unwarranted 
is demonstrated by (i) the complete lack of any evidence of 
dilatory or bad-faith conduct by Boyd; or (ii) the extraordinarily 
long periods of inactivity Utah courts have required in affirming 
dismissals with prejudice. Importantly, the defendants can point 
to no harm that resulted solely from the passage of time that would 
warrant imposition of the trial court's ultimate sanction. 
That the trial court abused its discretion is further 
evidenced by the availability of an array of procedures to move the 
case to trial, all of which would have been less drastic than 
dismissal with prejudice. For example, the trial court could have 
entered an order to show cause under Rule 4-103, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, ordered a scheduling conference as 
requested by Boyd, fixed a trial date or set discovery and 
dispositive motion deadlines. 
Boyd filed a request for a scheduling conference pursuant to 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on February 9, 1995, before 
the Harmon defendants moved for dismissal. Thus, by the time the 
Harmon defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Boyd had filed 
pleadings prosecuting his claims against them. Therefore, any 
period of inactivity had ended, and, the trial court abused its 
discretion by dismissing Boyd's claims against the Harmon 
defendants. 
13 
Finally, it was inappropriate for the trial court to dismiss 
Boyd's claims with prejudice when Boyd had engaged in settlement 
discussions during the period of inactivity. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING BOYD'S FOURTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT. 
In dismissing Boyd's claim under Utah Securities Act, the 
trial court concluded that the Utah Securities Act simply did 
affords no private cause of action for violations of its 
provisions. This conclusion is plainly inconsistent with the 
language of the statute and this Court's construction and 
interpretation of the Act. 
ARGUMENT 
L_ THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING BOYD'S 
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE. 
In adjudicating a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, 
trial courts have broad discretion, the exercise of which will not 
be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion and a 
likelihood that an injustice has occurred. Charlie Brown Constr. 
Co. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App.)f 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). The trial court's 
discretion is not without limits, however, and several principles 
should guide its disposition of a motion under Rule 41(b). Indeed, 
this Court has stated: "Dismissal with prejudice . . . is a harsh 
and permanent remedy when it precludes a presentation of a 
plaintiff's claims on their merits." Bonneville Tower Condominium 
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Mat. Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 
(Utah 1986); see also Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. 
Ins. Underwriters, Inc. , 16 Utah 2d 211, 216, 398 P.2d 685, 688 
(1965) (pretrial dismissal is "a drastic action . . . used 
sparingly and with great caution"). This Court has also cautioned 
that the trial court's "prerogative [to dismiss] falls short of 
unreasonable and arbitrary action which will result in injustice." 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors, Inc., 
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). Similarly, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has held that the trial court must "balance the need to 
expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial resources with 
the need to allow parties to have their day in court." Meadow 
Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). In sum, because affording parties an opportunity 
to be heard is, of course, the raison d'etre of the judicial 
system, and thus Utah courts have subordinated concerns of judicial 
economy to the need to provide a forum for the redress of civil 
disputes. Westinghouse, 544 P.2d at 879. 
As stated above, this Court has outlined at least five 
critical factors, in addition to the mere passage of time, that 
Utah courts should consider when deciding whether dismissal with 
prejudice is warranted. Those factors include: (1) the conduct of 
both parties; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move 
the case forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in moving 
the case forward; (4) the difficulty or prejudice resulting to the 
opposing party by reason of the delay; and (5) most important, 
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w h e t h e r i n j u s t i c e may r e s u l t from t h e d i s m i s s a l . W e s t i n a h o u s e , 544 
P .2d a t 879 . I n a p p l y i n g t h e s e f a c t o r s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t must 
c o n s i d e r t h e " t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " i d . A p p l y i n g t h e s e 
f a c t o r s t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e l e a d s t o t h e i n e s c a p a b l e 
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r s s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d . 
A^ "AN INJUSTICE HAS BEEN WROUGHT"40 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l w i t h p r e j u d i c e of B o y d ' s c l a i m s 
c o n s t i t u t e d p r e c i s e l y t h e t y p e of u n w a r r a n t e d i n j u s t i c e t h i s Cour t 
c a u t i o n e d a g a i n s t i n W e s t i n a h o u s e . I n d e e d , u n d e r W e s t i n a h o u s e , t h e 
i n j u s t i c e t h a t w i l l r e s u l t from t h e d i s m i s s a l w i t h p r e j u d i c e i s t h e 
most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r t o c o n s i d e r . i d . a t 879 . A f f i r m i n g t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of B o y d ' s c l a i m s would o n l y compound t h a t 
i n j u s t i c e . 
Whi le Boyd was n e g o t i a t i n g f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of Harmon C i t y 
w i t h t h e v a r i o u s d e f e n d a n t s , Boyd i n c u r r e d s i g n i f i c a n t e x p e n s e s f o r 
i n v e s t m e n t b a n k i n g c o n s u l t a n t s , a t t o r n e y s , a c c o u n t a n t s , t r a v e l , 
l o d g i n g and r e l a t e d e x p e n s e s . Boyd r e c a l l s t h a t such e x p e n s e s 
t o t a l l e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . A1 The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l 
of h i s c l a i m s o b v i o u s l y p r e c l u d e s Boyd from a s s e r t i n g h i s r i g h t t o 
t h e s e s i g n i f i c a n t damages . 
Country Meadows Convalescent Center v . Department of Heal th , 851 P.2d 
1212, 1213 (Utah App. 1993). Of the f ive Westinqhouse f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h in the 
Standard of Review s e c t i o n , i n f r a , Boyd submits t h a t t he f a c t u a l record before 
both the t r i a l cour t and t h i s Court adequate ly addresses the f i r s t through t h i r d 
f a c t o r s r e l a t i n g t o the conduct of t he p a r t i e s in ^ igh t of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
e f f o r t s t o move the case forward and t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o do s o . Consequently, 
Boyd's argument focuses p r i m a r i l y on the o the r Westinqhouse f a c t o r s — the 
i n j u s t i c e t h a t w i l l r e s u l t from d i s m i s s a l and the p r e j u d i c e , or lack the reo f , t o 
the defendants r e s u l t i n g from the cont inued pendency of the a c t i o n . 
41Record a t 396, 122 (Addendum U). 
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Additionally, Boyd's conduct in the present case is readily 
distinguishable from the types of conduct at issue in the Rule 
41(b) dismissals Utah appellate courts previously have allowed. 
Specifically, as is discussed below, each such case involved either 
dilatory conduct or some other type of misconduct, or a period of 
inactivity far exceeding the twenty-one months at issue here. Boyd 
did not fail to comply with any Rule of Civil Procedure, any other 
procedural rule or any court order or discovery request. Further, 
Boyd did not engage in any other type of misconduct such that the 
drastic measure of dismissal with prejudice is warranted. Further, 
during that twenty-one month period, defendants suffered no harm as 
a consequence of any inactivity so significant that Boyd's right to 
access to the courts should be denied. 
Finally, Boyd's claims have merit. Harmon City has admitted 
that it failed to make a material disclosure to Boyd relating to 
its mishandling of Harmon City's employees' pension/ERISA funds 
before the sale of Harmon City's stock to Boyd.A2 Defendants' 
failure to disclose this liability breached the parties' agreements 
and constituted securities fraud. This mishandling of Harmon 
City's employees' pension/ERISA funds resulted in a Consent 
Judgment being entered against Harmon City, Terry Harmon, F. Ray 
Green, and Midwest Realty and Finance, Inc., an affiliate of the 
Harmon defendants and Green, in favor of the U.S. Secretary of 
Record at 396, 123 (Addendum U); Record at 432-33, Answer to Request for 
Admission No. 6 (Addendum V). 
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Labor i n t h e amount of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 4 , 0 0 0 , 000 .4 3 T h i s Cour t i s 
f a m i l i a r w i t h t h i s d i s p u t e a s i t r e c e n t l y a d j u d i c a t e d an a p p e a l 
i n v o l v i n g t h e v e r y same ERISA l i a b i l i t y be tween Harmon C i t y , T e r r y 
Harmon and N i e l s e n . See Harmon C i t y , I n c . v . N i e l s e n & S e n i o r , 907 
P . 2 d 1162, 1166-67 (Utah 1995).A A Thus , Boyd has a m e r i t o r i o u s 
c l a i m i n v o l v i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of money which t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
d i s m i s s e d , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e l a c k of any m i s c o n d u c t on B o y d ' s 
p a r t t h a t w a r r a n t s such a h a r s h r e s u l t . T h u s , Boyd t h e r e f o r e has 
s u f f e r e d an i n j u s t i c e and a f f i r m i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of 
c l a i m s w o u l d o n l y c o m p o u n d t h a t i n j u s t i c e . 
B .^ THERE I S NO UTAH CASE AFFIRMING A DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 4 1 ( b ) MERELY UPON A SHOWING OF 
INACTIVITY FOR A PERIOD AS SHORT AS TWENTY-ONE MONTHS. 
INDEED. IN CASES SIMILAR TO THIS ACTION, THIS COURT HAS 
HELD THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, 
Dur ing t h e p r o c e e d i n g s b e l o w , d e f e n d a n t s have c i t e d no Utah 
c a s e , and Boyd i s aware of no Utah c a s e , i n which t h i s C o u r t has 
a f f i r m e d a d i s m i s s a l w i t h p r e j u d i c e s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of a p e r i o d 
of i n a c t i v i t y a s s h o r t a s t w e n t y - o n e m o n t h s . A l t h o u g h Utah 
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have a f f i r m e d d i s m i s s a l s u n d e r Rule 41 (b ) wherd 
t h e p e r i o d of i n a c t i v i t y was a s s h o r t a s two y e a r s , t h e p l a i n t i f f s 
i n t h o s e c a s e s , w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n , had r e f u s e d o r f a i l e d t o comply 
w i t h o r d e r s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r had engaged i n some o t h e r 
Record at 670-700 (Addendum W). 
This Court found that ERISA did not preempt the s t a t e law claims of the 
Harmon defendants and others against Nielsen and tha t material issues of fact 
precluded entry of summary judgment in favor of Nielsen on Harmon City, Terry 
Harmon and o thers ' claims tha t they had incurred ERISA l i a b i l i t y as a r e su l t of 
Nielsen's alleged legal malpractice. Harmon c i t y . Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior. 907 
P.2d at 1172. 
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affirmative misconduct. E.g., Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 
(Utah 1975)(affirming dismissal where plaintiff moved for 
continuance on the day of trial because it had failed to arrange 
for an expert witness), questioned in Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 
P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977); Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure 
Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(plaintiffs delayed 
two and one-half years to do discovery, failed to appear pursuant 
to an order to show cause and then waited eight months before 
moving to set aside the dismissal). Such conduct is conspicuously 
absent in this case. 
Indeed, this Court has held, in cases similar to the present 
case, that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing with 
prejudice. For example, in Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368, 
1369 (Utah 1977), this Court reversed the trial court's dismissal 
with prejudice as an abuse of discretion, noting: 
[I]t seems that neither party had any active interest in 
the matter for nearly four years. No reasons are given 
for the delay . . . . Since either party could have 
brought the matter to a conclusion it is difficult to see 
why the plaintiff should be denied his claim to more than 
$38,000 . . . . 
* * * 
The case of Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins is 
of interest. There a matter lay in limbo from June 5, 
1950 to May 28, 1958, when a motion was made to dismiss 
for lack of prosecution. This Court said: 
• Since any party to this action could 
have obtained the relief to which it was 
entitled at any time it had wanted but both 
parties chose to dally for a number of years, 
it was an abuse of discretion for the court to 
grant respondents' motion to dismiss with 
prejudice. 
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Id. at 1370 (emphases added). The period of i n a c t i v i t y in Johnson 
of over four years was considerably longer than the period of 
i n a c t i v i t y in the present case, jus t twenty-one months. 
Similar ly , in Westinghouse, t h i s Court reversed the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s dismissal as an abuse of d i sc re t ion because ne i ther par ty 
took any act ion to advance the case during the period of 
i n a c t i v i t y , and defendants fa i led to respond to p l a i n t i f f a f te r 
p l a i n t i f f assembled records pursuant to defendants ' discovery 
r e q u e s t s / 5 As in Westinghouse, in t h i s case there i s no 
indicat ion of any e f for t by the defendants to push the case any 
fas te r than p la in t i f f . 4 6 In Westinghouse, t h i s Court cautioned: 
While acknowledging t h a t p l a i n t i f f s must shoulder the g r e a t e r burden in 
moving t h e i r cases a long, the Court n e v e r t h e l e s s observed: 
[W]e are not impressed t h a t the defendants themselves were over ly 
d i l i g e n t or manifes t any p a r t i c u l a r ha s t e in g e t t i n g the p r e t r i a l 
d iscovery procedures completed and on with the t r i a l . 
Westinghouse, 544 P.2d a t 879. 
4 6Several of the defendants have denied Boyd's a s s e r t i o n t h a t defendants 
have done nothing in the p r e sen t l i t i g a t i o n . Indeed, defendants below claimed 
t h a t t h e i r a c t i ons t h a t f u l f i l l e d t h e i r d u t i e s under Westinghouse were taken in 
a proceeding f i l e d by Boyd aga in s t them in Texas. Record a t 587 ("The Harmon 
Defendants have taken not only Boyd's d e p o s i t i o n [ in the Texas a c t i o n ] , but t h e i r 
own!"); i d . a t 643-643 ( " F i n a l l y , P l a i n t i f f a l s o overlooks the expense of t ime 
and money incu r red by a l l of the Defendants in t h i s a c t i o n in defending 
themselves a g a i n s t t he claims a g a i n s t them in Texas s t a t e c o u r t , in which 
P l a i n t i f f Boyd ac ted as a t t o r n e y of record for NiNi Corpora t ion , P l a i n t i f f ' s 
a ss ignor and p redecesso r , as wel l as what Defendants have expended in the p r e s e n t 
a c t i o n . " ) S i g n i f i c a n t d iscovery was conducted in the Texas a c t i o n by a l l 
p a r t i e s , i nc lud ing Boyd, and included the fol lowing d e p o s i t i o n s : Samuel L. Boyd 
(417 pages ) , Doreen Harmon (99 pages ) , F. Ray Green (196 pages ) , Matthew Hi l ton 
(253 pages ) , Brinton Burbidge (78 pages ) , Daniel Bushnell (59 pages ) , Michael 
Gottfredson (133 pages ) , Ear l Jay Peck (89 pages ) , and Nie l s Pedersen (66 p a g e s ) . 
Record a t 661-62. This d iscovery i s voluminous and i s not f i l e d with t he Court 
for t h a t reason; however, i t i s a v a i l a b l e for review by the Court upon r e q u e s t . 
If defendants a re allowed t o d i scharge t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under Westinghouse 
by showing t h a t they have d i l i g e n t l y defended the claims a g a i n s t them by c i t i n g 
t o ac t i ons they took in Texas, Boyd's p u r s u i t of h i s claims t h e r e l o g i c a l l y and 
equ i t ab ly must evidence h i s p u r s u i t of h i s claims in the p r e sen t a c t i o n . 
Furthermore, in the Texas a c t i o n , the p a r t i e s f i l e d and responded t o 
va r ious d iscovery r e q u e s t s i nc lud ing r e q u e s t s for product ion of documents. This 
( c o n t i n u e d . . . ) 
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I t i s indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch 
and to move calendars with expedition in order to keep 
them up to da te . But i t i s even more important to keep 
in mind tha t the very reason for the existence of courts 
i s to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to 
do ju s t i ce between them. 
Westinqhouse, 544 P.2d at 879 (emphasis added). I t should be noted 
tha t Westinqhouse involved a three year delay from the time the 
complaint was f i led.4 7 
In Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports , I n c . , 
740 P. 2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the court affirmed the t r i a l 
cou r t ' s dismissal of the p l a i n t i f f ' s claim with prejudice because 
p l a i n t i f f s delayed responding to pending l i t i g a t i o n issues for 
inordinate ly long periods at several d i f fe rent stages in the 
p r e t r i a l proceedings. Then when both pa r t i e s to the l i t i g a t i o n and 
t h e i r respect ive counsel subsequently fa i led to appear at a cour t -
ordered p r e t r i a l conference, the t r i a l court dismissed the case. 
Unlike the p l a i n t i f f in Charlie Brown, Boyd nei ther fa i led to 
attend hearings nor fa i led to respond to motions pending before the 
t r i a l cour t . 
In Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ. Dept. of 
Agriculture and Applied Science, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), the Court of Appeals affirmed the t r i a l c o u r t ' s dismissal 
46( . . .cont inued) 
discovery was performed when the w i t n e s s e s ' memories were f resh and has preserved 
a s i g n i f i c a n t po r t i on of the evidence necessary t o t h i s c a s e . Accordingly, 
de fendan t ' s claims t h a t t h i s ac t i on should be dismissed because the evidence i s 
s t a l e or because of a l l eged f a i l e d memories of wi tnesses i s wi thout m e r i t . 
A7Cf. Polk v . I v e r s , 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977)(applying Westinqhouse 
f a c t o r s and r e v e r s i n g d i smi s sa l as an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n where per iod of 
i n a c t i v i t y was two and one-half years and cour t f a i l e d t o no t i fy a t t o r n e y s of new 
t r i a l d a t e ) . 
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for failure to prosecute because plaintiffs failed to take any 
action to move their case along for nearly two years, which delay 
occurred after a separate trial court previously had dismissed the 
case with prejudice for failure to prosecute, which decision was 
reversed by this Court to allow plaintiffs to refile their action. 
In the second action, neither plaintiff nor its counsel attended 
the hearing on the order to show cause why the trial court should 
not dismiss the case for the second time. Boyd clearly has not 
engaged in such flagrant disregard of the court's orders. Meadow 
Fresh Farms clearly has no application. 
In Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Department of 
Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the court affirmed the 
dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiff's petition for judicial 
review of the Department of Health's denial of an application for 
construction costs. Plaintiff took no action to advance the 
district court action for a period of more than five years. This 
extraordinarily long period of inactivity readily distinguishes 
Country Meadows from the present case. 
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals 
held that plaintiff had failed to diligently prosecute his claims 
and affirmed the dismissal of his claims with prejudice because 
plaintiff engaged in a series of dilatory actions including 
multiple motions for continuances and other motions after the case 
had been pending for nearly seven years and the defendants had 
filed a certificate of readiness for trial. Rushton therefore is 
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not an example of inactivity; rather, it involved affirmative 
actions by a party that inexcusably and in bad-faith delayed trial 
in the matter. In short, it was a case of egregious malfeasance. 
Boyd is guilty of no malfeasance, and Rushton therefore is 
inapplicable. 
In Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), this Court 
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims because there was a 
fourteen-month period of inactivity coupled with plaintiff's 
dilatory motion to continue on the day of trial because plaintiff 
still had not retained a crucial medical expert and therefore could 
not proceed with the trial. Fishier, 538 P.2d at 1324.48 Fishier, 
therefore, is readily distinguishable because of the plaintiff's 
misconduct in addition to the period of inactivity. 
In sum, the Rule 41(b) dismissals previously affirmed by Utah 
courts each are distinguishable from the present case. As shown 
above, each of those cases involved either dilatory conduct or 
misconduct or a period of inactivity far exceeding the twenty-one 
months at issue here. Consequently, the trial court's dismissal of 
Boyd's claims should be reversed. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES TO MOVE THE CASE ALONG THAT WERE 
LESS HARSH THAN DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. 
In this case, the trial court had at its disposal several 
tools to encourage the parties to move the case forward and police 
Fishier subsequently was questioned by this Court in Johnson v. 
Firebrand. 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977), where the Court stated that, in denying the 
request for continuance, the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff the 
opportunity to put on his case without the expert. .Id. at 1369. 
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its docket, all of which were less drastic than dismissal with 
prejudice. Boyd respectfully submits that, in these circumstances, 
it was an abuse of discretion not to employ one or more of these 
procedures. 
For example, Rule 4-103, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
provides: 
If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been 
served and filed within 180 days of the filing date, the 
clerk shall mail written notification to the parties 
stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date 
specified in the notification, the court shall dismiss 
the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution. 
No such notice was ever sent to the parties by the court clerk/9 
Had this notice been sent by the court clerk, Boyd respectfully 
submits that the notice would have spurred the parties to action as 
is evidenced by the discovery filed by Boyd after defendants' 
motions to dismiss were filed.50 See Hartford Leasing Corp. v. 
State, 888 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(sending plaintiff 
required notice to appoint counsel "would likely have spurred 
Hartford to action, as demonstrated by the plethora of legal 
documents filed by [plaintiff's counsel] concurrent with his Notice 
of Appearance and in response to the State's Motion to Dismiss. It 
would indeed be unjust to deprive Hartford of its day in court 
given the State's failure to provide the required notice.") 
Alternatively, the trial court could have entered other orders 
short of dismissal with prejudice, such as ordering a scheduling 
Record at 401, 112 (Addendum X). 
Record at 443-579. 
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conference as requested by Boyd, fixing a trial date and discovery 
and dispositive motion deadlines, or dismissing without prejudice. 
Use of any of these alternatives would have balanced the "need to 
expedite litigation and efficiently utilize . . . judicial 
resources with the need to allow parties to have their day in 
court." Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 219. By failing to 
implement one of these procedures and dismissing this case with 
prejudice in circumstances where there was no misconduct by Boyd, 
but only inactivity for a relatively short period of time, the 
trial court's decision was "unreasonable and arbitrary" resulting 
in injustice to Boyd. Westinahouse, 544 P. 2d at 879. Accordingly, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of Boyd's 
claims. 
EL;. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY DISMISSING 
BOYD'S CLAIMS AGAINST HARMON CITY AND THE HARMONS WHERE 
BOYD HAD FILED A SCHEDULING REQUEST BEFORE THE FILING OF 
THE HARMON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, 
Boyd f i l e d a r e q u e s t f o r a s c h e d u l i n g c o n f e r e n c e p u r s u a n t t o 
Rule 16 , Utah Ru les of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , on F e b r u a r y 9 , 1995 , b e f o r e 
t h e Harmon d e f e n d a n t s moved f o r d i s m i s s a l . Thus , by t h e t i m e t h e 
Harmon d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d t h e i r m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , Boyd had f i l e d 
p l e a d i n g s p r o s e c u t i n g h i s c l a i m s a g a i n s t them. T h e r e f o r e , any 
p e r i o d of i n a c t i v i t y had ended . 5 1 
Without exp lana t ion , the t r i a l cour t s t a t e d a t o r a l argument, "And so 
t h a t everyone unders tands , I 'm not going t o cons ider anything t h a t occurred by 
way of a c t i v i t y a f t e r the January of '95 motion [ to dismiss by Kir ton and 
Burbidge only] was f i l e d , for purposes of r e s o l v i n g t h i s mot ion." Record a t 806. 
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Boyd respectfully submits that even if the Court concludes 
that his claims against the attorney defendants should have been 
dismissed, Boyd took affirmative steps to prosecute his claims 
against the Harmon defendants by filing his request for scheduling 
conference before they moved to dismiss the case. Accordingly, at 
a minimum, this Court should reverse the dismissal of Boyd's claims 
against the Harmon defendants. 
L. THE PARTIES HAD SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS TWELVE MONTHS 
BEFORE THE TIME DEFENDANTS FILED THEIR MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS. 
In this case, Boyd engaged in settlement discussions with 
several of the defendants during the period of alleged inactivity 
and before the time defendants filed their motions to dismiss.52 
In light of such settlement discussions before the filing of a 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, Boyd submits that it 
was improper for the trial court to dismiss Boyd's claims with 
52 
Mr. Jones stated on the record before the trial court that after his 
meeting with Mr. Kay in 1994, he talked to Mr. Boyd regarding settlement. Record 
at 804-805, 812-13. Thereafter, Mr. Boyd proposed a settlement regarding Kirton 
and Burbidge to Mr. Kay. Mr. Kay never responded. Record at 400, 14. Mr. Jones 
testified, "In February 1994, I contacted Mr. Boyd regarding a meeting which I 
had with Mr. Kay at court regarding this case. Mr. Kay asked me to provide him 
with a settlement offer from Mr. Boyd. I contacted Mr. Boyd and he authorized 
me to make a proposal to Mr. Kay. I then called Mr. Kay regarding the settlement 
terms proposed by Mr. Boyd. Mr. Kay never told me of his clients' acceptance or 
rejection of Mr. Boyd's settlement offer." .Id. Accordingly, Boyd initiated 
settlement discussions as recently as ten months before the defendants filed 
their motions to dismiss. 
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prejudice.53 In Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 
1977), this Court held: 
Turning now to the issue as to whether or not a lapse of 
16 months in prosecuting a claim for relief is sufficient 
to support a dismissal with prejudice, this court has 
been active in that area and has held that where all of 
the litigants had power to obtain relief and failed to do 
so, it is error to dismiss with prejudice. None of the 
defendants requested a re-setting of either a pre-trial 
conference or trial as was mandated by the court 
previously when the pre-trial was suspended by reason of 
settlement negotiations. 
• * * 
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at hand, it 
is obvious that plaintiffs' lack of diligence in 
prosecuting over 16 months was reasonably excusable in 
light of the settlement efforts and had defendants been 
anxious to proceed they need only have taken such 
affirmative step themselves. Also, no prejudice to 
defendants' position is evident while serious injustice 
may well exist as result of the dismissal. 
Similarly, no material prejudice to defendants is evident here, 
despite their claims to the contrary. Since their motions to 
dismiss were decided in 1993, defendants have filed no substantive 
motions, served no written discovery, sent no notices of deposition 
and requested no scheduling or pretrial conference with the trial 
court. Boyd's inactivity, on the other hand, was partially due to 
his efforts to settle the case with at least three of the 
defendants. Therefore, dismissal was inappropriate under Utah Oil. 
53 
Much emphasis has been placed upon the differing accounts of the 
conversation between Mr. Jones and Mr. Kay. Where affidavits conflict on a 
motion to dismiss, Boyd submits that the trial court must look at the parties' 
affidavits in a light most favorable to Boyd and resolve the factual disputes in 
favor of the nonmoving party. Accordingly, the Court should find that settlement 
negotiations did take place and the court should reverse the trial court's 
dismissal under Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977). 
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II, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING BOYD'S FOURTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT, 
In his amended complaint, Boyd alleged that, in the spring of 
1986, the Harmon defendants and he entered into a binding written 
agreement for the purchase of all of the common stock of Harmon 
City.54 Boyd further alleged that certain of the defendants made 
untrue statements of material fact and omitted to state other 
material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading 
— specifically that defendants failed to disclose to Boyd, as the 
purchaser of the Harmon City stock, that Harmon City's shareholders 
had been accused of an ERISA violation involving a potential 
$4,000,000 liability.55 Based on these factual allegations, the 
fourth cause of action in the amended complaint asserted a 
violation of Section 61-1-1(2) of the Utah Securities Act 
(hereinafter the "Act") entitling Boyd to damages.56 I n 
early 1993, upon separate motions by the defendants, the trial 
court dismissed Boyd's fourth cause of action, concluding that 
there is no private right of action for securities fraud under the 
Act.57 The trial court's conclusion in that regard is contrary to 
the plain language of the Act and the application of the statute by 
Utah courts and constituted reversible error. 
5 ARecord a t 12, 1 1 6 . 
5 5 Record a t 12, 1 1 8 . 
5 6 Record a t 1 6 - 1 7 , 1 1 4 5 - 4 7 . 
5 7 Record a t 223-28 (Addendum K) ; 257-60 (Addendum L ) ; 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; (Addendum M); 
270-72 (Addendum N) ; 293-96 (Addendum O ) . 
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A^ THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO 
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT, 
Section 61-1-1 of the Act provides: 
It is unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
* * * 
(2) make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not 
misleading. 
Section 61-1-20 confers upon the Division of Securities of the 
Utah State Department of Commerce broad enforcement powers for 
violations of the Act. In addition to the enforcement authority of 
the Division of Securities, Section 61-1-22(1)(a), in relevant 
part, unequivocally and unambiguously confers a private right of 
action for violations of Section 61-1-1(2): 
A person who . . . offers, sells or purchases 
a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-
1(2) is liable to the person selling the 
security to or buying the security from him, 
who may sue either at law or in equity. 
In its order dismissing Boyd's claim under the Act, the trial 
court correctly observed that Boyd's claim was based on Sections 
61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22, as set forth above. However, in dismissing 
the securities fraud claim, the trial court mistakenly concluded 
that there is no private right of action for securities fraud under 
the Act. The trial court reasoned that (i) because there is no 
private right of action solely under Section 61-1-1 (citing 
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co. . 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974)), and because 
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Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22(1)(a) both involve the same 
actionable conduct, there can be no private right of action under 
Section 61-1-22; and (ii) Section 61-1-20 provides the exclusive 
enforcement procedures under the Act, all of which are vested with 
the Division of Securities.58 Neither of these rationales is 
consistent with the language of the statute or the cases applying 
the statute. 
In Milliner, the Court affirmed the dismissal of securities 
fraud claims by the purchaser of securities against the accountants 
and attorneys of the seller of the securities. The Court held that 
the accountants owed no duty to the plaintiff, and that plaintiff 
had failed to allege culpable conduct on the part of the attorney 
defendants. Milliner, 529 P. 2d at 808. The Court then observed in 
dicta that Section 61-1-1 "does not provide for a private right of 
action for its violation." Id. 
The contents of the complaint at issue in Milliner are not 
evident from the published opinion. Nevertheless, the only way to 
reconcile the Court's language in Milliner (quoted above) with the 
unambiguous provisions of Section 6-1-22 is to assume that the 
complaint relied upon Section 61-1-1 as the statutory authority for 
the private right of action, rather than relying on a violation of 
Section 61-1-1 as the predicate act giving rise to a private cause 
Record at 223-28 (Addendum K); 257-60 (Addendum L); 261-62; (Addendum M); 
270-72 (Addendum N); 293-96 (Addendum O). 
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of action under Section 61-1-22.59 Moreover, the Court in Mil l iner 
did not discuss the effect of Section 61-1-22 or i t s r e l a t ionsh ip 
with Section 61-1-1. 
In any case, Mil l iner cannot be read to support the 
proposit ion tha t there i s no pr iva te r igh t of act ion under the Act, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in l i gh t of the mult iple decisions in which t h i s Court 
and the Court of Appeals have acknowledged such a pr iva te r igh t 
e i t he r expressly or imp l i c i t l y . See, e . g . , Ball v. Volken, 741 
P. 2d 958, 960 (Utah 1987) (affirming t r i a l c o u r t ' s award on a 
pr iva te act ion under the Act and remanding for determination of 
a t to rneys ' fees ) ; Russell v. Marte l l , 681 P.2d 1193, 1195-96 (Utah 
1984) (affirming default judgment for p l a i n t i f f in p r iva te act ion 
brought under the Act for misrepresentat ions in connection with 
s ecu r i t i e s t r ansac t ions ) ; Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245, 1246 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) ( impl ic i t ly acknowledging tha t a person buying 
a secur i ty has a pr iva te cause of act ion for s e c u r i t i e s fraud under 
the Act) . 
Since 1974, when M i l l i n e r was decided, the L e g i s l a t u r e has , on s eve ra l 
occas ions , amended Sect ion 61-1-22. Neve r the l e s s , the ope ra t i ve language 
confe r r ing a p r i v a t e r i g h t of ac t i on for m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of m a t e r i a l f a c t in 
connect ion with an o f f e r , purchase or s a l e of s e c u r i t i e s has been a p a r t of t h a t 
s ec t i on s ince the Utah L e g i s l a t u r e f i r s t adopted a modified ve r s ion of the 
Uniform S e c u r i t i e s Act in 1963. See Laws of Utah 1963, Chapter 145. 
Any p o s s i b l e confusion t h a t may have e x i s t e d about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
Sect ions 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22 as of 1974, c e r t a i n l y would have been c l a r i f i e d 
by the 1990 amendments t o s ec t i on 61-1-22. Those amendments exchanged the 
n a r r a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n of the types of conduct t h a t a re a c t i o n a b l e under Sect ion 
61-1-22 for a shorthand re fe rence t o persons who of fe r or s e l l s e c u r i t i e s " in 
v i o l a t i o n of Subsect ion 6 1 - 1 - 1 ( 2 ) . " 1990 Laws of Utah, chapte r 133, s e c t i o n 15. 
I t i s c l e a r from t h i s amendment t h a t the L e g i s l a t u r e always has in tended a 
v i o l a t i o n of Sect ion 61-1-1(2) t o be the b a s i s for a p r i v a t e r i g h t of a c t i o n 
under Sect ion 6 1 - 1 - 2 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) . 
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Nor does Section 61-1-20, as the trial court assumed, render 
Section 61-1-22 a nullity. Rather, Section 61-1-20 allows the 
director of the Division of Securities to institute either 
administrative or judicial proceedings M[w]henever it appears to 
the director that any person has engaged, is engaging, or is about 
to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of [the 
Act]." Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-20. Conspicuously absent from 
Section 61-1-20 is any indication that the Legislature intended it 
to be the exclusive remedy for violations of the Act. As is 
explained above, such a construction would be contrary to the plain 
language of other sections of the statute as well as the judicial 
application of the statute by Utah courts. 
In sum, the trial court erroneously concluded that Boyd had no 
claim under the Act. Thus, that decision should be reversed.60 
Although not mentioned by the trial court in its memorandum decisions 
dismissing Boyd's securities fraud claim, defendants asserted in their memoranda 
in support of their motions to dismiss the securities fraud claim that Boyd had 
not actually purchased the stock of Harmon City, and therefore had no standing 
under the Act. The Utah Court of Appeals recently has clarified the extent to 
which a plaintiff must be a "purchaser" of securities to have standing under the 
Act. A review of that authority demonstrates that Boyd had standing under the 
Act because he alleged in his amended complaint that he had entered into a 
binding executory contract for the purchase of the securities. 
In Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245 (Utah ct. App. 1994), the court 
remanded a securities fraud action in which the lower court had entered judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff. The court held that there was insufficient evidence 
to determine whether the plaintiff was a "purchaser" for purposes of the Act. 
Id. at 1248. The court followed other jurisdictions that have adopted versions 
of the Uniform Securities Act in concluding that "[pjotential purchasers or mere 
offerees do not have a cause of action [under Section 61-1-22(1)(a)]." £d. at 
1246. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that a party who has entered into a 
binding executory contract for the purchase of securities may be deemed to be a 
purchaser for purposes of standing under the Act. Id. at 1247-48 n.5.; see also 
id. at 1249 (Bench J., dissenting) ("under the statute, there need be only a 
contract to sell and not necessarily an actual sale"). 
In this case, Boyd clearly and sufficiently alleged the existence of an 
enforceable contract for the purchase of the stock of Harmon City. Given such 
allegations, for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Boyd had 
(continued...) 
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CONCLUSION 
Dismissal for failure to prosecute with prejudice and on the 
merits is a harsh and permanent result not favored by this Court. 
Boyd does not dispute that a trial court may and should, in an 
appropriate case, exercise its discretion by imposing such a 
sanction. Boyd respectfully submits, however, that dismissal with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute should be reserved for cases of 
misconduct, contempt for court orders or rules, or extraordinarily 
long periods of inactivity — none of which are present in this 
case. At a minimum, Boyd should be allowed to proceed against the 
Harmon defendants because Boyd moved the trial court for a 
scheduling conference before those defendants filed their motion to 
dismiss. Finally, the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that Boyd had failed to state a claim under the Utah 
Securities Act. 
In light of the foregoing, Boyd respectfully requests that the 
Court reverse the trial court's decision to dismiss Boyd's claims 
with prejudice and remand to the trial court for additional 
proceedings. 
60( . . .continued) 
established his standing to sue under the Act. Accordingly, there was no 
alternate basis for the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss 
Boyd's securities fraud claim, and summary affirmance of that dismissal by this 
Court is inappropriate. 
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655 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 5 
TITLE H. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND 
ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An 
appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court 
to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from 
all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided 
by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial 
court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an 
appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but 
is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or 
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of 
attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties 
are entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their 
interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file 
a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another 
party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appel-
lant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the 
appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, 
or by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal 
shall be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the 
appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be 
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise 
directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the 
appellate court, the party making the original application 
shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the 
respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal 
shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall 
designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed 
from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; 
and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the 
appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by 
serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of 
record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party 
is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's 
last known address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the 
time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a 
civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of 
the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and 
also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal 
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of 
appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of 
appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docketing fee, and a 
copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the 
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate 
court. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the 
docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the 
appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the 
title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant 
identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of 
the appellant, such name shall be added to the title. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in 
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the 
trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required 
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered 
in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial 
court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under 
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be 
required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or 
amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the 
time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the 
order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other 
such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any 
party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for 
an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a 
defendant, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or 
denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before 
the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. 
Anew notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court 
disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except 
as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal 
filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order 
but before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court 
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of 
appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of 
appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice 
of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by 
paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later 
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of 
the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court 
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of 
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in 
accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No 
extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 
days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, 
whichever occurs later. 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory or-
ders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from 
an interlocutory order may be sought by any party by filing a 
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order 
with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial 
court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A 
timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines 
is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be 
considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission 
to appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may 
direct the appellant to file a petition that conforms to the 
requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented 
to the Supreme Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court an original and five copies of the 
petition, together with the fee required by statute. For a 
petition presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall 
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designation in any official publication of the statutes or 
ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice 
thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary 
in an action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic 
facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defam-
atory matter out of which the action arose; but it is 
sufficient to state generally that the same was published 
or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is 
controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter 
must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or 
spoken. 
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for 
libel or slander, the defendant may allege both the truth of 
the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating 
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, 
whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in 
evidence the mitigating circumstances. 
Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary infor-
mation. All pleadings and other papers filed with the court 
shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the 
title of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading or 
other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the 
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall 
include the names of all the parties, but other pleadings and 
papers need only state the name of the first party on each side 
with an indication that there are other parties. A party whose 
name is not known shall be designated by any name and the 
words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, 
unknown parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons 
who claim any interest in the subject matter of the action." 
Every pleading and other paper filed with the court shall also 
state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of 
any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which 
information shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first 
page. Every pleading shall state the name and address of the 
party for whom it is filed; this information shall appear in the 
lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading. 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of 
claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the 
contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable 
to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a para-
graph may be referred to by number in all succeeding plead-
ings. Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or 
occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated 
in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facili-
tates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a 
pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the 
same pleading or in another pleading, or in any motion. An 
exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes. 
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings 
and other papers filed with the court, except printed docu-
ments or other exhibits, shall be typewritten, printed or 
photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed paper of 
letter size (8 Va." x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 
inches above any typed material, a left-hand margin of not 
less than 1 inch, a right-hand margin of not less than one-half 
inch, and a bottom margin of not less than one-half inch. All 
typing or printing shall be clearly legible, shall be double-
spaced, except for matters customarily single-spaced or in-
dented, and shall not be smaller than pica size. Typing or 
printing shall appear on one side of the page only. 
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under 
all signature lines, and all signatures shall be made in 
permanent black or blue ink. 
(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. 
The clerk of the court shall examine all pleadings and other 
papers filed with the court. If they are not prepared in 
conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing but 
may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers 
for nonconforming papers. The clerk or the court may waive 
the requirements of this rule for parties appearing pro se. For 
good cause shown, the court may relieve any party of any 
requirement of this rule. 
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original 
pleading or paper filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the 
court may, upon motion, with or without notice, authorize a 
copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.) 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other pa-
pers; sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney 
of record in his individual name who is duly licensed to 
practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address also shall 
be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his 
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule 
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by 
affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two wit-
nesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circum-
stances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certification by him that he has read the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a 
pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, 
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the 
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose 
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an 
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the 
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other 
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer 
within twenty days after the service of the summons and 
complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by 
statute or order of the court. A party served with a pleading 
stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer 
thereto within twenty days after the service upon him. The 
plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer 
within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is 
ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the 
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a 
motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, 
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its 
disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the 
court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite 
statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within 
ten days after the service of the more definite statement. 
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(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim 
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack 
of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insuf-
ficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) 
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further 
pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by 
being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a 
claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to 
serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any 
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not ex-
cluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 
56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the 
pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the 
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enu-
merated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in 
a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment men-
tioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and 
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the 
court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be 
deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to 
which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or 
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to 
frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite 
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The 
motion shall point out the defects complained of and the 
details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the 
court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or 
within such other time as the court may fix, the court may 
strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make 
such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before 
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is 
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 
twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, the 
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scan-
dalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a 
motion under this rule may join with it the other motions 
herein provided for and then available to him. If a party 
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this 
rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter 
make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so 
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
fh) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and 
objections which he does not present either by motion as 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure 
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to 
state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the 
pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise 
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the 
court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if 
made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) 
in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a 
responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made 
pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such 
motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When 
the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a foreign 
corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the 
plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may 
be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determi-
nation by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the 
court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking 
with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs 
and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No 
security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or 
agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff 
fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the 
service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the 
defendant, enter an order dismissing the action, 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as 
a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the 
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for 
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the 
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not 
state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the 
claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the 
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or 
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to 
render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is 
not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a 
counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter 
of the opposing party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counter-
claim may or may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought 
by the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding in amount 
or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the 
opposing party. 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after plead-
ing. A claim which either matured or was acquired by the 
pleader after serving his pleading may, with the permission of 
the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental 
pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up 
a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable 
neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set 
up the counterclaim by amendment. 
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state 
as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party 
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-
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Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and man-
agement conferences. 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its 
discretion or upon motion of a party, may direct the attorneys 
for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before 
it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes 
as: 
(1) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that 
the case will not be protracted for lack of management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more 
thorough preparation; 
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and 
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the orderly 
disposition of the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. In any 
action, in addition to any pretrial conferences that may be 
scheduled, the court in its discretion may direct that a 
scheduling or management conference be held. The court may 
direct the attorneys or unrepresented parties to appear before 
the court. Scheduling or management conferences may also be 
held by way of telephone conferencing between the court and 
counsel as the particular case may require. Decisions and 
agreements reached at scheduling and management confer-
ences may be formally made an order of the court. At the 
conference, the court may consider the following matters: 
(1) the formation and simplification of the issues, in-
cluding the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses; 
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining additional 
parties or amendment of pleadings; 
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery; 
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions; 
(5) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of 
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof, stipula-
tions regarding the authenticity of documents, and ad-
vance rulings from the court on admissibility of evidence; 
(6) the identification of witnesses and documents, the 
need for and schedule for filing and exchanging trial 
briefs, and the dates for a final pretrial and scheduling 
conference and for a trial; 
(7) the advisability of referring matters to a lower court 
that has appropriate jurisdiction to hear the case; 
(8) the possibility of settlement; 
(9) the need for adopting special procedures for man-
aging particularly difficult or protracted actions that may 
involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal 
questions, or unusual proof problems; 
(10) the form and substance of a pretrial order, if it is 
determined that a formal pretrial order is necessary in 
the particular case; and 
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of 
the case. 
(c) Final pretrial or settlement conferences. In any 
action where a final pretrial conference has been ordered, it 
shall be held as close to the time of trial as reasonable under 
the circumstances. The conference shall be attended by at 
least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of 
the parties, and the attorneys attending the pretrial, unless 
waived by the court, shall have available, either in person or 
by telephone, the appropriate parties who have authority to 
make binding decisions regarding settlement. 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey 
a scheduling or pretrial order, if no appearance is made on 
behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a 
party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to 
participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney 
fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its 
own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as 
are just, and among others, any of the orders provided in Rule 
37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any other 
sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney 
representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, includ-
ing attorney fees, unless the court finds that the noncompli-
ance was substantially justified or that other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
PART IV. 
PARTIES. 
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, 
administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a 
party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made 
for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may 
sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose 
benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, 
an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in 
the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on 
the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed 
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action 
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and 
such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same 
effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
real party in interest. 
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an 
insane or incompetent person who is a party must appear 
either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem 
appointed in the particular case by the court in which the 
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in 
any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action or 
proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, 
insane or incompetent person in the action or proceeding, 
notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian 
and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem 
it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any 
unknown party who might be a minor or an incompetent 
person. 
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad 
litem appointed by a court must be appointed as follows: 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of 
the minor, if the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or 
if under that age, upon the application of a relative or 
friend of the minor. 
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application 
of the minor if the minor is of the age of fourteen years 
and applies within 20 days after the service of the 
summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so 
to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend 
of the minor, or of any other party to the action. 
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, 
the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to an 
order designating some suitable person to be guardian ad 
litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or 
someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after 
service of notice of such motion shall cause to be ap-
pointed a guardian for such minor. Service of such notice 
may be made upon the defendant's general or testamen-
tary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is 
none, such notice, together with the summons in the 
action, shall be served in the manner provided for publi-
cation of summons upon such minor, if over fourteen years 
of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such service on 
the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad 
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(c) Right of party examined to other medical reports. 
At the time of making an order to submit to an examination 
under Subdivision (a) of this rule, the court shall, upon motion 
of the party to be examined, order the party seeking such 
examination to furnish to the party to be examined a report of 
any examination previously made or medical treatment pre-
viously given by any examiner employed directly or indirectly 
by the party seeking the order for a physical or mental 
examination, or at whose instance or request such medical 
examination or treatment has previously been conducted. If 
the party seeking the examination refuses to deliver such 
report, the court on motion and notice may make an order 
requiring delivery on such terms as are just; and if an 
examiner fails or refuses to make such a report the court may 
exclude the examiner's testimony if offered at the trial, or may 
make such other order as is authorized under Rule 37. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Rule 36. Request for admission. 
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any 
other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of 
the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the 
scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to 
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to 
fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in 
the request. The request for admission shall contain a notice 
advising the party to whom the request is made that, pursu-
ant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless 
said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the 
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may 
allow. Copies of documents shall be served with the request 
unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made 
available for inspection and copying. The request may, without 
leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commence-
ment of the action and upon any other party with or after 
service of the summons and complaint upon that party. 
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be 
separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within 
thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter 
or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the 
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the 
matter, signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless the 
court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to 
serve answers or objections before the expiration of 45 days 
after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If 
objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The 
answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail 
the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit 
or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of 
the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a 
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of 
which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it 
as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering 
party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a 
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has 
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or 
readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit 
or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an 
admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for 
trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he 
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or 
set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
The party who has requested the admissions may move to 
determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless 
the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall 
order that an answer be served. If the court determines that 
an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, 
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an 
amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these 
orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made 
at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to trial. 
The provisions of Rule 37(aX4) apply to the award of expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this 
rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion 
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject 
to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial 
order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to 
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice 
him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any 
admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose 
of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for 
any other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other 
proceeding. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; 
sanctions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, 
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons af-
fected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as 
follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to 
a party may be made to the court in which the action is 
pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the 
court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
An application for an order to a deponent who is not a 
party shall be made to the court in the district where the 
deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question 
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a 
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation 
under Rule 30(bX6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an 
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 
34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as 
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the 
discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspec-
tion in accordance with the request. When taking a 
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the 
question may complete or adjourn the examination before 
he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may 
make such protective order as it would have been empow-
ered to make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of 
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be 
treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is 
granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated 
the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct 
or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable 
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attor-
ney fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the 
motion was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney 
advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or 
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in opposing the motion, including attor-
ney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the 
motion was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the 
court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in 
relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a 
just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposi-
tion is taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer 
a question after being directed to do so by the court in the 
district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure 
may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. 
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a 
party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) 
to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to 
provide or permit discovery, including an order made 
under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party 
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the court 
in which the action is pending may make such orders in 
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the 
following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the 
order was made or any other designated facts shall be 
taken to be established for the purposes of "tie action 
in accordance with the claim of the party - staining 
the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient 
party to support or oppose designated claims or 
defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing desig-
nated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts 
thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any 
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in 
addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of 
court the failure to obey any orders except an order to 
submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an 
order under Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce 
another for examination, such orders as are listed in 
Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, 
unless the party failing to comply shows that he is 
unable to produce such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition 
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey 
the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by 
the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make 
an award of expenses unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit 
the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the 
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document 
or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an 
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable 
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable 
attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds 
that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 
36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial 
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable 
ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) 
there was other g<n>a reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or 
serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request 
for inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or managing 
agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(bX6) or 
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the 
officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a 
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrog-
atories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the 
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request 
for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of 
the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion 
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and 
among others it may take any action authorized under Para-
graphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (bX2) of this rule. In lieu 
of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the 
party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by 
the failure, unless the court finds that the ^'Uire was sub-
stantially justified or that other circumstance^ n:%&e an award 
of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be 
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objection-
able unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective 
order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discov-
ery plan. If a party or his attorney fails to participate in good 
faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is 
required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for 
hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other 
party the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused 
by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
PART VI. 
TRIALS. 
Rule 38. Jury trial of right. 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared 
by the constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved to 
the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any 
issue triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee 
and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in 
writing at any time after the commencement of the action and 
not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a 
pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: Specification of issues. In his demand a party 
may specify the issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he 
shall be i-emed to have demanded trial by jury for all the 
issues - ible. If he has demanded trial by jury for only 
some o. «ae issues, any other party, within 10 days after 
service of the demand or such lesser time as the court may 
order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all 
of the issues of fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, 
to serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as 
required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by 
jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may 
not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as 
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the 
register of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues so 
demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written 
stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation 
made in open court and entered in the record, consent to 
trial by the court sitting without a jury, or 
(2^ The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds 
that c right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues 
does not exist, or 
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(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as 
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwith-
standing the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in 
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court 
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any 
or all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not 
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own 
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the 
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose 
verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter 
of right. 
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall pro-
vide by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar 
(1) without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party 
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as 
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute. 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, 
the court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be 
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such post-
ponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence 
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of 
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due 
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also 
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon 
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and 
if the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence 
would be given, and that it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the 
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present If required 
by the adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such 
postponement, proceed to have the testimony of any witness 
present taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and the 
testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same 
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made 
with respect to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 
32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B)]. 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable 
statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff 
without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at 
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer 
or of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have 
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the 
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without 
Prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who 
has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of 
any state an action based on or including the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Para-
graph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall 
not be dismissed at the plaintiff^ instance save upon 
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as 
the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been 
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of 
the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be 
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adju-
dication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the 
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without preju-
dice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of 
the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action 
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may 
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the 
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier 
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment 
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall 
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in 
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under 
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this 
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal 
of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A vol-
untary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph 
(1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a 
responsive pleading is served or, if there is none, before the 
introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff 
who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an 
action based upon or including the same claim against the 
same defendant, the court may make such order for the 
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may 
deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until 
the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse 
party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision 
(a)(lXi) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed 
such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such 
provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court 
to the adverse party against whom such provisional remedy 
was obtained. 
Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials. 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common 
question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may 
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue 
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it 
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may 
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of conve-
nience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any 
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of 
any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, 
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues. 
Rule 43. Evidence. 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be 
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these 
ru)es, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state. AU 
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court. 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts 
not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on 
affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court 
may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral 
testimony or depositions. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may 
specify or limit his powers and may direct him to report only 
upon particular issues or to do or perform particular acts or to 
receive and report evidence only and may fix the time and 
place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing 
of the master's report. Subject to the specifications and limi-
tations stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise 
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before 
him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or 
proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the 
order. He may require the production before him of evidence 
upon all matters embraced in the reference, including the 
production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and 
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the admissibil-
ity of evidence unless otherwise directed by the order of 
reference and has the authority to put witnesses on oath and 
may himself examine them and may call the parties to the 
action and examine them upon oath. When a party so re-
quests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered 
and excluded in the same manner and subject to the same 
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence for a 
court sitting without a jury. 
(d) Proceedings. 
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the clerk 
shall forthwith furnish the master with a copy of the order 
of reference. Upon receipt thereof unless the order of 
reference otherwise provides, the master shall forthwith 
set a time and place for the first meeting of the parties or 
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after the date of 
the order of reference and shall notify the parties or their 
attorneys. It is the duty of the master to proceed with all 
reasonable diligence. Either party, on notice to the parties 
and master, may apply to the court for an order requiring 
the master to speed the proceedings and to make his 
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and place 
appointed, the master may proceed ex parte or, in his 
discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a future day, giving 
notice to the absent party of the adjournment. 
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the atten-
dance of witnesses before the master by the issuance and 
service of subpoenas as provided in Rule 45. If without 
adequate excuse a witness fails to appear or give evi-
dence, he may be punished as for a contempt and be 
subjected to the consequences, penalties, and remedies 
provided in Rules 37 and 45. 
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of account-
ing are in issue before the master, he may prescribe the 
form in which the accounts shall be submitted and in any 
proper case may require or receive in evidence a state-
ment by a certified public accountant who is called as a 
witness. Upon objection of a party to any of the items thus 
submitted or upon a showing that the form of statement is 
insufficient, the master may require a different form of 
statement to be furnished, or the accounts or specific 
items thereof to be proved by oral examination of the 
accounting parties or upon written interrogatories or in 
6uch other manner as he directs. 
(e) Report. 
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall prepare a 
report upon the matters submitted to him by the order of 
reference and, if required to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, he shall set them forth in the report. 
He shall file the report with the clerk of the court and in 
an action to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise 
directed by the order of reference, shall file with it a 
transcript of the proceedings and of the evidence and the 
original exhibits. The clerk shall forthwith mail to all 
parties notice of the filing. 
(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be tried 
without a jury the court shall accept the master's findings 
of fact unless clearly erroneous. Within 10 days after 
being served with notice of the filing of the report any 
party may serve written objections thereto upon the other 
parties. Application to the court for action upon the report 
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion and upon 
notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The court after hearing 
may adopt the report or may modify it or may reject it in 
whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may 
recommit it with instructions. 
(3) In jury actions. In an action to be tried by a jury 
the master shall not be directed to report the evidence. 
His findings upon the issues submitted to him are admis-
sible as evidence of the matters found and may be read to 
the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any 
objections in point of law which may be made to the 
report. 
(4) Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a mas-
ter's report is the same whether or not the parties have 
consented to the reference; but, when the parties stipulate 
that a master's findings of fact shall be final, only ques-
tions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be 
considered. 
(5) Draft report. Before filing his report a master may 
submit a draft thereof to counsel for all parties for the 
purpose of receiving their suggestions. 
(f) Objections to appointment of master. A party may 
object to the appointment of any person as a master on the 
same grounds as a party may challenge for cause any prospec-
tive trial juror in the trial of a civil action. Such objections 
must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same 
manner as a motion. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
PARTVH. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules 
includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of 
a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving 
multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment 
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that there is 
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the 
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however desig-
nated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a 
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against 
one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the 
justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate 
rights of the parties on each side as between or among 
themselves. 
Rule 55 UTAri KULiHid u r ^ i v i u JL XV 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default 
shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, 
that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) l b whom awarded. Except when express provi-
sion therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in 
these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; pro-
vided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for 
review is taken, costs of th- action, other than costs in 
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the fina. determination of the cause. 
Costs against the state of ^ tan, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs 
must within five days after the entry of judgment serve 
upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and 
necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the 
court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct >nd that 
the disbursements have been necessarily incurr m the 
action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with :ne costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the 
memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of 
costs taxed by the court in which the judgment was 
rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the 
verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and 
filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but 
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be con-
sidered as served and filed on the date judgment is 
entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. 
The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any 
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs 
have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not in-
cluded in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank 
left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment 
docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear the clerk shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the 
default of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of 
this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in 
default any notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve 
any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules t 
be served on a party to the action or proceeding, except a 
provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event tha 
it is necessary for the court to conduct a hearing with 
regard to the amount of damages of the nondefaulting 
party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as 
follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a 
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by 
computation be made certain, and the defendant has been 
personally served otherwise than by publication or by 
personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon 
request of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if he has 
been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not an 
infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled 
to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. 
If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to 
determine the amount of damages or to establish the 
truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of an ther matter, the court may conduct such 
hearings or » aer such references as it deems necessary 
and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court 
may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The 
provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the 
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a 
party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of 
Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency 
thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the 
state of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or with-
out supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as 
to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in charac-
ter, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
-vidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if prac-
ticable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good 
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specify-
ing the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceed-
ings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial 
shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense re-
quired. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
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ARTICLE 9. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND JUVENILE PRACTICE. 
RULE 
4-901. Notice requirements for cases pending in both district 
or circuit court and juvenile court. 
4-902. Certification of district court cases to juvenile court. 
4-903. Uniform custody evaluations. 
4-904. Repealed. 
4-905. Domestic pretrial conferences and orders. 
4-906. Guardian ad litem program. 
4-907. Mandatory divorce education. 
4-908. [Reserved.] 
4-909. Mandatory divorce mediation. 
4-910. Sanctions for denial of child visitation. 
4-911. Motion and order for payment of costs and fees. 
4-912. Child support worksheets. 
ARTICLE 1. 
CALENDAR MANAGEMENT. 
Rule 4-101. Calendaring court sessions. 
Intent: 
lb establish a procedure for calendaring court sessions and 
cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) The clerk of court of record shall, prior to October 1 of 
each year, schedule the time for holding court for each court 
site within that courts jurisdiction. 
(2) The clerk of court shall annually prepare a court calen-
dar which shall include: 
(A) The locations within that court's jurisdiction in 
which court will be held. 
(B) The dates when court will be held. 
(3) The calendar shall be submitted to the Administrative 
Office prior to October 1 of each year. Calendars shall run from 
January 1 through December 31 of the following year. 
(4) The calendar shall be posted in a conspicuous location at 
the appropriate courthouse. 
(Amended effective April 15, 1995.) 
Rule 4-102. Law and motion calendar. 
Intent: 
Tb establish a uniform procedure of scheduling matters on 
the law and motion calendar. 
Tb establish uniform notice requirements and filing dead-
lines for law and motion matters. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil and criminal proceedings in 
the District and Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Law and motion matters, 
(A) In multi-judge districts, law and motion matters 
arising in connection with a case which has been assigned 
for all purposes to a particular judge shall be heard by the 
assigned judge. 
(B) If the assigned judge is unavailable, the case shall 
not be assigned or transferred to any other judge for 
handling without the approval of the presiding judge. 
(2) Notice and filing requirements. 
(A) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring 
written notice shall be heard only after written notice 
served no less than five days prior to the date of the 
hearing, unless the court for good cause shown orders the 
period of time for notice of hearing shortened. 
(B) Affidavits in support of law and motion matters 
must be filed with the motion or memorandum of points 
and authorities supporting or opposing the motion. Other 
documents filed in support of or in opposition to law and 
motion matters, including returns of service on supple-
mental orders, orders to show cause and bench warrants, 
must be filed in the clerk's office at least two working days 
before the hearing on the matter, together with a copy of 
the signed order showing the date and time of the re-
quired appearance. 
(C) Proceedings based upon supporting documents 
which are not filed in accordance with this rule may be 
dismissed. 
(3) Ex-parte matters, stipulated matters and supple-
mental proceedings. 
(A) Ex-parte matters based upon stipulations may be 
presented at any time to the assigned judge. Proceedings 
on the law and motion calendar involving the taking of 
evidence may be heard after those not requiring the 
taking of evidence. Add-ons may be heard on the day set 
for hearing, provided proper notice has been given and the 
convenience of the court permits such hearing. 
(B) Motions for supplemental proceedings may be set 
on the weekly supplemental proceedings calendar or 
before the judge assigned to the case on the assigned 
judge's regular law and motion calendar. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Rule 4-103. Civil calendar management. 
Intent: 
lb establish a procedure which allows the trial courts to 
manage civil case processing. 
Tb reduce the time between case filing and disposition. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) If a default judgment has not been entered by the 
plaintiff within 60 days of the availability of default, the clerk 
shall mail written notification to the plaintiff stating that 
absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in the 
notification, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice 
for lack of prosecution. 
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been served 
and filed within 180 days of the filing date, the clerk shall mail 
written notification to the parties stating that absent a show-
ing of good cause by a date specified in the notification, the 
court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of 
prosecution. 
(3) Any party may, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, move to vacate a dismissal entered under this rule. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; May 1, 1993; May 15, 
1994.) 
Rule 4-104. Request for trial setting. 
Intent: 
lb establish a procedure for the assignment of trial dates, 
lb provide firm and timely trial dates in civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit Courts. 
TabH 
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with 
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small 
claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con-
tain, if known, the judgment debtor's address or last known address and social 
security number. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was 
made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff" or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint 
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation. 
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court, 
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agree-
ment which has not been reduced to writing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; April 15, 1995.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- The 1995 amendment rewrote Subdivision 
ment added the final sentence to the Intent (6) after "shall contain," which had read "the 
paragraph, deleted "and not of record" follow- address or the last known address of the judg-
ing "courts of record" in the Applicability para- ment debtor and the social security number of 
graph, and added Subdivision (10). the judgment debtor if known." 
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CHAPTER 2 
SUPREME COURT 
Section 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice and 
associate chief justice — Selection and func-
tions. 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
78-2-3. Repealed. 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
78-2-5. Repealed. 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
78-2-7. Repealed. 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice 
and associate chief justice — Selection and 
functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed 
initially to serve until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten 
years and commences on the first Monday in January follow-
ing the date of election. A justice whose term expires may 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief 
justice from among the members of the court by a majority 
vote of all justices. The term of the office of chief justice is four 
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief 
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be 
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 
days of a vacancy in tha t office, the associate chief justice shall 
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to 
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of 
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by 
law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The 
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years. The 
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be 
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice deter-
mines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice. 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate 
chief justice as consistent with law. 1990 
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6. Repealed . 1971,1081 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer 
Questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and 
Process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
^ d decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
, (3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
Jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over. 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of 
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division 
of Sovereign Lands and Forestry; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a statute of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 1995 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. S u p r e m e C o u r t — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and pract ice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
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Chapter 
2b Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certifi-
cation 
3 Securities and Securities Transfer Agents [Re-
pealed] 
4 Take-Over Offers for Equity Securities [Re-
pealed] 
5 Corporate Take-Overs [Repealed] 
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CHAPTER 1 
UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Section 
61-1-1 
61-1-2 
61-1-3 
61-1-4 
61-1-5 
61-1-6 
61-1-7 
61-1-8 
61-1-9 
61-1-10 
61-1-11 
61-1-12 
61-1-13 
61-1-14 
61-1-14 5 
61-1-16 
61-1-17 
61-1-18 
61-1-18 1 
61-1-18 2 
61-1-18 3 
61-1-18 4 
61-1-18 5 
61-1-18 6 
61-1-18 7 
61-1-19 
61-1-20 
61-1-21 
61-1-21 1 
61-1-21 5 
61-1-22 
61-1-23 
61-1-24 
61-1-25 
61-1-26 
61-1-27 
61-1-28 
61-1-29 
61-1-30 
Fraud unlawful 
Investment adviser — Unlawful acts 
Licensing of broker-dealers, agents, 
and investment advisers 
Licensing procedure 
Posthcensmg provisions 
Denial, suspension, revocation, can-
cellation, or withdrawal of license 
Registration before sale 
Registration by notification 
Registration by coordination 
Registration by qualification 
Provisions applicable to registration 
generally 
Denial, suspension, and revocation of 
registration 
Definitions 
Exemptions 
Burden of proving exemption 
FJJJJ?^ of sa)as hterature 
False statements unlawful 
No finding by division on merits — 
Contrary representation unlawful 
Division of Securities established — 
Director — Appointment — Func-
tions 
Technical experts and specialists — 
Employment — Contracts 
Budget — Annual report 
Information obtained by division — 
Use for personal benefit prohibited 
— Disclosure 
Fees collected by division 
Securities Advisory Board established 
— Appointment — Duties — Quali-
fications — Terms — Vacancies — 
Meetings — Conflicts of interest — 
Compensation 
Procedures — Adjudicative proceed-
ings 
Funding of securities investor educa-
tion and training 
Investigations authorized 
Enforcement 
Penalties for violations 
Limitation of prosecutions 
Legaf counsef — Prosecutions 
Sales and purchases in violation — 
Remedies — Limitation of actions 
Review of orders 
Rules, forms, and orders of division 
Record of registrations 
Scope of the act — Service of process 
Construction of chapter 
Citation of chapter 
Savings clause 
Prior law repealed — Savings clause 
61-1-1. Fraud unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person, m connection with 
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly
 0 
indirectly to 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in orxfer to make the statements made, m the 
light of the circumstances under which they are 
made, not misleading, or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person
 198J 
61-1-2. Investment adviser — Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who receives any 
consideration from another person primarily for ad-
vising the other person as to the value of securities or 
their purchase or sale, whether through the issuance 
of analyses or reports or otherwise to 
(a) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud the other person, 
(b) engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon the other person, or 
(c) divide or otherwise split any consideration 
with any person not licensed under this chapter 
as an investment advisor or investment adviser 
representative 
(2) (a) Except as may be permitted by rule of the 
division, it is unlawful for any investment ad-
viser to enter into, extend, or renew any invest-
ment advisory contract unless it provides in writ-
mg that 
d) the investment adviser shall not be 
compensated on the basis of a share of capi-
tal gams upon or capital appreciation of the 
funds or any portion of the funds of the cli-
ent, 
(n) no assignment of the contract may be 
made by the investment adviser without the 
consent of the other party to the contract; 
and 
(in) the investment adviser, if a partner-
ship, shall notify the other party to the con-
tract of any change in the membership of the 
partnership within a reasonable time after 
the change 
(b) Subsection 61-l-2(2)(a)(i) does not prohibit 
an investment advisory contract which provides 
for compensation based upon the total value of a 
fund averaged over a definite period, or as of defi-
nite dates or taken as of a definite date 
(c) "Assignment," as used in Subsection 
61-l-2(2)(a)(n), includes any direct or indirect 
transfer or hypothecation of an investment advi-^  
sory contract by the assignor or of a controlling 
block of the assignor's outstanding voting secun-
ties by a security holder of the assignor ^ 
(d) If the investment adviser is a partnership, 
no assignment of an investment advisory con-
tract is considered to result from the death or 
withdrawal of a minority of the members of the 
investment adviser having only a minority inter-
est in the business of the investment adviser, or 
from the admission to the investment adviser ot, 
one or more members who, after admission, will 
be only a minority of the members and will havei 
only a minority interest in the business 
3) It is unlawful for any investment adviser to 
•e or have custody of any securities or funds of any 
' t if: 
(a) the division by rule prohibits custody; or 
(b) in the absence of a rule, the investment 
Jadviser fails to notify the division that he has or 
"may have custody. 
tj The division may by rule adopt exemptions 
Subsections 61-l-2(2)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) where 
exemptions are consistent with the public inter-
gnd within the purposes fairly intended by the 
Jicy and provisions of this chapter. 1993 
f.1-3. Licensing of broker-dealers, agents, and 
investment advisers. 
) It is unlawful for any person to transact busi-
in this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless 
person is licensed under this chapter. 
!) (a) It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or is-
suer to employ or engage an agent unless the 
agent is licensed. The license of an agent is not 
" iffective during any period when he is not associ-
a ted with a particular broker-dealer licensed un-
ler this chapter or a particular issuer, 
(b) When an agent begins or terminates a con-
lection with a broker-dealer or issuer, or begins 
'or terminates those activities which make him 
tan agent, the agent as well as the broker-dealer 
Vor issuer shall promptly notify the division, 
t) It is unlawful for any person to transact busi-
in this state as an investment adviser or as an 
iment adviser representative unless: 
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter; or 
(b) the person's only clients in this state are 
^investment companies as defined in the Invest-
m e n t Company Act of 1940, other investment ad-
visers, broker-dealers, banks, trust companies, 
^savings and loan associations, insurance compa-
zines, employee benefit plans with assets of not 
tiless than $1,000,000, and governmental agencies 
or instrumentalities, whether acting for them-
i$elves or as trustees with investment control, or 
vother institutional investors as are designated by 
So rule or order of the director; or 
;e/ (c) the person has no place of business in this 
state and during any period of 12 consecutive 
imonths does not direct business communications 
pin this state in any manner to more than five 
clients, other than those specified in Subsection 
,<n (b), whether or not the person or any of those to 
'i whom the communications are directed is then 
i< present in this state. 
[4). (a) It is unlawful for any investment adviser 
} required to be licensed to employ an investment 
[j adviser representative unless the investment ad-
viser representative is licensed under this chap-
ter, 
ft •• (b) The license of an investment adviser repre-
sentative is effective during the period when the 
person is employed by an investment adviser li-
ij, censed under this chapter. 
&'< (c) When an investment adviser representa-
t i v e begins or terminates employment with an 
investment adviser, both the investment adviser 
CL\.and the investment adviser representative shall 
B Promptly notify the division. 1991 
f* 
*7i\"*" k* c e n s*nS procedure. 
gft) (a) A broker-dealer, agent, investment adviser, 
or investment adviser representative must ob-
tain an initial or renewal license by filing with 
the division or its designee an application to-
gether with a consent to service of process under 
Section 61-1-26. 
(b) The application shall contain whatever in-
formation the division by rule requires concern-
ing such matters as: 
(i) the applicant's form and place of orga-
nization; 
(ii) the applicant's proposed method of do-
ing business; 
(iii) the qualifications and business his-
tory of the applicant; in the case of a broker-
dealer or investment adviser, the qualifica-
tions and business history of any partner, 
officer, or director, any person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar func-
tions, or any person directly or indirectly 
controlling the broker-dealer or investment 
adviser; 
(iv) any injunction or administrative or-
der or conviction of a misdemeanor involving 
a security or any aspect of the securities 
business and any conviction of a felony; and 
(v) the applicant's financial condition and 
history. 
(c) The division may, by rule or order, require 
an applicant for an initial license to publish an 
announcement of the application in one or more 
specified newspapers published in this state. 
(d) Licenses of broker-dealers, agents, invest-
ment advisers, and investment adviser represen-
tatives shall expire on December 31 of each year. 
(e) (i) If no denial order is in effect and no pro-
ceeding is pending under Section 61-1-6, a 
license becomes effective at noon of the 30th 
day after an application is filed. 
(ii) The division may by rule or order spec-
ify an earlier effective date and may by order 
defer the effective date until noon of the 30th 
day after the filing of any amendment. 
(iii) Licensing of a broker-dealer automat-
ically constitutes licensing of only one part-
ner, officer, director, or a person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar func-
tions as a licensed agent of the broker-
dealer. 
(iv) Licensing of an investment adviser 
automatically constitutes licensing of only 
one partner, officer, director, or a person oc-
cupying a similar status or performing simi-
lar functions. 
(2) (a) Every applicant for an initial or renewal 
license shall pay a reasonable filing fee as deter-
mined under Section 61-1-18.4. 
(b) If the license or renewal is not granted or 
the application is withdrawn, the division shall 
retain the fee. 
(3) A licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser 
may file an application for licensing of a successor for 
the unexpired portion of the year. There shall be no 
filing fee. 
(4) The division may by rule require a minimum 
capital for licensed broker-dealers and establish min-
imum financial requirements for investment ad-
visers, which may include different requirements for 
those investment advisers who maintain custody of or 
have discretionary authority over client funds or se-
curities and those investment advisers who do not. 
(5) (a) The division may by rule require licensed 
broker-dealers and investment advisers who 
have custody of or discretionary authority over 
client funds or securities to post surety bonds and 
may by rule determine the conditions and the 
amounts of the bonds. 
(b) Any appropriate deposit of cash or securi-
ties may be accepted in lieu of any required bond. 
(c) No bond may be required of any licensee 
whose net capital, or in the case of an investment 
adviser whose minimum financial requirements, 
which may be defined by rule, exceeds $30,000. 
(d) Every bond shall provide for suit on the 
bond by any person who has a cause of action 
under Section 61-1-22 and, if the division by rule 
or order requires, by any person who has a cause 
of action not arising under this chapter. 
(e) Every bond shall provide that no suit may 
be maintained to enforce any liability on the 
bond unless brought before the expiration of four 
years after the act or transaction constituting the 
violation or the expiration of two years after the 
discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting 
the violation, whichever expires first. 1991 
61-1-5. Postlicensing provisions. 
(1) (a) Every licensed broker-dealer and invest-
ment adviser shall make and keep such accounts, 
correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and 
other records as the division by rule prescribes. 
(b) All required records shall be preserved for 
three years unless the division by rule prescribes 
otherwise for particular types of records. 
(2) (a) Every licensed broker-dealer shall, within 
24 hours after demand, furnish to any customer 
or principal for whom the broker-dealer has exe-
cuted any order for the purchase or sale of any 
securities, either for immediate or future deliv-
ery, a written statement showing the time when, 
the place where, and the price at which the secu-
rities were bought and sold. 
(b) With respect to investment advisers, the 
division may require that certain information be 
furnished or disseminated as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors and advisory clients. 
(c) To the extent determined by the director, 
information furnished to clients or prospective 
clients of an investment adviser pursuant to the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the rules 
thereunder may be used in whole or partial satis-
faction of this requirement. 
(3) Every licensed broker-dealer and investment 
adviser shall file financial reports as the division by 
rule prescribes. 
(4) If the information contained in any document 
filed with the division is or becomes inaccurate or 
incomplete in any material respect, the licensee shall 
promptly file a correcting amendment unless notifica-
tion of the correction has been given under Section 
61-1-3. 
(5) (a) All the records referred to in Subsection (1) 
are subject at any time or from time to time to 
reasonable periodic, special, or other examina-
tions by representatives of the division, within or 
without this state, as the division deems neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors. 
(b) For the purpose of avoiding unnecessary 
duplication of examination, the division may co-
operate with the securities administrators of 
other states, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, and national securities exchanges or na-
tional securities associations registered under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 1991 
61-1-6. Denial, suspension, revocation, cancella-
tion, or withdrawal of license. 
(1) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the director, by means of adjudica-
tive proceedings conducted in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, may 
issue an order denying, suspending, or revoking any 
license, barring or censuring any licensee or any offi-
cer, director, partner, or person occupying a similar 
status or performing similar functions for a licensee 
from employment with a licensed broker-dealer or in-
vestment adviser, or restricting or limiting a licensee 
as to any function or activity of the business for 
which a license is required in this state, and may 
impose a fine if the director finds that it is in the 
public interest and if he finds any of the following 
with respect to the applicant or licensee or, in the 
case of a broker-dealer or investment adviser, any 
partner, officer, or director, or any person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions, or any 
person directly or indirectly controlling the broker-
dealer or investment adviser, that the person: 
(a) has filed an application for a license that, 
as of its effective date or as of any date after 
filing in the case of an order denying effective-
ness, was incomplete in any material respect or 
contained any statement that was, in light of the 
circumstances under which it was made, false or 
misleading with respect to any material fact; 
(b) has willfully violated or willfully failed to 
comply with any provision of this chapter or a 
predecessor act or any rule or order under this 
chapter or a predecessor act; 
(c) was convicted, within the past ten years, of 
any misdemeanor involving a security or any as-
pect of the securities business, or any felony; 
(d) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by 
any court of competent jurisdiction from engag-
ing in or continuing any conduct or practice in-
volving any aspect of the securities business; 
(e) is the subject of an order of the director or 
any predecessor denying, suspending, or revok-
ing license as a broker-dealer, agent, investment 
adviser, or investment adviser representative; 
(f) is the subject of: 
(i) an adjudication or determination, 
within the past five years by a securities or 
commodities agency or administrator of an-
other state, Canadian province or territory, 
or a court of competent jurisdiction that the 
person has willfully violated the Securities 
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
Commodity Exchange Act, or the securities 
or commodities law of any other state; or 
(ii) an order entered within the past five 
years by the securities administrator of any 
state or Canadian province or territory or by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission 
denying or revoking license as a broker-
dealer, agent, investment adviser, or invest-
ment adviser representative or the substan-
tial equivalent of those terms or is the sub-
ject of an order of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission suspending or expelling 
the person from a national securities ex-
change or national securities association reg-
istered under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, or is the subject of a United States post 
office fraud order; except that 
(in) the division may not commence 
agency action to revoke or suspend any li-
cense under Subsection (f) more than one 
year from the date of the order relied on, and 
the director may not enter an order under 
Subsection (f) on the basis of an order under 
another state's law unless that order was 
based on facts that would currently consti-
tute a ground for an agency action under this 
section, 
(g) has engaged in dishonest or unethical prac-
tices in the securities business, 
(h) is insolvent, either in the sense that liabili-
ties exceed assets or in the sense that obligations 
cannot be met as they mature, except that the 
director may not enter an order against a broker-
dealer or investment adviser under this subsec-
tion without a finding of insolvency as to the bro-
ker-dealer or investment adviser, 
(1) is not qualified on the basis of the lack of 
training, experience, and knowledge of the secu-
rities business, except as otherwise provided in 
Subsection (3), 
(j) has failed reasonably to supervise his 
agents or employees if the person is a broker-
dealer, or his investment adviser representatives 
or employees if the person is an investment ad-
viser, or 
(k) has failed to pay the proper filing fee 
within 30 days after being notified by the divi-
sion of a deficiency 
(2) The division may enter a denial order under 
Subsection (l)(j) or (k), but shall vacate the order 
when the deficiency has been corrected 
(3) The division may not institute a suspension or 
revocation proceeding on the basis of a fact or trans-
action known to it when the license became effective 
unless the proceeding is instituted within the next 
120 days 
(4) The following provisions govern the application 
of Subsection 61-l-6(l)(i) 
(a) The director may not enter an order 
against a broker-dealer on the basis of the lack of 
qualification of any person other than 
(l) the broker-dealer himself if he is an in-
dividual, or 
(n) an agent of the broker-dealer 
(b) The director may not enter an order 
against an investment adviser on the basis of the 
lack of qualification of any person other than 
d) the investment adviser himself if he is 
an individual, or 
(n) an investment adviser representative 
(c) The director may not enter an order solely 
on the basis of lack of experience if the applicant 
or licensee is qualified by training or knowledge 
(d) The director shall consider that an agent 
who will work under the supervision of a licensed 
broker-dealer need not have the same qualifica-
tions as a broker-dealer and that an investment 
adviser representative who will work under the 
supervision of a licensed investment adviser need 
not have the same qualifications as an invest-
ment adviser 
(e) d) The director shall consider that an in-
vestment adviser is not necessarily qualified 
solely on the basis of experience as a broker-
dealer or agent 
(n) When the director finds that an appli-
cant for a license as a broker-dealer is not 
qualified as an investment adviser, the di-
rector may condition the applicant's license 
as a broker-dealer upon the applicants not 
transacting business in this state as an in-
vestment adviser 
(f) (l) The division may by rule provide for ex-
aminations, which may be written or oral or 
both, to be taken by any class of or all appli-
cants 
(n) The division may by rule or order 
waive the examination requirement as to a 
person or class of persons if the division de-
termines that the examination is not neces-
sary for the protection of investors 
(5) If the director finds that any licensee or appli-
cant for a license is no longer in existence, has ceased 
to do business as a broker-dealer, agent, investment 
adviser, or investment adviser representative, or is 
subject to an adjudication of mental incompetence or 
to the control of a committee, conservator, or guard-
ian, or cannot be located after reasonable search, the 
division may summarily cancel or deny the license or 
application according to the procedures and require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Proce-
dures Act 
(6) (a) Withdrawal from license as a broker-dealer, 
agent, investment adviser, or investment adviser 
representative becomes effective 30 days after re-
ceipt of an application to withdraw or within a 
shorter period of time as determined by the direc-
tor, unless 
(l) a revocation or suspension proceeding 
is pending when the application is filed, 
(n) a proceeding to revoke or suspend or to 
impose conditions upon the withdrawal is in-
stituted within 30 days after the application 
is filed, or 
(in) additional information is requested 
by the division regarding the withdrawal ap-
plication 
(b) (I) If a proceeding described in Subsection 
(5)(a) is pending or instituted, the director 
shall designate by order when and under 
what conditions the withdrawal becomes ef-
fective 
(n) If additional information is requested, 
withdrawal is effective 30 days after the ad-
ditional information is filed 
(c) (l) If no proceeding is pending or instituted, 
and withdrawal automatically becomes ef-
fective, the director ma> initiate a revoca-
tion or suspension proceeding under Section 
61-1-6 within one year after withdrawal be-
came effective 
(n) The director shall enter any order un-
der Subsection (1Kb) as of the last date on 
which the license was effective 1991 
61-1-7. Registration before sale. 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any 
security in this state unless it is registered under this 
chapter or the security or transaction is exempted 
under Section 61-1-14 1983 
61-1-8. Registration by notification. 
(1) The following securities may be registered by 
notification, whether or not they are also eligible for 
registration by coordination under Section 61-1-9 
(a) any security whose issuer and any prede-
cessors have been in continuous operation for at 
least five years if there has been no default dur-
ing the current fiscal year or within the three 
preceding fiscal years in the payment of princi-
pal, interest, or dividends on any security of the 
issuer, or any predecessor with a fixed maturity 
or a fixed interest or dividend provision, and the 
issuer and any predecessors during the past three 
fiscal years have had average net earnings, de 
termined in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles 
(1) which are applicable to all securities 
without a fixed maturity or a fixed interest 
or dividend provision outstanding at the date 
the registration statement is filed and equal 
to at least 5% of the amount of such out-
standing securities, as measured by the max-
imum offering price or the market price on a 
day, selected by the registrant, within 30 
days before the date of filing the registration 
statement, whichever is higher, or book 
value on a day, selected by the registrant, 
within 90 days of the date of filing the regis-
tration statement to the extent that there is 
neither a readily determinable market price 
nor a cash offering price, or 
(n) which, if the issuer and any predeces-
sors have not had any security of the type 
specified in Subsection (l)(a)(i) outstanding 
for three full fiscal years, equal to at least 
5% of the amount, as measured in Subsection 
(l)(a)(i), of all securities which will be out-
standing if all the securities being offered or 
proposed to be offered, whether or not they 
are proposed to be registered or offered in 
this state, are issued, 
(b) any security, other than a certificate of in-
terest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining 
title or lease or in payments out of production 
under such a title or lease, registered for 
nonissuer distribution if any security of the same 
class has ever been registered under this chapter 
or a predecessor act, or the security being regis-
tered was originally issued pursuant to an ex-
emption under this chapter or a predecessor act 
(2) A registration statement under this section 
shall contain the following information and be accom-
panied by the following documents in addition to the 
information specified in Subsection 61-1-11(3) and 
the consent to service of process required by Section 
61-1-26 
(a) a statement demonstrating eligibility for 
registration by notification, 
(b) with respect to the issuer and any signifi-
cant subsidiary 
(I) its name, address, and form of organi-
zation, 
(n) the state or foreign jurisdiction and 
the date of its organization, and 
(m) the general character and location of 
its business, 
(c) with respect to any person on whose behalf 
any part of the offering is to be made in a 
nonissuer distribution 
(2) his name and address, 
(II) the amount of securities of the issuer 
held by him as of the date of the filing of the 
registration statement, and 
(III) a statement of his reasons for making 
the offering, 
(d) a description of the security being regis-
tered, 
(e) the information and documents specified in 
clauses (h), (1), and 0) of Subsection 61-1-10(2), 
and 
(f) in the case of any registration under Sub-
section 61-l-8(l)(b) which does not also satisfy 
the conditions of Subsection 61-l-8(l)(a) 
(I) a balance sheet of the issuer as of a 
date within four months prior to the filing of 
the registration statement, and 
(II) a summary of earnings for each of the 
two fiscal years preceding the date of the bal-
ance sheet and for any period between the 
close of the last fiscal year and the date of 
the balance sheet, or for the period of the 
issuer's and any predecessor's existence if 
less than two years 
(3) If no stop order is in effect and no proceeding is 
pending under Section 61-1-12, a registration state-
ment under this section automatically becomes effec-
tive at 3 p m Mountain Standard Time of the second 
full working day after the filing of the registration 
statement or the last amendment, or at such earlier 
time as the division determines 1991 
61-1-9. Registration by coordination. 
(1) Any secunty for which a registration statement 
or a notification under Regulation A or any successor 
to Regulation A has been filed under the Securities 
Act of 1933 in connection with the same offering may 
be registered by coordination 
(2) A registration statement under this section 
shall contain the following information and be accom-
panied by the following documents in addition to the 
information specified in Subsection 61-1-11(3) and 
the consent to service of process required by Section 
61-1-26 
(a) One copy of the disclosure statement to-
gether with all its amendments filed under the 
Securities Act of 1933, 
(b) If the division by rule or otherwise re-
quires, a copy of the articles of incorporation and 
bylaws or their substantial equivalents currently 
in effect, a copy of any agreements with or among 
underwriters, a copy of any indenture or other 
instrument governing the issuance of the secu-
rity to be registered and a specimen or copy of the 
security, 
(c) If the division requests, any other informa-
tion, or copies of any other documents, filed un-
der the Securities Act of 1933, and 
(d) An undertaking to forward all future 
amendments to the disclosure statement 
promptly and in any event not later than the first 
working day after the day they are forwarded to 
or filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, whichever first occurs 
(3) A registration statement under this section au-
tomatically becomes effective at the moment the dis-
closure statement becomes effective if all the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied 
(a) no stop order is in effect and no proceeding 
is pending under Section 61-1-12, 
(b) the disclosure statement has been on file 
with the division for at least ten working days, 
ancf 
(c) a statement of the maximum and minimum 
proposed offering prices and the maximum un-
derwriting discounts and commissions has been 
on file for two full working days or such shorter 
period as the division permits by rule or other-
wise and the offering is made within those limi-
tations 
(4) (&) The registrant shall promptly notify the di-
vision by telephone or telegram of the date and 
time when the disclosure statement became ef-
fective and the content of the price amendment, 
if any, and shall promptly file a posteffective 
amendment containing the information and doc-
uments in the price amendment. 
(b) "Price amendment" means the final federal 
amendment which includes a statement of the 
offering price, underwriting and selling discounts 
or commissions, amount of proceeds, conversion 
rates, call prices, and other matters dependent 
upon the offering price. 
(5) (a) Upon failure to receive the required notifi-
cation and posteffective amendment with respect 
to the price amendment, the division may enter a 
stop order, without notice or hearing, retroac-
tively denying effectiveness to the registration 
statement or suspending its effectiveness until 
compliance with Subsection (4), if it promptly no-
tifies the registrant by telephone or telegram and 
promptly confirms by letter or telegram when it 
notifies by telephone of the issuance of the order. 
(b) If the registrant proves compliance with 
the requirements of Subsection (4) as to notice 
and posteffective amendment, the stop order is 
void as of the time of its entry. 
(6) The division may by rule or otherwise waive 
either or both of the conditions specified in Subsec-
tions (3)(b) and (3)(c). 
(7) If the disclosure statement becomes effective 
before all the conditions in Subsections (3)(b) and 
(3)(c) are satisfied and they are not waived, the disclo-
sure statement automatically becomes effective as 
soon as all the conditions are satisfied. 
(8) If the registrant advises the division of the date 
when the disclosure statement is expected to become 
effective, the division shall promptly advise the regis-
trant by telephone or telegram, at the registrant's 
expense, whether all the conditions are satisfied and 
whether it then contemplates the institution of pro-
ceedings under Section 61-1-12, but this advice by the 
division does not preclude the institution of such a 
proceeding at any time. 
(9) The division may by rule or order permit regis-
tration by coordination of any security for which a 
notification or similar document has been filed under 
the Securities Act of 1933 in connection with the 
same offering. 1991 
61-1-10. Registration by qualification. 
(1) Application may be made to register any secu-
rity by qualification. 
(2) A registration statement under this section 
shall contain the following information and be accom-
panied by the following documents in addition to the 
information specified in Subsection 61-1-11(3) and 
the consent to service of process required by Section 
61-1-26: 
(a) with respect to the issuer and any signifi-
cant subsidiary: 
(i) its name, address, and form of organi-
zation; 
(ii) the state or foreign jurisdiction and 
date of its organization; 
(iii) the general character and location of 
its business; 
(iv) a description of its physical properties 
and equipment; and 
(v) a statement of the general competitive 
conditions in the industry or business in 
which it is or will be engaged; 
(b) with respect to every director and officer of 
the issuer or person occupying a similar status or 
performing similar functions: 
(i) his name, address, and principal occu-
pation for the past five years; 
(ii) the amount of securities of the issuer 
held by him as of a specified date within 30 
days of the filing of the registration state-
ment; 
(iii) the amount of the securities covered 
by the registration statement to which he 
has indicated his intention to subscribe; and 
(iv) a description of any material interest 
in any material transaction with the issuer 
or any significant subsidiary affected within 
the past three years or proposed to be af-
fected; 
(c) with respect to persons covered by Subsec-
tion (b), the remuneration paid during the past 
12 months and estimated to be paid during the 
next 12 months, directly or indirectly, by the is-
suer, together with all predecessors, parents, 
subsidiaries, and affiliates, to all those persons in 
the aggregate; 
(d) with respect to any person owning of 
record, or beneficially if known, 10% or more of 
the outstanding shares of any class of equity se-
curity of the issuer, the information specified in 
Subsection (b) other than the person's occupa-
tion; 
(e) with respect to every promoter if the issuer 
was organized within the past three years, the 
information specified in Subsection (b), any 
amount paid to the promoter within that period 
or intended to be paid to the promoter, and the 
consideration for any such payment; 
(f) with respect to any person on whose behalf 
any part of the offering is to be made in a 
nonissuer distribution: 
(i) the person's name and address; 
(ii) the amount of securities of the issuer 
held by the person as of the date of filing of 
the registration statement; 
(iii) a description of any material interest 
in any material transaction with the issuer 
or any significant subsidiary effected within 
the past three years or proposed to be ef-
fected; and 
(iv) a statement of the person's reasons for 
making the offering; 
(g) the capitalization and long-term debt, on 
both a current and pro forma basis, of the issuer 
and any significant subsidiary, including a de-
scription of each security outstanding or being 
registered or otherwise offered, and a statement 
of the amount and kind of consideration, whether 
in the form of cash, physical assets, services, 
patents, goodwill, or anything else, for which the 
issuer or any subsidiary has issued any of its se-
curities within the past two years or is obligated 
to issue any of its securities; 
(h) (i) the kind and amount of securities to be 
offered; 
(ii) the proposed offering price or the 
method by which it is to be computed; 
(iii) any variation therefrom at which any 
proportion of the offering is to be made to 
any person or class of persons other than the 
underwriters, with a specification of any 
such person or class; 
(iv) the basis upon which the offering is to 
be made if otherwise than for cash; 
(v) the estimated aggregate underwriting 
and selling discounts or commissions and 
finders' fees, including separately cash, secu-
rities, contracts, or anything else of value to 
accrue to the underwriters or finders in con-
nection with the offering, or, if the selling 
discounts or commissions are variable, the 
basis of determining them and their maxi-
mum and minimum amounts; 
(vi) the estimated amounts of other selling 
expenses, including legal, engineering, and 
accounting charges; 
(vii) the name and address of every under-
writer and every recipient of a finder's fee; 
(viii) a copy of any underwriting or sell-
ing-group agreement under which the distri-
bution is to be made, or the proposed form of 
any such agreement whose terms have not 
yet been determined; and 
(ix) a description of the plan of distribu-
tion of any securities which are to be offered 
otherwise than through an underwriter; 
(i) (i) the estimated cash proceeds to be re-
ceived by the issuer from the offering; 
(ii) the purposes for which the proceeds 
are to be used by the issuer; 
(iii) the amount to be used for each pur-
pose; 
(iv) the order or priority in which the pro-
ceeds will be used for the purposes stated; 
(v) the amounts of any funds to be raised 
from other sources to achieve the purposes 
stated; the sources of any such funds; and 
(vi) if any part of the proceeds is to be used 
to acquire any property, including goodwill, 
otherwise than in the ordinary course of 
business, the names and addresses of the 
vendors, the purchase price, the names of 
any persons who have received commissions 
in connection with the acquisition, and the 
amounts of any such commissions and any 
other expense in connection with the acquisi-
tion, including the cost of borrowing money 
to finance the acquisition; 
(j) a description of any stock options or other 
security options outstanding, or to be created in 
connection with the offering, together with the 
amount of any such option held or to be held by 
every person required to be named in clause (b), 
(d), (e), (0, or (h) and by any person who holds or 
will hold 10% or more in the aggregate of any 
such options; 
(k) (i) the dates of, parties to, and general ef-
fect concisely stated of, every management 
or other material contract made or to be 
made otherwise than in the ordinary course 
of business if it is to be performed in whole or 
in part at or after the filing of the registra-
tion statement or was made within the past 
two years, together with a copy of every such 
contract; and 
(ii) a description of any pending litigation 
or proceeding to which the issuer is a party 
and which materially affects its business or 
assets, including any such litigation or pro-
ceeding known to be contemplated by gov-
ernmental authorities; 
(1) a copy of any prospectus, pamphlet, circu-
lar, form letter, advertisement, or other sales lit-
erature intended as of the effective date to be 
used in connection with the offering; 
(m) (i) a specimen copy of the security being 
registered; 
(ii) a copy of the issuer's articles of incor-
poration, and bylaws, if any, or their sub-
stantial equivalents, as currently in effect; 
and 
(iii) a copy of any indenture or other in-
strument covering the security to be regis-
tered; 
(n) a signed or conformed copy of an opinion of 
counsel as to the legality of the security being 
registered, with an English translation if it is in 
a foreign language, which shall state whether 
the security when sold will be legally issued, 
fully paid, and nonassessable, and if a debt secu-
rity, a binding obligation of the issuer; 
(o) the written consent of any accountant, en-
gineer, appraiser, or other person whose profes-
sion gives authority to a statement made by him, 
if that person is named as having prepared or 
certified a report or valuation, other than a pub-
lic and official document or statement, which is 
used in connection with the registration state-
ment; 
(p) (i) a balance sheet of the issuer as of a date 
within four months prior to the filing of the 
registration statement; 
(ii) a profit and loss statement and analy-
sis of retained earnings for each of the three 
fiscal years preceding the date of the balance 
sheet and for any period between the close of 
the last fiscal year and the date of the bal-
ance sheet, or for the period of the issuer's 
and any predecessors' existence if less than 
three years; and 
(iii) if any part of the proceeds of the offer-
ing is to be applied to the purchase of any 
business, the same financial statements 
which would be required if that business 
were the registrant; and 
(q) such additional information or verification 
of any statement as the division requires by rule 
or order. 
(3) A registration statement under this section be-
comes effective when the division so orders. 
(4) As a condition of registration under this sec-
tion, a prospectus containing the information, but not 
containing copies of contracts or agreements specified 
in Subsections (2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (0, (g), (h), (i), (j), 
(k), and (p) shall be sent or given to each person to 
whom an offer is made before or concurrently with: 
(a) the first written offer made to the person, 
otherwise than by means of a public advertise-
ment, by or for the account of the issuer or any 
other person on whose behalf the offering is be-
ing made, or by any underwriter or broker-dealer 
who is offering part of an unsold allotment or 
subscription taken by the person as a participant 
in the distribution; 
(b) the confirmation of any sale made by or for 
the account of any such person; 
(c) payment pursuant to any such sale; or 
(d) delivery of the security pursuant to any 
such sale, whichever occurs first. 1991 
61-1-11. Provisions applicable to registration 
generally. 
( D A registration statement may be filed by the 
issuer, any other person on whose behalf the offering 
is to be made, or a licensed broker-dealer. 
(2) Every person filing a registration statement 
shall pay a filing fee as determined under Section 
61-1-18.4. 
(3) Every registration statement shall specify: 
(a) the amount of securities to be offered in 
this state; 
(b) the states in which a registration state-
ment or similar document in connection with the 
offering has been or is to be filed, and 
(c) any adverse order, judgment, or decree en-
tered in connection with the offering by the regu 
latory authorities in each state or by any court or 
the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(4) Any document filed under this chapter or a pre 
decessor act within five years preceding the fifing of a 
registration statement may be incorporated by refer-
ence in the registration statement to the extent that 
the document is currently accurate 
(5) The division may permit the omission of any 
item of information or document from any registra-
tion statement 
(6) In the case of a nonissuer distribution, informa-
tion may not be required under Section 61-1-10 or 
Subsection 61-1-11(9) unless it is known to the person 
filing the registration statement or to the persons on 
whose behalf the distribution is to be made, or can be 
furnished by them without unreasonable effort or ex-
pense 
(7) (a) The division may require as a condition of 
registration by qualification or coordination 
(l) that any security issued within the 
past three years or to be issued to a promoter 
for a consideration substantially different 
from the public offering price, or to any per-
son for a consideration other than cash, be 
deposited in escrow, and 
(n) that the proceeds from the sale of the 
registered security be impounded until the 
issuer receives a specified amount from the 
sale of the security either in this state or 
elsewhere 
(b) The division may determine the conditions 
of any escrow or impounding required by this 
subsection, but it may not reject a depository 
solely because of location in another state 
(8) (a) Every registration statement is effective for 
one year from its effective date 
(b) All outstanding securities of the same class 
as a registered security are considered to be reg-
istered for the purpose of any nonissuer transac-
tion 
(I) so long as the registration statement is 
effective, and 
(n) between the 30th day after the entry of 
any stop order suspending or revoking the 
effectiveness of the registration statement 
under Section 61-1-12, if the registration 
statement did not relate in whole or in part 
to a nonissuer distribution and one year 
from the effective date of the registration 
statement 
(c) A registration statement may not be with-
drawn for one year from its effective date if any 
securities of the same class are outstanding 
(d) A registration statement may be with-
drawn otherwise only in the discretion of the di-
vision 
(9) So long as a registration statement is effective 
and the offering is not completely sold, the division 
may require the person who filed the registration 
statement to file reports, not more often than quar-
terly, to keep reasonably current the information con-
tained in the registration statement and to disclose 
the progress of the offering 
(10) (a) A registration statement may be amended 
after its effective date so as to increase the secu-
rities specified to be offered and sold, if the public 
offering price and underwriters' discounts and 
commissions are not changed from the respective 
amounts of which the division was informed 
(b) The amendment becomes effective when 
the division so orders 
(c) Everv person filing an amendment shall 
pay a registration fee as determined under Sec-
tion 61-1-18 4 with respect to the additional secu-
rities proposed to be offered 
(d) The amendment relates back to the date of 
the sale of the additional security being regis 
tered provided that within six months of the 
date of the sale the amendment is filed and the 
additional registration fee is paid 
(11) (a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsec-
tion (b), an issuer may only employ or engage an 
agent to effect or attempt to effect transactions in 
its securities who is licensed under this chapter 
and associated with a licensed broker-dealer 
(b) A partner, officer, or director of an issuer, 
or a person occupying a similar status or per-
forming similar functions, ma> act as an agent of 
the issuer to effect or attempt to effect transac-
tions in its securities, provided the person is li-
censed under this chapter and receives no com-
mission or other remuneration, directly or indi-
rectly, for effecting or attempting to effect the 
transactions 
(12) (a) Any security that is offered or sold under 
Section 4(5) of the Securities Act of 1933 or that 
is a "mortgage related security" as defined in 
Section 3(a)(41) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 shall not be exempt under Subsection 
61-l-14(l)(a) to the same extent as any obligation 
issued by or guaranteed as to principal and inter-
est by the United States or an agency or instru-
mentality of the United States Accordingly, any 
such security shall comply with the applicable 
registration and qualification requirements set 
forth in this chapter 
(b) This subsection specifically overrides the 
preemption of state law contained in Section 
106(c) of the Secondary Mortgage Market En-
hancement Act of 1984, Public Law Number 
98-440 1994 
61-1-12. Denial, suspension, and revocation of 
registration. 
(1) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the director, by means of adjudica-
tive proceedings conducted in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act, 
may issue a stop order that denies effectiveness to, or 
suspends or revokes the effectiveness of, any securi-
ties registration statement and may impose a fine if 
he finds that the order is in the public interest and 
that 
(a) the registration statement, as of its effec-
tive date or as of any earlier date in the case of 
an order denying effectiveness, or any amend-
ment under Subsection 61-1-11(10) as of its effec-
tive date, or any report under Subsection 61-1-
11(9), is incomplete in any material respect, or 
contains any statement that was, in the light of 
the circumstances under which it was made, false 
or misleading with respect to any material fact, 
(b) any provision of this chapter, or any rule, 
order, or condition lawfully imposed under this 
chapter, has been willfully violated, in connec-
tion with the offering, by 
d) the person filing the registration state-
ment, 
(ii) the issuer, any partner, officer, or di-
rector of the issuer, any person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar func-
tions, or any person directly or indirectly 
controlling or controlled by the issuer, but 
only if the person filing the registration 
statement is directly or indirectly controlled 
by or acting for the issuer; or 
(in) any underwriter; 
(c) the security registered or sought to be reg-
istered is the subject of an administrative stop 
order or similar order, or a permanent or tempo-
rary injunction of any court of competent juris-
diction entered under any other federal or state 
act applicable to the offering; except that the di-
vision may not commence agency action against 
an effective registration statement under this 
subsection more than one year from the date of 
the order or injunction relied on, and it may not 
enter an order under this subsection on the basis 
of an order or injunction entered under the secu-
rities act of any other state unless that order or 
injunction was based on facts that would cur-
rently constitute a ground for a stop order under 
this section; 
(d) the issuer's enterprise or method of busi-
ness includes or would include activities that are 
illegal where performed; 
(e) the offering has worked or tended to work a 
fraud upon purchasers or would so operate; 
(f) the offering has been or would be made 
with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and 
sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compen-
sation, or promoters' profits or participation, or 
unreasonable amounts or kinds of options; 
(g) when a security is sought to be registered 
by notification, it is not eligible for such registra-
tion; 
(h) when a security is sought to be registered 
by coordination, there has been a failure to com-
ply with the undertaking required by Subsection 
61-l-9(2)(d); or 
(i) the applicant or registrant has failed to pay 
the proper filing fee. 
(2) The director may enter an order under this sec-
tion but may vacate the order if he finds that the 
conditions that prompted its entry have changed or 
that it is otherwise in the public interest to do so. 
(3) The director may not issue a stop order against 
an effective registration statement on the basis of a 
fact or transaction known to the division when the 
registration statement became effective unless the 
proceeding is instituted within the next 120 days. 
(4) No person may be considered to have violated 
Section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any order or 
sale effected after the entry of an order under this 
section if that person proves by a preponderance of 
ths evidence that he did not know, and in the exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known, of the order. 
1990 
6M-13. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that, directly or 
indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, 
controls or is controlled by, or is under common 
control with a person specified. 
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a 
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or 
issuer in effecting or attempting to effect pur-
chases or sales of securities. "Agent" does not in-
clude an individual who represents an issuer, 
who receives no commission or other remunera-
tion, directly or indirectly, for effecting or at-
tempting to effect purchases or sales of securities 
in this state, and who: 
(a) effects transactions in securities ex-
empted by Subsection 61-l-14(l)(a), (b), (c), 
(i), or (j); 
(b) effects transactions exempted by Sub-
section 61-1-14(2); or 
(c) effects transactions with existing em-
ployees, partners, officers, or directors of the 
issuer. A partner, officer, or director of a bro-
ker-dealer or issuer, or a person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar func-
tions, is an agent only if he otherwise comes 
within this definition. 
(3) "Broker-dealer" means any person engaged 
in the business of effecting transactions in securi-
ties for the account of others or for his own ac-
count. "Broker-dealer" does not include: 
(a) an agent; 
(b) an issuer; 
(c) a bank, savings institution, or trust 
company; 
(d) a person who has no place of business 
in this state if: 
(i) the person effects transactions in 
this state exclusively with or through: 
(A) the issuers of the securities 
involved in the transactions; 
(B) other broker-dealers; or 
(C) banks, savings institutions, 
trust companies, insurance compa-
nies, investment companies as de-
fined in the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, pension or profit-shar-
ing trusts, or other financial institu-
tions or institutional buyers, 
whether acting for themselves or as 
trustees; or 
(ii) during any period of 12 consecu-
tive months the person does not direct 
more than 15 offers to sell or buy into 
this state in any manner to persons 
other than those specified in Subsection 
(3)(d)(i), whether or not the offeror or 
any of the offerees is then present in this 
state; 
(e) a general partner who organizes and 
effects transactions in securities of three or 
fewer limited partnerships, of which the per-
son is the general partner, in any period of 
12 consecutive months; 
(f) a person whose participation in trans-
actions in securities is confined to those 
transactions made by or through a broker-
dealer licensed in this state; 
(g) a person who is a real estate broker 
licensed in this state and who effects trans-
actions in a bond or other evidence of indebt-
edness secured by a real or chattel mortgage 
or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the 
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire 
mortgage, deed or trust, or agreement, to-
gether with all the bonds or other evidences 
of indebtedness secured thereby, is offered 
and sold as a unit; 
(h) a person effecting transactions in com-
modity contracts or commodity options; or 
(i) other persons as the division, by rule or 
order, may designate, consistent with the 
public interest and protection of investors, as 
not within the intent of this subsection 
(4) "Bu>" or "purchase" means every contract 
for purchase of, contract to buy, or acquisition of 
a security or interest in a security for value 
(5) "Commodity" means, except as otherwise 
specified by the division by rule 
(a) any agricultural, grain, or livestock 
product or byproduct, except real property or 
any timber, agricultural, or livestock prod-
uct grown or raised on real property and of-
fered or sold by the owner or lessee of the 
real property, 
(b) any metal or mineral, including a pre-
cious metal, except a numismatic com whose 
fair market value is at least 15% greater 
than the value of the metal it contains, 
(c) any gem or gemstone, whether charac-
terized as precious, semi-precious, or other-
wise, 
(d) any fuel, whether liquid, gaseous, or 
otherwise, 
(e) any foreign currency, and 
(f) all other goods, articles, products, or 
items of any kind, except any work of art 
offered or sold by art dealers, at public auc-
tion or offered or sold through a private sale 
by the owner of the work 
(6) "Commodity contract" means any account, 
agreement, or contract for the purchase or sale, 
primarily for speculation or investment purposes 
and not for use or consumption by the offeree or 
purchaser, of one or more commodities, whether 
for immediate or subsequent delivery or whether 
delivery is intended by the parties, and whether 
characterized as a cash contract, deferred ship-
ment or deferred delivery contract, forward con-
tract, futures contract, installment or margin 
contract, leverage contract, or otherwise 
(a) Any commodity contract offered or sold 
shall, in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, be presumed to be offered or sold for 
speculation or investment purposes 
(b) (I) A commodity contract shall not in-
clude any contract or agreement which 
requires, and under which the purchaser 
receives, within 28 calendar days from 
the payment in good funds any portion 
of the purchase price, physical delivery 
of the total amount of each commodity to 
be purchased under the contract or 
agreement 
(n) The purchaser is not considered to 
have received physical delivery of the 
total amount of each commodity to be 
purchased under the contract or agree-
ment when the commodity or commodi-
ties are held as collateral for a loan or 
are subject to a lien of any person when 
the loan or hen arises in connection with 
the purchase of each commodity or com-
modities 
(7) (a) "Commodity option" means anv ac-
count, agreement, or contract giving a party 
to the option the right but not the obligation 
to purchase or sell one or more commodities 
or one or more commodity contracts, or both 
whether characterized as an option, privi-
lege, indemnity, bid, offer, put, call, advance 
guaranty, decline guaranty, or otherwise 
(b) It does not include an option traded on 
a national securities exchange registered 
with the United btates becunneb cum JUA 
change Commission or on a board of trade 
designated as a contract market by the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission 
(8) "Director" means the director of the Divi-
sion of Securities charged with the administra-
tion and enforcement of this chapter 
(9) "Division" means the Division of Securities 
established by Section 61-1-18 
(10) "Executive director" means the executive 
director of the Department of Commerce 
(11) "Fraud," "deceit," and "defraud" are not 
limited to their common-law meanings 
(12) "Guaranteed" means guaranteed as to 
payment of principal or interest as to debt securi-
ties, or dividends as to equity securities 
(13) (a) "Investment adviser" means any per-
son who, for compensation, engages in the 
business of advising others, either directly or 
through publications or writings, as to the 
value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing m, purchasing, or selling securi-
ties, or who, for compensation and as a part 
of a regular business, issues or promulgates 
analyses or reports concerning securities 
(b) "Investment adviser" does not include 
(l) a bank, savings institution, or 
trust company; 
(n) a lawyer, accountant, engineer, or 
teacher whose performance of these ser-
vices is solely incidental to the practice 
of his profession, 
(m) a broker-dealer or its agent 
whose performance of these services is 
solely incidental to the conduct of his 
business as a broker-dealer and who re-
ceives no special compensation for them, 
dv) a publisher of any bona fide news-
paper, news column, news letter, news 
magazine, or business or financial publi-
cation or service, of general, regular, 
and paid circulation, whether communi-
cated in hard copy form, or by electronic 
means, or otherwise, that does not con-
sist of the rendering of advice on the ba-
sis of the specific investment situation of 
each client, 
(v) a person whose advice, analyses, 
or reports relate only to securities ex-
empted by Subsection 61-l-14(l)(a), 
(vi) an investment advisor represen-
tative, or 
(vn) such other persons not within the 
intent of this subsection as the division 
may by rule or order designate 
(14) "Investment adviser representative" 
means any partner, officer, director of, or a per-
son occupying a similar status or performing sim-
ilar functions, or other individual employed by or 
associated with an investment adviser, except 
clerical or ministerial personnel, who 
(a) makes any recommendations or other-
wise renders advice regarding securities di-
rectly to advisory clients, 
(b) manages accounts or portfolios of cli-
ents, 
(c) determines which recommendation or 
advice regarding securities should be given 
if that person is a member of the investment 
adviser's investment committee that deter-
mines general investment advice to be given 
to clients or, if the investment adviser has no 
investment committee, the person deter-
mines general client advice, but if there are 
more than five such persons, only the super-
visors of these persons are considered to be 
investment adviser representatives; 
(d) solicits, offers, or negotiates for the 
sale of or sells investment advisory services; 
or 
(e) immediately supervises employees who 
perform any of the foregoing. 
(15) (a) "Issuer" means any person who issues 
or proposes to issue any security or has out-
standing a security that it has issued. 
(b) With respect to a preorganization cer-
tificate or subscription, "issuer" means the 
promoter or the promoters of the person to be 
organized. 
(c) With respect to: 
(i) interests in trusts, including but 
not limited to collateral trust certifi-
cates, voting trust certificates, and cer-
tificates of deposit for securities; or 
(ii) shares in an investment company 
without a board of directors, "issuer" 
means the person or persons performing 
the acts and assuming duties of a deposi-
tor or manager under the provisions of 
the trust or other agreement or instru-
ment under which the security is issued. 
(d) With respect to an equipment trust 
certificate, a conditional sales contract, or 
similar securities serving the same purpose, 
"issuer" means the person by whom the 
equipment or property is to be used. 
(e) With respect to interests in partner-
ships, general or limited, "issuer" means the 
partnership itself and not the general part-
ner or partners. 
(f) With respect to certificates of interest 
or participation in oil, gas, or mining titles 
or leases or in payment out of production un-
der the titles or leases, "issuer" means the 
owner of the title or lease or right of produc-
tion, whether whole or fractional, who cre-
ates fractional interests therein for the pur-
pose of sale. 
(16) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indi-
rectly for the benefit of the issuer. 
(17) "Person" means an individual, a corpora-
tion, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock 
company, a joint venture, a trust where the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a secu-
rity, an unincorporated organization, a govern-
ment, or a political subdivision of a government. 
(18) "Precious metal" means the following, 
whether in coin, bullion, or other form: 
(a) silver; 
(b) gold; 
(c) platinum; 
(d) palladium; 
(e) copper; and 
(f) such other substances as the division 
may specify by rule. 
(19) "Promoter" means any person who, acting 
alone or in concert with one or more persons, 
takes initiative in founding or organizing the 
business or enterprise of a person. 
(20) (a) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract 
for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a 
security or interest in a security for value. 
(b) "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every 
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation 
of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a 
security for value. 
(c) The following are examples of the defi-
nitions m Subsections (a) and (b): 
(i) any security given or delivered 
with or as a bonus on account of any 
purchase of a security or any other 
thing, is part of the subject of the pur-
chase, and has been offered and sold for 
value; 
(ii) a purported gift of assessable 
stock is an offer or sale as is each assess-
ment levied on the stock; 
(iii) an offer or sale of a security that 
is convertible into, or entitles its holder 
to acquire or subscribe to another secu-
rity of the same or another issuer is an 
offer or sale of that security, and also an 
offer of the other security, whether the 
right to convert or acquire is exercisable 
immediately or in the future; 
(iv) any conversion or exchange of one 
security for another shall constitute an 
offer or sale of the security received in a 
conversion or exchange, and the offer to 
buy or the purchase of the security con-
verted or exchanged; 
(v) securities distributed as a divi-
dend wherein the person receiving the 
dividend surrenders the right, or the al-
ternative right, to receive a cash or prop-
erty dividend is an offer or sale; 
(vi) a dividend of a security of another 
issuer is an offer or sale; or 
(vii) the issuance of a security under a 
merger, consolidation, reorganization, 
recapitalization, reclassification, or ac-
quisition of assets shall constitute the 
offer or sale of the security issued as 
well as the offer to buy or the purchase 
of any security surrendered in connec-
tion therewith, unless the sole purpose 
of the transaction is to change the is-
suer's domicile. 
(d) The terms defined in Subsections 
(20)(a) and (b) do not include: 
(i) a good faith gift; 
(ii) a transfer by death; 
(iii) a transfer by termination of a 
trust or of a beneficial interest in a 
trust; 
(iv) a security dividend not within 
Subsection (20)(c)(v) or (vi); 
(v) a securities split or reverse split; 
or 
(vi) any act incident to a judicially ap-
proved reorganization in which a secu-
rity is issued in exchange for one or 
more outstanding securities, claims, or 
property interests, or partly in such ex-
change and partly for cash. 
(21) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934," "Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940" mean the federal statutes of 
those names as amended before or after the effec-
tive date of this chapter. 
(22) "Security" means any: 
(a) note; 
(b) stock; 
(c) treasury stock; 
(d) bond; 
(e) debenture, 
(f) evidence of indebtedness, 
(g) certificate of interest or participation 
in any profit-sharing agreement, 
(h) collateral-trust certificate, 
(1) preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, 
(j) transferable share, 
(k) investment contract, 
(1) burial certificate or burial contract 
(m) voting-trust certificate, 
(n) certificate of deposit for a security, 
(o) certificate of interest or participation 
in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in 
payments out of production under such a ti-
tle or lease, 
(p) commodity contract or commodity op-
tion, or 
(q) in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a "security," or any cer-
tificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, 
guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase any of the foregoing 
"Security" does not include any insurance or 
endowment policy or annuity contract under 
which an insurance company promises to 
pay money in a lump sum or periodically for 
life or some other specified period 
(23) "State" means any state, territory, or pos-
session of the United States, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Puerto Rico 
(24) "Working days" means 8 a m to 5 p m , 
Monday through Friday, exclusive of legal holi-
days hsted m Section 63-13-2 
(25) A term not defined in Section 61-1-13 
shall have the meaning as established by divi-
sion rule The meaning of a term neither defined 
in this section nor by rule of the division shall be 
the meaning commonly accepted in the business 
community 1993 
61-1-14. Exemptions. 
(1) The following securities are exempted from Sec 
tions 61-1-7 and 61-1-15 
(a) any security, including a revenue obliga-
tion, issued or guaranteed by the United States, 
any state, any political subdivision of a state, or 
any agency or corporate or other instrumentality 
of one or more of the foregoing, or any certificate 
of deposit for any of the foregoing, 
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by Can 
ada, any Canadian province, any political subdi 
vision of any Canadian province, any agency or 
corporate or other instrumentality of one or more 
of the foregoing, or any other foreign government 
with which the United States currently main-
tains diplomatic relations, if the security is rec 
ognized as a valid obligation by the issuer or 
guarantor, 
(c) any security issued by and representing an 
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any 
bank organized under the laws of the United 
States, or any bank, savings institution, or trust 
company supervised under the laws of any state, 
(d) any security issued by and representing an 
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any 
federal savings and loan association, or any 
building and loan or similar association orga-
nized under the laws of any state and authorized 
to do business in this state, 
(e) any security issued or guaranteed by any 
federal credit union or any credit union, indus-
trial loan association, or similar association orga-
nized and supervised under the laws of this state, 
(f) any security issued or guaranteed by any 
railroad, other common carrier, public utility or 
holding company which is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the interstate commerce commission, a 
registered holding company under the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsid-
iary of such a company within the meaning of 
that act, or any security regulated in respect of 
its rates or in its issuance by a governmental 
authority of the United States, any state, Can-
ada, or any Canadian province, 
(g) any security listed on the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
System, the New York Stock Exchange, the 
American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock 
exchange or medium approved by the division, 
except that the director may at any time suspend 
or revoke this exemption for any particular stock 
exchange, medium, security, or securities under 
Subsection 61-1-14(4), any other security of the 
same issuer which is of senior or substantially 
equal rank to any security so listed and approved 
by the director, any security called for by sub-
scription rights or warrants so listed or approved, 
or any warrant or right to purchase or subscribe 
to any of the foregoing, 
(h) d) any security issued by any person orga-
nized and operated not for private profit but 
exclusively for religious, educational, benev-
olent, charitable, fraternal, social, athletic, 
or reformatory purposes, or as a chamber of 
commerce or trade or professional associa-
tion, and 
(n) any security issued by a corporation 
organized under Title 3, Chapter 1, and any 
security issued by a corporation to which the 
provisions of that chapter are made applica-
ble by compliance with the requirements of 
Section 3-1-21, 
d) a promissory note, draft, bill of exchange, or 
banker's acceptance that evidences an obligation 
to pay cash within nine months after the date of 
issuance, exclusive of days of grace, or a renewal 
of such an obligation that is likewise limited, or a 
guarantee of such an obligation or of a renewal 
d) issued in denominations of at least 
$50,000, and 
(n) either 
(A) receives a rating in one of the 
three highest rating categories from a 
nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization, or 
(B) the issuer satisfies requirements 
established by rule or order of the divi-
sion, 
(j) any investment contract issued in connec-
tion with an employees' stock purchase, savings, 
pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit p\an, 
(k) a security issued by an issuer registered as 
an open-end management investment company 
or unit investment trust under Section 8 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, if 
(0 (A) the issuer is advised by an invest-
ment adviser that is a depository insti-
tution exempt from registration under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or 
that is currently registered as an invest-
ment adviser, and has been registered, 
or is affiliated with an adviser that has 
been registered, as an investment ad-
viser under the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940 for at least three years next pre-
ceding an offer or sale of a security 
claimed to be exempt under this subsec-
tion; and 
(B) the adviser has acted, or is affili-
ated with an investment adviser that 
has acted as investment adviser to one 
or more registered investment compa-
nies or unit investment trusts for at 
least three years next preceding an offer 
or sale of a security claimed to be ex-
empt under this subsection; or 
(ii) the issuer has a sponsor that has at all 
times throughout the three years before an 
offer or sale of a security claimed to be ex-
empt under this subsection sponsored one or 
more registered investment companies or 
unit investment trusts the aggregate total 
assets of which have exceeded $100,000,000; 
(iii) in addition to Subsection (i) or (ii), the 
division has received prior to any sale ex-
empted herein: 
(A) a notice of intention to sell which 
has been executed by the issuer which 
sets forth the name and address of the 
issuer and the title of the securities to be 
offered in this state; and 
(B) a filing fee as determined under 
Section 61-1-18.4; 
(iv) in the event any offer or sale of a secu-
rity of an open-end management investment 
company is to be made more than 12 months 
after the date on which the notice and fee 
under Subsection (iii) is received by the di-
rector, another notice and payment of the ap-
plicable fee shall be required. 
(v) For the purpose of this subsection, an 
investment adviser is affiliated with another 
investment adviser if it controls, is con-
trolled by, or is under common control with 
the other investment adviser; 
(1) any security as to which the director, by 
rule or order, finds that registration is not neces-
sary or appropriate for the protection of inves-
tors. 
(2) The following transactions are exempted from 
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15: 
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected 
through a broker-dealer or not; 
(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstand-
ing security, if as provided by rule of the division: 
(i) information about the issuer of the se-
curity as required by the division is cur-
rently listed in a securities manual recog-
nized by the division, and the listing is based 
upon such information as required by rule of 
the division; or 
(ii) the security has a fixed maturity or a 
fixed interest or dividend provision and 
there has been no default during the current 
fiscal year or within the three preceding fis-
cal years, or during the existence of the is-
suer and any predecessors if less than three 
years, in the payment of principal, interest, 
or dividends on the security; 
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or 
through a registered broker-dealer pursuant to 
an unsolicited order or offer to buy; 
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other 
person on whose behalf the offering is made and 
an underwriter, or among underwriters; 
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence 
of indebtedness secured by a real or chattel mort-
gage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the 
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mort-
gage, deed of trust, or agreement, together with 
all the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness 
secured thereby, is offered and sold as a unit; 
(f) any transaction by an executor, administra-
tor, sheriff, marshal, receiver, trustee in bank-
ruptcy, guardian, or conservator; 
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide 
pledgee without any purpose of evading this 
chapter; 
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings institu-
tion, trust company, insurance company, invest-
ment company as defined in the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing 
trust, or other financial institution or institu-
tional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether the 
purchaser is acting for itself or in some fiduciary 
capacity; 
(i) any offer or sale of a preorganization certifi-
cate or subscription if: 
(i) no commission or other remuneration 
is paid or given directly or indirectly for so-
liciting any prospective subscriber; 
(ii) the number of subscribers acquiring 
any legal or beneficial interest therein does 
not exceed ten; and 
(iii) there is no general advertising or so-
licitation in connection with the offer or sale; 
(j) any transaction pursuant to an offer by an 
issuer of its securities to its existing securities 
holders, if: 
(i) no commission or other remuneration, 
other than a standby commission is paid or 
given directly or indirectly for soliciting any 
security holders in this state and the trans-
action constitutes either: 
(A) the conversion of convertible secu-
rities; 
(B) the exercise of nontransferable 
rights or warrants; 
(C) the exercise of transferable rights 
or warrants if the rights or warrants are 
exercisable not more than 90 days after 
their issuance; or 
(D) the purchase of securities under a 
preemptive right; and 
(ii) the exemption created by Subsection 
(2)(j) is not available for an offer or sale of 
securities to existing securities holders who 
have acquired their securities from the is-
suer in a transaction in violation of Section 
61-1-7; 
(k) any offer, but not a sale, of a security for 
which registration statements have been filed 
under both this chapter and the Securities Act of 
1933 if no stop order or refusal order is in effect 
and no public proceeding or examination looking 
toward such an order is pending;' 
(1) a distribution of securities as a dividend if 
the person distributing the dividend is the issuer 
of the securities distributed; 
(m) any nonissuer transaction effected by or 
through a registered broker-dealer where the 
broker-dealer or issuer files with the division, 
and the broker-dealer maintains in his records, 
and makes reasonably available upon request to 
any person expressing an interest in a proposed 
transaction in the security with the broker-
dealer information prescribed by the division un-
der its rules; 
(n) any transactions not involving a public of-
fering; 
(o) any offer or sale of "condominium units" or 
"time period units" as those terms are defined in 
the Condominium Ownership Act, whether or 
not to be sold by installment contract, if the pro-
visions of the Condominium Ownership Act, or if 
the units are located in another state, the condo-
minium act of that state, the Utah Uniform Land 
Sales Practices Act, the Utah Timeshare and 
Camp Resort Act, and the Utah Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code are complied with; 
(p) any transaction or series of transactions in-
volving a merger, consolidation, reorganization, 
recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of assets, 
if the consideration for which, in whole or in part, 
is the issuance of securities of a person or per-
sons, and if: 
(i) the transaction or series of transactions 
is incident to a vote of the securities holders 
of each person involved or by written consent 
or resolution of some or all of the securities 
holders of each person involved; 
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is 
given under a provision in: 
(A) the applicable corporate statute or 
other controlling statute; 
(B) the controlling articles of incorpo-
ration, trust indenture, deed of trust, or 
partnership agreement; or 
(C) the controlling agreement among 
securities holders; 
(iii) (A) one person involved in the trans-
action is required to file proxy or infor-
mational materials under Section 14(a) 
or (c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 or Section 20 of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and has so filed; 
(B) one person involved in the trans-
action is an insurance company which is 
exempt from filing under Section 
12(g)(2)(G) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, and has filed proxy or infor-
mational materials with the appropriate 
regulatory agency or official of its domi-
ciliary state; or 
(C) all persons involved in the trans-
action are exempt from filing under Sec-
tion 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, and file with the division 
such proxy or informational material as 
the division requires by rule; 
(iv) the proxy or informational material is 
filed with the division and distributed to all 
securities holders entitled to vote in the 
transaction or series of transactions at least 
ten working days prior to any necessary vote 
by the securities holders or action on any 
necessary consent or resolution; and 
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or 
revoke the exemption within ten working 
days after filing of the proxy or informa-
tional materials; 
(q) any transaction pursuant to an offer to sell 
securities of an issuer if: 
(i) the transaction is part of an issue in 
which there are not more than 15 purchasers 
in this state, other than those designated in 
Subsection (2)(h), during any 12 consecutive 
months; 
(ii) no general solicitation or general ad-
vertising is used in connection with the offer 
to sell or sale of the securities; 
(iii) no commission or other similar com-
pensation is given, directly or indirectly, to a 
person other than a broker-dealer or agent 
licensed under this chapter, for soliciting a 
prospective purchaser in this state; 
(iv) the seller reasonably believes that all 
the purchasers in this state are purchasing 
for investment; 
(v) the transaction is part of an aggregate 
offering that does not exceed $500,000, or a 
greater amount as prescribed by a division 
rule, during any 12 consecutive months; and 
(vi) the director, as to a security or trans-
action, or a type of security or transaction, 
may withdraw or further condition this ex-
emption or waive one or more of the condi-
tions in Subsection (q); 
(r) any transaction involving a commodity con-
tract or commodity option; and 
(s) any transaction as to which the division 
finds that registration is not necessary or appro-
priate for the protection of investors. 
(3) Every person filing an exemption notice or ap-
plication shall pay a filing fee as determined under 
Section 61-1-18.4. 
(4) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the director, by means of an adjudi-
cative proceeding conducted in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, may 
deny or revoke any exemption specified in Subsection 
(l)(g), (h), or (j) or in Subsection (2) with respect to: 
(a) a specific security, transaction, or series of 
transactions; or 
(b) any person or issuer, any affiliate or suc-
cessor to a person or issuer, or any entity subse-
quently organized by or on behalf of a person or 
issuer generally and may impose a fine if he finds 
that the order is in the public interest and that: 
(i) the application for or notice of exemp-
tion filed with the division is incomplete in 
any material respect or contains any state-
ment which was, in the light of the circum-
stances under which it was made, false or 
misleading with respect to any material fact; 
(ii) any provision of this chapter, or any 
rule, order, or condition lawfully imposed 
under this chapter has been willfully vio-
lated in connection with the offering or ex-
emption by: 
(A) the person filing any application 
for or notice of exemption; 
(B) the issuer, any partner, officer, or 
director of the issuer, any person occupy-
ing a similar status or performing simi-
lar functions, or any person directly or 
indirectly controlling or controlled by 
the issuer, but only if the person filing 
the application for or notice of exemp-
tion is directly or indirectly controlled 
by or acting for the issuer; or 
(C) any underwriter; 
(iii) the security for which the exemption 
is sought is the subject of an administrative 
stop order or similar order, or a permanent 
or temporary injunction or any court of com-
petent jurisdiction entered under any other 
federal or state act applicable to the offering 
or exemption; the division may not institute 
a proceeding against an effective exemption 
under this subsection more than one year 
from the date of the order or injunction re-
lied on, and it may not enter an order under 
this subsection on the basis of an order or 
injunction entered under any other state act 
unless that order or injunction was based on 
facts that would currently constitute a 
ground for a stop order under this section; 
(iv) the issuer's enterprise or method of 
business includes or would include activities 
that are illegal where performed; 
(v) the offering has worked, has tended to 
work, or would operate to work a fraud upon 
purchasers; 
(vi) the offering has been or was made 
with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' 
and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other 
compensation, or promoters' profits or partic-
ipation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of 
options; 
(vii) an exemption is sought for a security 
or transaction which is not eligible for the 
exemption; or 
(viii) the proper filing fee, if required, has 
not been paid. 
(5) (a) No order under Subsection (4) may operate 
retroactively. 
(b) No person may be considered to have vio-
lated Section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any 
offer or sale effected after the entry of an order 
under this subsection if he sustains the burden of 
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known, of the or-
der. 1993 
61-1-14.5. Burden of proving exemption. 
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil, crimi-
nal, administrative, or judicial, the burden of proving 
an exemption under Section 61-1-14 or an exception 
from a definition under Section 61-1-13 is upon the 
person claiming the exemption or exception. 1983 
61-1-15. Filing of sales literature. 
The division may by rule or order require the filing 
of any prospectus, pamphlet, circular, form letter, ad-
vertisement, or other sales literature or advertising 
communication addressed or intended for distribution 
to prospective investors, unless the security or trans-
action is exempted by Section 61-1-14. 1983 
61-1-16. False statements unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person to make or cause to be 
made, in any document filed with the division or in 
any proceeding under this chapter, any statement 
which is, at the time and in the light of the circum-
stances under which it is made, false or misleading in 
any material respect. 1983 
61-1-17. No finding by division on merits — 
Contrary representation unlawful. 
(1) Neither the fact that an application for regis-
tration or a registration statement has been filed nor 
the fact that a person or security is effectively regis-
tered constitutes a finding by the division that any 
document filed under this chapter is true, complete, 
and not misleading. Neither any such fact nor the 
fact that an exemption or exception is available for a 
security or a transaction means that the division has 
passed in any way upon the merits or qualifications 
of, or recommended or given approval to, any person, 
security, or transaction. 
(2) It is unlawful to make, or cause to be made, to 
any prospective purchaser, customer, or client any 
representation inconsistent with Subsection (1). 1983 
61-1-18. Division of Securities established — Di-
rector — Appointment — Functions. 
(1) (a) There is established within the Department 
of Commerce a Division of Securities. 
(b) The division shall be under the direction 
and control of a director, appointed by the execu-
tive director with the governor's approval. 
(c) The director shall be responsible for the ad-
ministration and enforcement of this chapter. 
(d) The director shall hold office at the plea-
sure of the governor. 
(2) The director, with the approval of the executive 
director, may employ such staff as necessary to dis-
charge the duties of the division at salaries to be fixed 
by the director according to standards established by 
the Department of Human Resource Management. 
1991 
61-1-18.1. Technical experts and specialists — 
Employment — Contracts. 
The director may employ or contract with technical 
experts and specialists including but not limited to 
certified public accountants, appraisers, engineers, 
and tax accountants to conduct or participate in any 
examination, audit, investigation or proceeding. 1983 
61-1-18.2. Budget — Annual report. 
The director shall annually prepare and submit to 
the executive director: 
(1) a budget for the expenses of the division for 
the administration and enforcement of this chap-
ter for the next fiscal year; and 
(2) a report outlining the division's work for 
the preceding fiscal year. 1983 
61-1-18.3. Information obtained by division — 
Use for personal benefit prohibited — 
Disclosure. 
It is unlawful for any of the division's employees or 
any member of the Securities Advisory Board to use 
for personal benefit any non-public information 
which is filed with or obtained by the division. No 
provision of this chapter authorizes the division or 
any of its officers or employees to disclose any such 
information except among themselves or when neces-
sary or appropriate in a proceeding or investigation 
under this chapter. No provision of this chapter ei-
ther creates or derogates from any privilege which 
exists at common law or otherwise when documen-
tary or other evidence is sought under subpoena di-
rected to the division or any of its employees. 1983 
61-1-18.4. Fees collected by division. 
The Division of Securities shall establish, charge, 
and collect fees pursuant to Section 63-38-3.2, except 
when it can be demonstrated that the fee amount 
should be based on factors other than cost, for the 
following: 
(1) the fair and reasonable cost of any exami-
nation, audit, or investigation authorized or re-
quired by this chapter or other state law; 
(2) certificate of serving and mailing process 
served upon the division in any action or proceed-
ing commenced or prosecuted in this state 
against any person who has appointed the divi-
sion its agent as provided in Subsection 
61-1-26(7); and 
(3) copies and authentication of all papers, 
publications, data, and other records available to 
the public or issued under the division's author-
ity. 1994 
61-1-18.5. Securities Advisory Board estab-
lished — Appointment — Duties — 
Qualifications — Terms — Vacancies 
— Meetings — Conflicts of interest — 
Compensation. 
(1) There is hereby established a Securities Advi-
sory Board. Members of the board shall be appointed 
by the governor with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. The board shall have the following duties: 
(a) formulate and make recommendations to 
the director regarding policy and budgetary mat-
ters; 
(b) submit recommendations regarding regis-
tration requirements and division rules; 
(c) formulate and make recommendations to 
the director regarding the establishment of rea-
sonable fees; and 
(d) generally act in an advisory capacity to the 
director with respect to the exercise of his duties, 
powers, and responsibilities. 
(2) The Securities Advisory Board shall be com-
prised of five members, two from the securities bro-
kerage community who have at least five years prior 
experience in securities matters, one from the securi-
ties section of the Utah Bar Association, one officer or 
director of a corporation not subject to the reporting 
requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and one from the public at 
large who has no active participation in the securities 
business. The term of the public member first ap-
pointed shall expire July 1, 1987, the term of the 
broker and one attorney first appointed shall expire 
July 1,1986, and the term of the other broker and the 
officer or director first appointed shall expire July 1, 
1985. The terms of the board members thereafter 
shall run three years with no member serving more 
than two consecutive terms. 
(3) Any vacancy in the membership of the board 
occurring other than by expiration of the term shall 
be filled in the same manner as the original appoint-
ment, but for the unexpired term only. All members 
shall serve until their respective successors are ap-
pointed and qualified. 
(4) The board shall meet at least quarterly on a 
regular date to be fixed by the board and at such 
other times at the call of the director or any two mem-
bers of the board. Four members shall constitute a 
quorum for the transaction of business. Actions of the 
board shall require a vote of a majority of those 
present. 
(5) Each member of the board shall, by sworn and 
written statement filed with the Department of Com-
merce and the lieutenant governor, disclose any posi-
tion of employment or ownership interest that the 
member has with respect to any entity or business 
subject to the jurisdiction of the division. This state-
ment shall be filed upon appointment and must be 
appropriately amended whenever significant changes 
occur in matters covered by the statement. 
(6) The members of the board shall receive no sal-
ary but shall be paid a per diem allowance, as pro-
vided by law, for each day actually spent in the per-
formance of their duties, and travel expenses as es-
tablished by the Division of Finance. 1990 
61-1-18.6. Procedures — Adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
The Division of Securities shall comply with the 
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
46b, in its adjudicative proceedings. 1987 
61-1-18.7. Funding of securities investor educa-
tion and training. 
(1) There is created a special revenue fund known 
as the Securities Investor Education and Training 
Fund to provide revenue for educating the public and 
the securities industry as provided in this section. 
(2) All money received by the state by reason of 
civil penalties ordered and administrative fines col-
lected pursuant to this chapter shall be deposited in 
the Securities Investor Education and Training Fund, 
and subject to the requirements of Title 51, Chapter 
5. 
(3) The special revenue fund may include any fines 
collected by the division after July 1, 1989, pursuant 
to voluntary settlements or administrative orders. 
(4) (a) The fund shall earn interest. 
(b) All interest earned on fund monies shall be 
deposited into the fund. 
(5) Notwithstanding Title 63, Chapter 38, Budget-
ary Procedures Act, the director may use special reve-
nue fund monies, upon concurrence of the Securities 
Advisory Board and the executive director of the De-
partment of Commerce, in a manner consistent with 
the duties of the division under this chapter and only 
for any or all of the following and the expense of pro-
viding them: 
(a) education and training of Utah residents in 
matters concerning securities laws and invest-
ment decisions, by publications or presentations; 
(b) education of registrants and licensees un-
der this chapter, by: 
(i) publication of this chapter and rules 
and policy statements and opinion letters of 
the division; and 
(ii) sponsorship of seminars or meetings to 
educate registrants and licensees as to the 
requirements of this chapter; and 
(c) investigation and litigation. 
(6) If the balance in the fund exceeds $100,000 at 
the close of any fiscal year, the excess shall be trans-
ferred to the General Fund. 1992 
61-1-19. Investigations authorized. 
(1) (a) The division in its discretion may make any 
public or private investigations within or with-
out this state as it considers necessary to deter-
mine whether any person has violated, is violat-
ing, or is about to violate any provision of this 
chapter or any rule or order hereunder. 
(b) To aid in the enforcement of this chapter or 
in the prescribing of rules and forms hereunder, 
the division may require or permit any person to 
file a statement in writing, under oath or other-
wise as to all the facts and circumstances con-
cerning the matter to be investigated. 
(c) The division may publish information con-
cerning any violation of this chapter or the viola-
tion of any rule or order hereunder. 
(2) For the purpose of any investigation or proceed-
ing under this chapter, the division or any employee 
designated by it may: 
(a) administer oaths and affirmations; 
(b) subpoena witnesses and compel their atten-
dance; 
(c) take evidence; and 
(d) require the production of any books, pa-
pers, correspondence, memoranda, agreements, 
or other documents or records relevant or mate-
rial to the investigation. 1990 
61-1-20. Enforcement . 
Whenever it appears to the director that any per-
son has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in 
any act or practice constituting a violation of this 
chapter or any rule or order under this chapter, in 
addition to any specific powers granted in this chap 
ter 
(1) (a) the director may issue an order direct-
ing the person to appear before the division 
and show cause why an order should not be 
issued directing the person to cease and de-
sist from engaging in the act or practice, or 
doing any act in furtherance of the activity, 
(b) the order to show cause shall state the 
reasons for the order and the date of the 
hearing, 
(c) the director shall promptly serve a 
copy of the order to show cause upon each 
person named in the order, 
(d) the director shall hold a hearing on the 
order to show cause no sooner than ten busi-
ness days after the order is issued, 
(e) after a hearing, the director may issue 
an order to cease and desist from engaging in 
any act or practice constituting a violation of 
this chapter or any rule or order under this 
chapter The order shall be accompanied by 
written findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, 
(f) the director may impose a fine, and 
(g) the director may bar or suspend that 
person from associating with a licensed bro-
ker-dealer or investment adviser in this 
state 
(2) (a) The director may bring an action in the 
appropriate district court of this state or the 
appropriate court of another state to enjoin 
the acts or practices and to enforce compli-
ance with this chapter or any rule or order 
under this chapter, 
(b) upon a proper showing in an action 
brought under this section, the court may 
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, 
prohibitory or mandatory injunction, 
(n) issue a restraining order or writ of 
mandamus, 
(in) enter a declaratory judgment, 
(IV) appoint a receiver or conservator 
for the defendant or the defendant's as-
sets, 
(v) order disgorgement, 
(vi) order rescission, 
(vn) impose a fine of not more than 
$500 for each violation of the act, and 
(vni) enter any other relief the court 
considers just, and 
(c) the court may not require the division 
to post a bond in an action brought under 
this subsection 1994 
61-1-21. Penalties for violations. 
(1) A person who willfully violates any provision of 
this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or 
who willfully violates any rule or order under this 
chapter, or who willfully violates Section 61-1-16 
knowing the statement made to be false or mislead-
ing in any material respect, shall upon conviction be 
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 
shall upon conviction be 
(a) fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned 
not more than five years or both if, at the time 
the crime was committed the property, money 
or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be ob 
tamed was worth $10,000 or less, 
(b) fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned 
not more than 10 years or both if, at the time the 
crime was committed, the property, money, or 
thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be ob-
tained was worth more than $10,000 
(3) No person mav be imprisoned for the violation 
of any rule or order if he proves that he had no knowl 
edge of the rule or order 1992 
61-1-21.1. Limitat ion of p rosecu t ions . 
(1) No indictment or information may be returned 
or civil complaint filed under this chapter more than 
five years after the alleged violation 
(2) As to causes of action arising from violations of 
this chapter, the limitation of prosecutions provided 
in this section supersedes the limitation of actions 
provided in Section 76-1-302 and Title 78, Chapter 
12, Articles 1 and 2 1992 
61-1-21.5. Legal counse l — Prosecu t ions . 
(1) The attorney general shall advise and repre-
sent the division and its staff in all civil matters, 
administrative or judicial, requiring legal counsel or 
services in the exercise or defense of the division's 
power or the performance of its duties 
(2) With the concurrence of the attorney general, 
the staff of the division may represent the division in 
hearings conducted during the course of adjudicative 
proceedings of the division 
(3) In the prosecution of all criminal actions under 
this chapter, the attorney general, county attorney, 
or district attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction, 
shall provide all legal services for the division and its 
staff The division may refer such evidence as is 
available concerning violations of this chapter to the 
attorney general or the appropriate county attorney 
or district attorney for criminal prosecution 1993 
61-1-22. Sales a n d p u r c h a s e s in violation — 
Remedies — Limita t ion of ac t ions . 
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security m 
violation of Subsection 61-1-3(1), Section 61-1-7, 
Subsection 61-1-17(2), any rule or order under 
Section 61-1-15, which requires the affirmative 
approval of sales literature before it is used, any 
condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 
61-1-11(7), or offers, sells, or purchases a security 
in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is liable to 
the person selling the security to or buying the 
security from him, who may sue either at law or 
in equity to recover the consideration paid for the 
security, together with interest at 12% per year 
from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable 
attorney's fees, less the amount of any income 
received on the security, upon the tender of the 
security or for damages if he no longer owns the 
security 
(b) Damages are the amount that would be re-
coverable upon a tender less the value of the se-
curity when the buyer disposed of it and interest 
at 12% per year from the date of disposition 
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection 
(1) may award an amount equal to three times the 
consideration paid for the security, together with in-
terest, costs, and attorney's fees, less any amounts, 
all as specified in Subsection (1) upon a showing that 
the violation was reckless or intentional 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, an : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
individual, 
Plaintiff, 
: CASE NO. 920901436 
vs. 
s 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah I 
corporation, et al., 
: 
Defendants. 
7 
This matter comes before the Court upon defendants Motion to 
Dismiss, pursuant to Rules 12(e), 9(b) and (12(b)(6), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the four claims filed by the plaintiff in the 
above-mentioned case. The specific defendants involved in this 
motion and decision are Brinton Burbidge, and Kirton, McConkie & 
Bushnell (collectively and hereafter "Kirton"). A hearing was held 
on January 15, 1993, and the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, the Memoranda submitted 
by counsel, and the pertinent law, rules as stated herein. The 
Kirton defendants' Motion is denied as to the plaintiff's First, 
Second and Third Claims for Relief, and is granted as to the Fourth 
Claim for Relief. 
The plaintiff alleges that the Kirton defendants, as 
attorneys, represented certain co-defendants in this case. The 
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plaintiff claims that during the formation of a contract between 
the parties: (1) the Kirton defendants breached their contractual 
obligations to the plaintiff by failing to disclose various 
liabilities on the securities of the transaction; (2) that the 
defendants made promises on behalf of its client that the plaintiff 
relied on and hence suffered a detriment; (3) that the defendants 
committed fraud by making false statements to the plaintiff to 
induce the plaintiff to enter the contract; and (4) that the 
plaintiff has a claim against the defendants based on Utah's 
Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Ann., Sections 62-1-22. 
Rule 12(e), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
part that: 
If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he 
may move for a more definite statement. . . . 
However, motions for a more definite statement are not favored 
by the court. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a motion under 
Rule 12(e) is properly made only when the complaint is indefinite, 
ambiguous, or vague in either factual allegation or legal theory to 
such an extent that the moving party cannot reasonably be required 
to frame his responsive pleading. Liquor Control Commission v. 
Atlas. 243 P.2d 441 (1952). 
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It is the opinion of the Court that the plaintiff's Complaint 
against the Kirton defendants is sufficiently clear and definite to 
enable defendant to frame a response. 
Rule 9(b) provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated 
with particularity. 
This Court finds that the plaintiff has pled fraud with 
sufficient specificity with regard to the alleged conduct and 
individual Kirton defendants to withstand the provisions of Rule 
9(b). 
Rule 12(b)(6), provides that a pleading may be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
is appropriate only "when it appears to be a certainty that the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts 
which could be provided in support of its claim." Arrow v. Zions 
First National Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (1988). In considering a motion 
to dismiss a complaint, a court is to survey its allegations in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and grant dismissal "only if 
the plaintiff could not in any event establish a right to recover." 
Barr v. Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207 (1965). 
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In this case, the plaintiff's Fourth Claim for Relief is based 
on the Kirton defendants alleged violations of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, Utah Code Ann., Section 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22. 
However, the Supreme Court has expressly ruled that Section 61-1-1 
does not provide for a private right of action. Millner v. Elmer 
Fox and Co. , 529 P.2d 806 (1974). Further, the language in the 
first sentence of Section 61-1-22 is identical to the provisions of 
Section 61-1-1. Additionally, Section 61-1-20, which authorizes 
the enforcement of the Act, refers exclusively to the Division of 
Securities, established within the Department of Commerce, and 
provides various remedies and procedures for the Division. 
Based on this, the Court finds that the plaintiff's Fourth 
Claim falls within the narrow provisions of Rule 12(b)(6), as 
relief cannot be granted to the plaintiff under the State's Uniform 
Securities Act in the factual context of this case, as the 
plaintiff in bringing suit as a private party rather than as an 
agent of the state government. 
With regards to the plaintiff's First, Second and Third 
Claims, the Court finds that these claims present issues of fact 
that require that the plaintiff be given an opportunity to present 
its case. Where there is any doubt about whether a claim should be 
dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue must be 
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resolved in favor of the party seeking an opportunity to present 
its proof. Olson v. Park. Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Kirton defendants argue that the plaintiff has not alleged 
facts that demonstrate the existence of a contract between 
themselves and the plaintiff, promissory estoppel, or of fraud. 
However, the Court disagrees and finds that if the facts, as 
presented in the plaintiff's Complaint, could be proved at trial, 
those facts would be sufficient to support the claims as pleaded. 
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss the plaintiff's First, Second and TljjL^ d Claims for Relief 
is denied. 
Dated this ^<Tday of Februai 
LESLIE A 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUPPLEMENT TO 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, an : FEBRUARY, 1993 
individual, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, 
: CASE NO. 920901436 
vs. 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah : 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants• 
This matter came before the Court on defendants' Motions to 
Dismiss, pursuant to Rules 12(e), 9(b) and (12(b)(6), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The specific defendants involved are Brinton 
Burbidge, and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell (collectively and 
hereafter "Kirton"), and Terry and Doreen Harmon (hereafter the 
"Harmon defendants"). 
On July 31, 1992, the Harmon defendants made a Rule 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, claiming that the plaintiff 
did not have standing to assert a claim under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. 
On August 11, 1992, the Kirton defendants made a Rule 12(e) 
Motion for a More Definite Statement, a Rule 9(b) Motion for a more 
particular statement concerning plaintiff's fraud claim, and 
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incorporated the Harmon defendants' 12 (b) (6) motion concerning the 
plaintiff's claim under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. The 
plaintiff's Fourth Claim for Relief goes to the claimed securities 
law violation. 
A hearing was held on January 15, 1993, and the matter was 
taken under advisement. The Court reviewed the pleadings, the 
Memoranda submitted by counsel, and the pertinent law, and ruled on 
February 23, 1993 in a Memorandum Decision, that the defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss would be denied as to the plaintiff's first, 
second and third claims for relief, but would be granted as to the 
plaintiff's fourth claim for relief, as the plaintiff did not have 
a cause of action under the state's Uniform Securities Act. 
On March 15, 1993, the Court received a letter from the Kirton 
defendants requesting that the Ruling that had been issued 
dismissing the plaintiff's fourth cause of action be clarified as 
to whether it included the Harmon defendants, as well as the Kirton 
defendants, as Terry and Doreen Harmon had also moved for dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court now supplements its Memorandum 
Decision of February 23, 1993 to clarify that the ruling of 
February 23, 1993 applies to both Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell 
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(the "Kirton" defendants), as well as to JTer^ ry and Doreen Harmon 
(the "Harmon" defendants). 
Dated this / /day of April/ 199; 
LESLIE A: LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this, .day of 
April, 1993: 
Samuel L. Boyd 
Pro se 
901 Main Street, Suite 5010 
Dallas, Texas 75202 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Attorney for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake T. Ostler 
Attorney for Defendant Harmon City, 
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas L, Kay 
Attorney for Defendants Brinton Burbidge 
and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Gottfredson 
Attorney for Defendant Gottfredson 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, MD 20878 
Victoria K. Kidman 
Attorney for Defendant Hilton 
9 Exchange Place, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CIVIL NO. 920901436 
A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 
4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with 
defendant, Nielsen & Senior's, Motion for Partial Judgment on 
the Pleadings, the Court having reviewed the Motion, Memorandum 
in support and no Memorandum in opposition having been filed, 
and the Court being fully advised and finding good cause, rules 
as stated herein. 
The Motion is granted and the Fourth Claim for Relief as to 
this defendant is dismissed. Mr. Nielsen is to prepare an 
Order consisted with, this Ruling. 
Dated this n/J) da\r of April, 1993 
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BOYD V. HARMON CITY PAGE TWO COURT'S RULING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, 
this .day of April, 1993: 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
36 S. State, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake T. Ostler 
Attorney for Defendants Harmon City 
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas L. Kay 
Attorney for Defendants Burbidge, and 
Kirton, McConkie & Poelman 
111 East 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Gottfredson, Esq. 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, Maryland 20878 
Victoria K. Kidman 
Attorney for Defendant Hilton 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
John K. Mangum 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Third Juries LNrtiiCt 
MAY 1 0 1993 
Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
John K. Mangum (2072) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Telefax: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior 
By. £. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah 
corporation; et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DISMISSING WITH 
PREJUDICE THE FOURTH CLAIM 
FOR RELIEF OF PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AS ALLEGED 
AGAINST NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Civil No. 920901436CV 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Having reviewed the motion of Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
for partial judgment on the pleadings, dated March 10, 1993, 
seeking a dismissal with prejudice of the fourth claim for relief 
of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, together with the memorandum 
filed in support thereof, and the prior papers filed in this action 
on both sides of said issue, no memorandum in opposition having 
been filed by Plaintiff after and specifically in response to 
Nielsen & Senior's motion, and the Court being fully advised in 
the premises, having ruled on the same issue presented hereby in a 
20253.NI211 64 
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memorandum decision in this action dated February 23, 1993 and in 
a supplement thereto dated April 14, 1993, and finding good cause 
to grant Nielsen & Senior's motion pursuant to the Court's ruling 
on said motion dated April 20, 1993, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the fourth claim for relief of 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, pertaining to claimed violations 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, be and hereby is dismissed, 
with prejudice, insofar as the same is alleged against Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior, on the ground that said cause of action, under 
the factual circumstances alleged in this case, does not state 
and cannot be amended to state a viable claim for relief. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 2^i? day of April, 1993, I served 
the foregoing proposed ORDER DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE THE FOURTH 
CLAIM FOR RELIEF OF PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT AS ALLEGED 
AGAINST NIELSEN & SENIOR by mailing a true and correct copy of 
the same, first class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esa. 
DURHAM & EVANS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Samuel L. Boyd 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake T. Ostler, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants Harmon City, 
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon 
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas L. Kay, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorneys for Defendants Brinton Burbidge 
and Kirton, McConkie & Poelman 
900 Broadway Centre 
111 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Gottfredson, Esq. 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, Maryland 20878 
Victoria K. Kidman, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant Hilton 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Blake T. Ostler (A4642) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Defendants Harmon City, Inc., 
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon 
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
MAY 2 7 1993 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON, 
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON, 
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah 
corporation, MICHAEL 
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSON & 
SENIOR, a Utah corporation, TERRY 
HARMON, and MRS. TERRY 
HARMON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DISMISSING FOURTH 
CLAIM AS TO DEFENDANTS 
HARMON CITY, INC., TERRY 
HARMON AND MRS. TERRY 
HARMON 
Civil No. 92-0901436-CV 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
This matter came on for hearing on the 15th day of January, 1993 before 
the above entitled court. The Court having heard the arguments and read the memoranda 
on file in this matter and for good cause, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs Fourth 
Claim is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Defendants Harmon City, Inc., 
Terry Harmon and Mrs. Terry Harmon. 
DATED this *A ' d ay of May, 1993. 
lonora 
District Court J 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ' o^-i-day of May, 1993 I caused to be mailed 
a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing ORDER to the following by mailing 
said copy through the United States mail, postage prepaid: 
Samuel L. Boyd, Pro Se 
5010 NationsBank Plaza 
901 Main Street 
Lock Box 100 
Dallas, TX 75202 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Thomas L. Kay 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorneys for Defendants Brinton Burbidge and 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
60 East South Temple, #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael Gottfredson 
Attorney for Defendant Gottfredson 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, MD 20878 
-3-
Victoria K. Kidman 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant Hilton 
9 Exchange Place, 9th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD, SAMUEL L 
VS 
HARMON CITY, INC 
HILTON, MATTHEW 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 92090143 6 CV 
DATE 04/06/95 
HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK EHM 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. JONES, JEFFREY M. 
D. ATTY. OSTLER, BLAKE T 
THIS CASE IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, THOMAS KAY APPEARING 
FOR BRINTON BURBIDGE & KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN, JEFFERY JONES 
APPEARING FOR THE PLAINTIFF, ARTHUR NIELSEN AND JOHN MANGUM 
APPEARING FOR NIELSEN AND SENIOR, AND CATHERINE LARSON 
APPEARING FOR THE DEFENDANT MATTHEW HILTON. 
THE MOTION IS ARGUED TO THE COURT BY COUNSEL AND SUBMITTED. 
THE COURT NOW BEING FULLY ADVISED, GRANTS THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WITH PREJUDICE. 
MR. KAY IS TO PREPARE FINDINGS AND AN ORDER. 
0 0CS30 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD, SAMUEL L 
VS 
HARMON CITY, INC 
HILTON, MATTHEW 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 92090143 6 CV 
DATE 06/01/95 
HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK EHM 
AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS. 
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DENIED. 
2. PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND ORDER ARE DENIED. THE FINDINGS AND ORDER ARE 
SIGNED AS SUBMITTED ON THE ABOVE DATE. 
MR. KAY IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
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Case No: 920901436 CV 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the J 3* day of ^QbjAU. iffiO, 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
BLAKE T OSTLER 
Atty for Defendant 
1800 EAGLE GATE PLAZA 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Atty for Defendant 
1100 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
JEFFREY M. JONES 
Atty for Plaintiff 
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SUITE 850 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84144 
THOMAS KAY 
Atty for Defendant 
111 E BROADWAY, STE 900 
BROADWAY CENTRE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
GLENN C. HANNI 
Atty for Defendant 
600 BOSTON BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON 
15524 QUAIL RUN DRIVE 
NORTH POTOMAC MD 20878 
District Court Clerk 
By: f^O/Majuuyyi 
Deputy Clerk 
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THOMAS L. KAY (A1778) 
PAUL D. NEWMAN (A4889) 
AMY E. WEISSMAN (A7012) 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
I l l East Broadway, Suite 900 
Broadway Centre 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 237-1900 
Attorneys for Brinton Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
VS. ; 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah ] 
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON, ] 
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON, ] 
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah ] 
corporation, MICHAEL ] 
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR ; 
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON, 
and MRS. TERRY HARMON, ; 
Defendants. ] 
• FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 92-0901436-CV 
) Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
On April 6, 1995, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis. The Court, having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, the 
"©JPSTWCT COURT 
m 1 1995 
^puiyctes 
1 
(I i* (> V 1 >• 
pleadings, and the arguments of counsel, hereby renders the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about July 10, 1992, Samuel L. Boyd ("Boyd" or "Plaintiff") filed his 
Amended Complaint against Defendants. 
2. The events underlying the causes of action asserted in the Amended Complaint 
occurred during 1986. 
3. On or about July 31, 1992, Defendants Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, and 
Doreen Harmon ("Harmon Defendants") filed a Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Claim of 
Plaintiffs Complaint, along with a Memorandum in Support of the Motion. 
4. On August 11, 1992, Defendants Brinton Burbidge ("Burbidge") and Kirton, 
McConkie & Bushnell ("Kirton") filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and Request 
for Oral Argument, along with a Memorandum in Support of their Motion. 
5. On or about August 17, 1992, Defendant Nielsen & Senior ("Nielsen & Senior") 
filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint. Defendant Matthew Hilton ("Hilton") filed an 
Answer on or about August 18, 1992. 
6. On or about September 4, 1992, Boyd filed his Opposition to the Harmon 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
7. On or about September 14, 1992, Boyd filed his Opposition to Burbidge and 
Kirton's Motion to Dismiss. 
8. On or about September 15, 1992, the Harmon Defendants filed a Reply 
Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss. 
2 
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9. On September 22, 1992, Burbidge and Kirton filed a Reply Memorandum in 
Support of their Motion to Dismiss Complaint. 
10. On January 15, 1993, the Court held a hearing on Burbidge and Kirton's Motion 
to Dismiss and took the matter under advisement. 
11. On February 23, 1993, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision by which it 
denied Burbidge and Kirton's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First, Second, and Third Claims for 
Relief, and granted the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief. 
12. On March 10, 1993, Nielsen & Senior filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the 
Pleadings and a Memorandum in Support of that Motion. Nielsen & Senior's Motion was not 
opposed by Plaintiff. 
13. On March 12, 1993, Burbidge and Kirton filed an Answer to Amended 
Complaint. 
14. On April 14, 1993, the Court issued a Supplement to its Memorandum Decision, 
clarifying that the Memorandum Decision dismissed Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief not only 
against Kirton and Burbidge, but also against the Harmon Defendants. 
15. On April 20, 1993, the Court granted Nielsen & Senior's Motion for Partial 
Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissed Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for Relief against Nielsen & 
Senior. 
16. On or about April 21, 1993, the Harmon Defendants filed their Answer to 
Amended Complaint. 
3 
17. On or about May 19, 1993, Nielsen & Senior filed an Amended Answer to 
Amended Complaint, pursuant to a Stipulation For Leave to File Amended Answer filed 
concurrently therewith. 
18. Plaintiff took no action in this lawsuit other than defending against the various 
motions to dismiss. With regard to Burbidge, Kirton, and the Harmon Defendants, Plaintiff has 
done nothing for more than two years since defending against the Motion to Dismiss at the 
January 15, 1993 hearing before this Court. 
19. During February 1994, Thomas L. Kay, counsel for Burbidge and Kirton, 
encountered Jeffrey M. Jones, counsel for Plaintiff, at court. During that chance encounter, Mr. 
Kay suggested to Mr. Jones that he either "do something" to move this lawsuit along or else 
dismiss the claims against Burbidge and Kirton. Mr. Jones responded that he would look into 
it. No other discussion occurred: no monetary or other settlement terms were exchanged, and 
no negotiations took place. Despite this conversation, neither Mr. Jones nor any other attorney 
in his firm did anything to move the lawsuit along or to dismiss the claims against Burbidge and 
Kirton. 
20. Nielsen and Senior and its counsel have not engaged in any settlement discussions 
with Plaintiff for more than two years. 
21. No settlement discussions have taken place between Plaintiff and the Harmon 
Defendants. 
22. No settlement discussions have taken place between Plaintiff and Hilton. 
4 
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23. On January 26, 1995, Burbidge and Kirton filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure 
to Prosecute. Shortly thereafter, Hilton, Nielsen & Senior, and the Harmon Defendants filed 
similar motions. 
24. Plaintiff did not initiate any discovery until after the Motions to Dismiss for 
Failure to Prosecute were pending before the Court. Initiating discovery at this late date was 
Plaintiffs first affirmative conduct in more than two years, and the only action taken other than 
filing the Amended Complaint. 
25. There has been no real activity in the case for over two years. 
26. Plaintiff has had over three years to pursue his claim and has chosen not to do so. 
He has had a forum for the resolution of his disputes and has chosen not to use it. 
27. The onus was not on Defendants to undertake expensive discovery or other action 
when Plaintiff had taken no action to further his lawsuit. 
28. Other than the filing of the Complaint, all action taken in this lawsuit has been 
initiated by Defendants. Plaintiff has filed no dispositive motions. In fact, it is Defendants' 
activity that has generated the majority of the work in this case, and all of the activity for the 
last several years. 
29. Plaintiff offered no sufficiently reasonable or viable excuse for his lack of 
diligence, and the Court can find none. 
30. The pendency of this lawsuit has required the presence and activity of six 
attorneys, has necessitated an expenditure of their time and energy, and has resulted in 
considerable expense and concomitant prejudice to Defendants, their clients. 
5 
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31. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the attorney-Defendants must 
maintain professional liability coverage and insurance and, in so doing, must undertake 
significant reporting to maintain that insurance. 
32. The Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that all Defendants must pay 
attorneys to defend them and incur costs in connection with the defense and opinions regarding 
ongoing liability and loss contingency. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has considered the following five criteria in evaluating Defendants' 
Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute: (a) the conduct of the parties; (b) the opportunity 
each party has had to move the case along; (c) what each party has done to move the case 
forward; (d) the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side; 
and (e) whether injustice may result from the dismissal. Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State 
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul 
W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)). 
2. Each of the five factors weighs in favor of Defendants. 
3. No sufficiently reasonable or viable excuse exists for Plaintiff's lack of diligence. 
4. Because Plaintiff had three years to pursue his claim, but chose not to do so, he 
is not unfairly prejudiced by dismissal of this action. In light of the Court's findings of fact, 
no injustice will result from dismissal. 
5. The four Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute were brought pursuant to 
Rule 41(b), which provides: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with 
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for 
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dismissal of an action or of any claim against him . . . . Unless 
the court in its order of dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal 
under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this 
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper 
venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
U.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Dismissal therefore operates as an adjudication on the merits, unless 
otherwise provided. 
6. Pursuant to Rule 41(b), this lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits 
as against Burbidge, Kirton, Hilton, Nielsen & Senior, and the Harmon Defendants. 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I /-^" day of April, 1995,1 served a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE upon the following named persons by depositing said document 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. ^ 
J. Mark Gibb 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Blake T. Ostler, Esq. ' 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Harmon Defendants 
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. / 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Matthew Hilton 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. •/ 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael Gottfredson, Esq. 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, MD 20878 
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THOMAS L. KAY (A1778) 
PAUL D. NEWMAN (A4889) 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
I l l East Broadway, Suite 900 
Broadway Centre 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 237-1900 
Attorneys for Brinton Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah ) 
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON, ] 
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON, ] 
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah ] 
corporation, MICHAEL ] 
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR ] 
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON, ; 
and MRS. TERRY HARMON, ] 
Defendants. ] 
• ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
> MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
) FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
) Civil No. 92-0901436-CV 
) Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, came on for hearing before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on 
April 6, 1995. Plaintiff was represented by Jeffrey M. Jones and J. Mark Gibb. Defendant 
Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon and Mrs. Terry Harmon were represented by Blake T. 
Ostler. Defendant Matthew Hilton was represented by Catherine M. Larson. Defendants 
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Brinton Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell were represented by Thomas L. Kay. 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior was represented by Arthur H. Nielsen and John K. Mangum. 
Prior to the hearing, the Court had reviewed the memoranda of counsel, cases cited by 
the parties and the pleadings on file. After hearing the arguments of counsel and after making 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute are 
granted and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this /£fajTof April, \995. 
BY THE COKRT: 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the | y day of April, 1995,1 served a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR 
FADLURE TO PROSECUTE upon the following named persons by depositing said document 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. 
J. Mark Gibb 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Blake T. Ostler, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Harmon Defendants 
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Matthew Hilton 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael Gottfredson, Esq. 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, MD 20878 
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THOMAS L. KAY (A1778) 
PAUL D. NEWMAN (A4889) 
S N E L L & W I L M E R L L P . 
I l l East Broadway, Suite 900 
Broadway Centre 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 237-1900 
Attorneys for Brinton Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie & Poelman 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah ] 
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON, ; 
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON, ; 
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah ; 
corporation, MICHAEL 
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR , 
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON. ; 
and MRS. TERRY HARMON, ; 
Defendants. ] 
> ORDER 
) Civil No. 92-0901436-CV 
) Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Plaintiff, Samuel L. Boyd, filed Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration on April 
27, 1995. The Objection and the Motion were fully briefed by the parties, and were submitted 
RIED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
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to the Court for decision pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(d) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
The Court, having considered the parties' submissions, and good cause appearing 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
2. Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment is denied. 
DATED this ' {•} day of June, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
^HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS' 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT " " 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /<^fJi day of June, 1995,1 served a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing ORDER upon the following named persons by depositing said document in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Blake T. Ostler, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Harmon Defendants 
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Matthew Hilton 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael Gottfredson, Esq. 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, MD 20878 
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Paul M. Durham (0939) 
Jeffrey M. Jones (1741) 
J. Mark Gibb (5702) 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P . C . 
Key Bank T o w e r , S u i t e 850 
50 S o u t h Main S t r e e t 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 84144 F8LEJ3tt&YMCr8SU8T 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 8 - 2 4 2 4 Third jHrt'cta! D.&tnct 
Attorneys for Plaintiff HAY 0 1 1995 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIST^iaffcirtfcjQWRT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, 
Plaintiff, 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON, 
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON, 
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah 
corporation, MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON, 
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah 
corporation, TERRY HARMON and 
MRS. TERRY HARMON, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL L. 
BOYD IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Civil No. 920901436CV 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
:ss 
COUNTY OF DALLAS ) 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, I have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth herein and would so testify if 
called upon to do so. 
si I-. '• r\ c 
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2 . I am an attorney and have reviewed the proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the defendants in this 
action and find several portions to be in error. 
3. The delay in pursuing this case was due to my counsel's 
attention to the case in which I was sued by my previous counsel of 
record in the present case, Mr. Isom. 
4. Isom and I thereafter exchanged several letters to 
attempt to settle our fee dispute. Unfortunately a compromise and 
settlement could not be reached. Isom thereafter filed a Motion 
for Withdrawal of Counsel in this action. 
5. On September 9, 1992, I filed an action in the Dallas 
County Court, State of Texas, Samuel L. Boyd v. David K. Isom and 
the Law Offices of David K. Isom, Cause No. 92-7710, ("the Texas 
Action") seeking among other things, a declaratory judgment that I 
only pay Isom for reasonable attorneys' fees actually incurred, as 
well as out-of-pocket expenses in representing me in this action. 
6. Subsequent to my filing of the Texas Action in Texas, 
Isom filed a related action in Utah on September 22, 1992 (the 
"Isom Action"). The Texas Action was stayed and the Isom Action 
was tried before Judge Frank G. Noel who issued a memorandum 
decision in favor of Isom on June 16, 1993. My attorneys filed my 
notice of appeal in the Isom action on December 9, 1993. 
7. In February 1994, Mr. Jones, my attorney contacted me 
regarding a meeting which he had with Mr. Kay at court regarding 
this case. I asked Mr. Jones to inform Mr. Kay regarding 
settlement terms proposed by me. Mr. Kay apparently never told Mr. 
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Jones of his clients acceptance or rejection of my settlement 
offer. 
8. On June 2, 1994, my counsel filed my appellant's brief in 
the Isom Action. On or about July 26f 1994, while the matter was 
in the process of being submitted to the Utah Supreme Court, Mr. 
Isom and I settled the Isom Action. 
9. Defendants in this action have only filed a motion to 
dismiss. Further, these motions to dismiss were not filed with 
respect to all claims in this action, but were only with respect to 
the fourth cause of action for securities fraud with the exception 
of Burbidge and Kirton's motion which was filed on all causes of 
action. 
10. Accordingly, it is my understanding that defendants 
Harmon City, Inc., Matthew Hilton, Michael Gottfredson, Nielsen & 
Senior, Terry Harmon and Mrs. Terry Harmon have taken no action 
with respect to Plaintiff's First, Second and Third Causes of 
Action other than to answer the Amended Complaint. 
11. I am not aware of any evidence of defendants' expense or 
prejudice that is currently before the Court nor was it at the time 
of the Court's ruling granting defendants' motion to dismiss. 
12. I am not aware of any evidence of defendants' maintenance 
of professional liability coverage and insurance that is currently 
before the Court nor was it at the time of the Court's ruling 
granting defendants' motion to dismiss. 
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13. Upon information and belief, not all defendants have paid 
other outside attorneys to defend them, but instead have defended 
themselves. 
14. Defendants, to my knowledge, have not previously 
requested a scheduling conference in this action. 
15. I have not been made aware of any Orders to Show Cause 
issued or hearings held in this case regarding a lack of 
prosecution until April 6, 1995. 
16. Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 2 does not appear to 
differentiate between the defendants regarding their conduct and 
opportunity to move the case along. 
17. Only Kirton and Burbidge, to the extent of my knowledge, 
filed a Motion to Dismiss all causes of action in this case. 
18. I also understand that Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, 
and Mrs. Terry Harmon's motion to dismiss was only with respect to 
the Fourth Cause of Action. Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, and 
Mrs. Terry Harmon have done nothing with respect to defending or 
bringing motions regarding the First, Second, and Third Causes of 
Action until their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was 
filed. 
19. I am not aware that Defendant Nielsen & Senior has done 
anything other than file an Answer to the Complaint and request a 
partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to the Fourth Cause 
of Action. Nielsen & Senior has done nothing with respect to 
defending or bringing motions regarding the First, Second, and 
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Third Causes of Action until its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute was filed. 
20. I understand that Defendant Hilton has done nothing but 
answer the Complaint until his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute was filed. 
21. Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 2 does not consider the 
very significant expense incurred by me in negotiating the purchase 
of Harmon City, Inc., which is the basis for my claims in this 
lawsuit. 
22. During the time in which I was negotiating for the sale 
of Harmon City, Inc. with the various defendants I incurred great 
expense and attorney fees. The expenses incurred by me were for 
bank consultants, attorneys, travel, housing and related expenses, 
which expenses I recall totalled approximately $50,000.00. I have 
further incurred attorney time and expenses well exceeding 
$100,000.00 in seeking recovery for my losses in the failed 
purchase of Harmon City, Inc. 
23. Because of these expenses and the lack of prejudice shown 
by defendants, it is my strong opinion and belief that dismissal of 
my claims with prejudice will result in severe and substantial 
injustice to me. I wanted to purchase Harmon City, Inc. and 
Citicorp was willing to finance the acquisition subject to 
clarifying a material, non-disclosure relating to the Company's 
mishandling of their employees and pension/ERISA money. 
24. If given the opportunity, my attorneys have committed to 
diligently pursue discovery and my claims. 
5 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 2(p day of April, 1995 
Samuel L 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of April, 
1995 
My Commission Expires: 
l'Z8^& 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, this ~"gfc** day of 
April, 1995, to the following: iSt*— 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake T. Ostler, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas L. Kay, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorney for Defendant 
111 East Broadway #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(\ ** r, *?> ^ 
Michael Gottfredson, Esq. 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, MD 20878 
Glenn C. Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorney for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Blake T. Ostler (A4642) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Harmon City, Inc. 
Terry Harmon & Mrs. Terry Harmon 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON, 
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON, 
McCONKIE BUSHNELL, a Utah 
corporation, MICHAEL 
GOTTFREDSON, NIELSON & SENIOR, 
a Utah corporation, TERRY HARMON 
and MRS. TERRY HARMON 
Defendants. 
HARMONS DEFENDANTS' 
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 9209021436CV 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendants Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon and Mrs. Terry Harmon (the "Harmons 
Defendants") hereby respond Plaintiffs First Request for Admissions as follows: 
I 0 V | O i' 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. The Harmons Defendants object to each and every request insofar and to 
the extent that such requests seek work product and/or disclosure of attorney-client 
privileged, or otherwise privileged, information. 
2. The Harmons Defendants object to each and every Request on the grounds 
that the Court should first determine the Harmons' Defendants Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Prosecute. 
3. The Harmons Defendants object to each and every request insofar and to 
the extent that it seeks information not relevant to the subject matter of this action and not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
4. In accordance with these objections and exceptions, and without waiving any 
of them, the Harmons Defendants respond to the Plaintiffs Request to Admit as follows: 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST TO ADMIT 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that during the period between January 1, 1986, through 
September 31, 1986, T.R. Harmon was the chief executive office (sic) and president of 
Harmon City Incorporation. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that during that same period you were a trustee of the Profit-
Sharing Plan as well as the Benefit Trust. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
-2-
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REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that as the chief executive officer of Harmon City and as a 
Trustee of the Profit-Sharing Plan and the Benefit Trust, you were notified by an officer of 
the U.S. Department of Labor that an audit of the records of the Trust and the Profit-
Sharing Plan was to be initiated. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that as Trustee of the Trust and Profit-Sharing Plan you 
received a letter July 24, 1986, from the U.S. Department of Labor that there may be 
personal liability for violation of U.S. Department of Labor rules and regulations. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that that same letter informed you that a formal investigation 
was to be initiated or instituted by the U.S. Department of Labor of the transactions of the 
Trustees and the Trust with entities or individuals the Trustees were associated or involved 
with. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that the U.S. Department of Labor investigation established 
that violations of its rules and regulations had, in fact, occurred. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to Request No. 6 on the grounds that 
it is too vague to form a coherent request. Without waiving the foregoing objection, the 
Harmons Defendants admit that the U.S. Department of Labor concluded that violations of 
ERISA had occurred and brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
-3-
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Utah. However, the Harmons Defendants deny that any final determination was made to 
establish such alleged violations. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that you and other Trustees were held personally liable for 
the misuse or mismanagement of the Trust and Profit-Sharing Plan funds and required to 
reimburse said funds or a substantial portion thereof. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that you received a letter dated June 2, 1986, from Nini 
corporation offering to purchase 100 percent of the shares of Harmon City. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that on June 24, 1986, a meeting was held at which time 
certain basic terms were agreed upon between Boyd as agent of Nini Corporation and the 
Shareholders to purchase 100 percent of the Harmon City shares. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants admit that a meeting was held but deny that 
any binding or final agreement was reached. 
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that Matthew Hilton, Esq., attorney at law, was present at 
said meeting representing the Harmons and Martins and Greens, the Shareholders of 
Harmon City. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that pursuant to the instructions of the Shareholders, Mr. 
Hilton, attorney at law, prepared an agreement setting forth all of the terms of the Purchase 
-4-
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Agreement between Nini Corporation, the plaintiff, and the Shareholders whereby Nini 
Corporation would purchase 100 percent of the outstanding stock of Harmon City. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that the Agreement was signed by Nini Corporation on July 
8, 1986, and by the Shareholders of Harmon City on July 7, 1986. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request on the ground that the 
subject Agreement speaks for itself and deny the Request to the extent the subject 
Agreement is inconsistent with it. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that though the closing date was set in the Purchase 
Agreement as August 30,1986, that date was later extended to September 10,1986, with the 
agreement of the Plaintiff and the Shareholders of Harmon City. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants admit that a closing date was set for 30 August 
1986 and was later extended on several occasions and deny the remainder of the Request 
because it is untrue. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that the Purchase Agreement set the value per share of 
Harmon City at $20.00 per share. 
RESPONSE: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 15: Admit that the total purchase price of 100 percent of Harmon City 
shares was agreement (sic) to be $20,000,000. 
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RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to Request No. 15 on the grounds that 
it is too vague to allow them to form a coherent response and therefore deny the same. 
REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that the $20,000,000 figure was subject to reduction as set 
forth in paragraph 2 of the Purchase Agreement. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this request because the subject 
Agreement speaks for itself and deny this Request to the extent the subject Agreement is 
inconsistent with it. 
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that the Seller agreed that so long as negotiations with the 
Plaintiff were continuing, the Plaintiff had the exclusive and sole right to negotiate with the 
Shareholders of Harmon City, individually or as a group for the purchase of the shares of 
Harmon City. 
RESPONSE: Denied. The subject Agreement speaks for itself and the Plaintiffs 
recharacterization of the Agreement in this Request is not consistent with the intent and 
meaning of the Agreement. 
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that the Shareholders of Harmon City without notice to the 
Plaintiff negotiated a sale of Harmon City shares among themselves as of August 28, 1986, 
resulting in the Harmon Family Agreement. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. To the extent the Harmons Defendants 
understand this Request, they deny that they negotiated a sale of Harmon City stock as of 
28 August 1986. 
-6-
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REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that The (sic) August 28, 1986 Agreement incudes two 
Shareholders who were not identified nor made a party to the original Purchase Agreement, 
to wit, Laurie Harmon and Sid Harmon. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request because the subject 
Agreement speaks for itself and deny this Request to the extent the agreement is inconsistent 
with this Request. 
REQUEST NO. 20 : Admit that The (sic) August 28,1986 Agreement does not include 
one Shareholder that signed the Purchase Agreement dated July 7, 8, 1986, between the 
Plaintiff and Seller, to wit, Jerry R. Harmon Trust. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 19. 
REQUEST NO. 21: Admit that The (sic) August 28,1986 Agreement was negotiated 
and prepared after the Shareholders entered into the Purchase Agreement with the Plaintiff. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 22: Admit that T.R. Harmon or his attorney had informed the 
Shareholders of Harmon City at the time The (sic) August 28, 1986 Agreement was signed 
that the Plaintiffs offer to purchase Harmon City shares had not been rejected and in fact 
the Plaintiff had been granted additional time in which to verify the financial information 
obtained concerning the financial condition of Harmon City. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request because it requests 
attorney-client privileged information. 
-7-
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REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that the Shareholders of Harmon City anticipated the failure 
of The (sic) August 28, 1986 Agreement because they did not intend to execute the final 
sales agreement between themselves and Plaintiff because they had entered into an 
agreement providing for the specific distribution of Harmon City shares to pay or otherwise 
resolve the existing financial problems with certain shareholders and certain banks, as well 
as the Profit-Sharing Plan and the Benefit Trust. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. Without waiving the foregoing objection, 
the Harmons Defendants deny this request because it is untrue. 
REQUEST NO. 24: Admit that after The (sic) August 28, 1986 Agreement was in fact 
instituted and the conditions enforced, all the debts and liabilities were paid or extinguished 
or forgiven and that F. Ray Green and his wife and children were to be paid $784,574.00 for 
their remaining shares of Harmon City. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. 
REQUEST NO. 25: Admit that T.R. Harmon and his wife and children benefitted from 
the August 28,1986 Agreement in that several debt liabilities of T.R. Harmon were also paid, 
extinguished or forgiven because he was jointly liable with F. Ray Green for the payment, 
refunding and restitution of funds to the Profit-Sharing Plan and Benefit Trust. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
0 0 0 i 3 ; 
REQUEST NO. 26: Admit that The (sic) August 28,1986 Agreement provides that T.R. 
Harmon Limited would purchase from F. Ray Green 56,041 shares of Harmon City stock for 
$14.00 per share. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request on the ground that the 
subject Agreement speaks for itself. 
REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that T. R. Harmon Limited is either (1) owned by Terry R. 
Harmon or (2) owned by Terry R. Harmon and his wife and children or (3) controlled by 
Terry R. Harmon. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. 
REQUEST NO. 28: Admit that T.R. Harmon did not inform the Shareholders of 
Harmon City of the potential liability of Harmon City, its officers and shareholders for the 
ERISA violations. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. 
REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that the Plaintiff became aware of said potential liability 
sometime on the day of September 9, 1986. 
RESPONSE: Denied. The Plaintiff was notified of the possible Department of Labor 
claims much earlier. 
REQUEST NO. 30: Admit that the representatives of the Plaintiff asked for more 
information regarding the ERISA violations on September 10, 1986, at the time of the 
scheduled closing. 
-9-
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RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. 
REQUEST NO. 31: Admit that on September 10, T.R. Harmon representing himself, 
the other Shareholders, and Harmon City was present at the time set for the closing with the 
Plaintiff under the terms of the Purchase Agreement. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 32: Admit that on September 10, 1986, Boyd was present with an 
officer or agent of City Corp., Plaintiffs financing bank. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. 
REQUEST NO. 33: Admit that the representative of City Corp. informed all present 
that the loan to the Plaintiff for $20 million had in fact been approved. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 15. 
REQUEST NO. 34: Admit that City Corp. had all documents in hand and was prepared 
to distribute the money as the parties to the Purchase Agreement, the Shareholders of 
Harmon City agreed and directed. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request because it calls for the 
state of mind of another and information exclusively within the possession of Plaintiffs agent. 
REQUEST NO. 35: Admit that the City Corp. agent had just been informed of the 
potential liability because of the investigation being conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Labor concerning the Trust and the Profit-Sharing Plan. 
RESPONSE: See response to Requests No. 6 and 34. 
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REQUEST NO. 36: Admit that both the Plaintiff and City Corp. through their 
representing agents requested a continuance for a review of the circumstances regarding the 
U.S. Department of Labor claim of the Department of Labor could be checked out (sic). 
RESPONSE: See response to Requests No. 15 and 34. 
REQUEST NO. 37: Admit that T.R. Harmon refused on behalf of himself and all other 
Shareholders to grant an extension of the time requested by the Plaintiff and City Corp. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 38: Admit that T.R. Harmon within 24 hours after refusing the request 
for continuance by the Plaintiff and its financing bank, notified all Shareholders and Zions 
Bank that the terms of the August 28, 1986 Agreement were to be in effect. 
RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 39: Admit that pursuant to the terms of the August 28, 1986 
Agreement, T.R. Harmon obtained control of Harmon City, Inc. by becoming the major 
shareholder, and had an ownership or control of greater than 50 percent of the shares. 
RESPONSE: The Harmons Defendants object to this Request on the grounds that it 
speaks for itself. In addition, and without waiving the foregoing objection, the Harmons 
Defendants deny this request. 
REQUEST NO. 40: Admit that all Harmon City shares owned by or in the possession 
of T.R. Harmon are represented by certificates issued in the name of either T.R. Harmon 
Limited or T.R. Harmon personally. 
-11-
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RESPONSE: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 41: Admit that all the terms and conditions set forth in The (sic) 
August 28, 1986 Agreement have been met and no party is in default. 
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 16. Without waiving the foregoing objection, 
the Harmons Defendants deny this Request because it is not true. 
DATED this day of March, 1995. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Blake T. Ostler 
Attorneys for Defendants Harmon City, Inc., 
Terry Harmon & Mrs. Terry Harmon 
-12-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the |/^Klday of March, 1995,1 caused to be delivered 
by the method indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing HARMONS 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR 
ADMISSION to the following: 
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FEDERAL EXPRESS 
U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERY 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
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U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERY 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Thomas L. Kay 
SNELL & WILMER 
111 East Broadway, #900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael Gottfredson 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, MD 20878 
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Glenn C. Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Paul M. Durham 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
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Patricia S. Weiner, Attorney 
Office of the Solicitor ' ' 
United States Department of Labor 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
Ann McLaughlin, 
Secretary of Labor, United States 
Department of Labor, 
PARTIAL CONSENT 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
Terry Harmon, an individual, 
F. Ray Green, an individual, 
Harmon City, Inc.f a Utah 
corporation, and Midwest Realty 
and Finance, Inc.r a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants* 
This action was filed by the Secretary of Labor 
alleging that the defendants failed to discharge their 
responsibilities as fiduciaries of the Harmon City, Inc. 
Profit Sharing Plan ("the Plan") in violation of Title I of 
CIVIL ACTION 
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the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq., and seeking to enjoin further 
violations of the Act and to obtain other equitable relief. 
The defendants waive service of the Complaint and admit 
that the Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant, to 
ERISA §502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. §H32(e)(2), and that venue lies 
in the District of Utah, Central Division, pursuant to ERISA 
§502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1132(e)(2). 
The defendants, without admitting or denying the 
violations of ERISA alleged in the Complaint, consent to this 
Partial Judgment. 
All parties having agreed to the entry of this Order, 
and it appearing that the Court has jurisdiction over the 
parties and subject matter of this action and that the Court 
is empowered to provide the following, equitable relief, it is 
ORDERED: 
1. Judgment be entered as set forth below. 
2. Plaintiff shall have judgment against defendants in 
the amount of $4 million, payment of which amount shall be 
made as follows: 
a. On or before /h&((cr 1^ 1938, defendants shall 
pay to the Plan cash in the amount of $500,000; 
b. On or before y&t^m/ff.Sl988, defendant Harmon 
City, Inc. (hereinafter Harmon's) shall draft and give the 
Plan a promissory note in the amount of $500,000. said note 
will be paid based on a thirty year amortization schedule 
with a ten year call and shall bear interest on the unpaid 
2
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balance at the prime rate published by First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A. salt Lake City, Utah as of $Cg\tMw6r j 1988. 
Payments on said note are to be made on the 15th of each 
month. Any failure to make a payment due pursuant to this 
note within 3 0 days of the date when such payment is due 
shall result in all remaining monies due pursuant to this 
note becoming immediately due and payable. Said note shall 
be secured at the option of plaintiff, by either (a) deeds of 
trust on the following properties: 
The Cable TV Property 
cafe Silvestre 
Hartwell House 
or (b) first trust deed(s) on properties wherein the MAI 
appraised value of the equity is at least $600,000 (c) or a 
combination of the above. The defendants shall provide 
plaintiff with the appraisals referred to in sub-paragraphs 
(b) above within 30 days of the signing of this Order, and 
plaintiff shall indicate her selection of securities within 
ten -lays thereof. Defendants shall then tender the selected 
deed or deeds of trust to the Plan forthwith. 
c. On or before 88, the Plan shall transfer 
to defendant Harmon City, Inc. all right title and ownership 
interest in the below identified pieces of real property, 
which real property defendant takes subject to all 
encumbrances, liens and indebtedness of any kind- The 
property to be transferred is: 
0 (t 0 £: 7 2 
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Alsop Building 
3086-3092 West 3500 South 
West Valley c i t y , Utah 
Brinker Building 
1140 East 3 6th S t ree t 
Ogden, Utah 
Cable TV Building 
3575 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 
Cafe Silvestre 
3525 South 2200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 
Medident Building 
70 South 9 00 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Sandy Commercial 
530 West 9460 South 
sandy, Utah 
Sana/ Commercial 
560 West 9460 South 
Sandy, Utah 
Harman Drive Apartments 
4637 & 4653 West Harman Drive 
West Valley, Utah 
Hartwell House 
56 West Hartwell Ave 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
0 0 0 6 1 :< 
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Irving Street Apartments 
74 4 & 7 46 North Irving Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Olvmpus Apartments 
2035 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Redondo Apartments 
326 East Redondo Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Riverton Apartments 
12659 & 12679 South 1630 West 
Riverton, Utah 
Riviera West Apartments 
872 west 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
West Valley Apartments 
4123 West 3275 South and 4147 West 3280 South 
West Valley City, Utah 
Chattel No. iv. Lot m 
9425 South 2500 West 
South Jordan, Utah 
Pleasant Valley (4S Lots regaining) 
3100 South 6400 West 
West Valley City, Utah 
Roxborough I, Lot 3 5 
2 8 55 Roxborough Park 
West Valley City, Utah 
A n r\ 
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Spring Meadow (13 lots remaining) 
200 West 
Kamas, Utah 
Westcove P,U.D« 
4460 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 
The trustee(s) of the Plan or their designates is/are 
ordered/directed to execute all documents necessary to 
transfer title to the above identified real properties from 
the Plan to defendant Harmon City, Inc-
(d) The defendants shall transfer to the Plan 
stoc): in Harmon City, inc. worth $3 million dollars* The 
parties shall have said corporation appraised in order to 
determine the exact number of shares which must be 
transferred. Credit to the extent of $129,000 shall be given 
against such transfer for the forfeiture to the Plan of the 
entirety of the vested account balance of participant 
defendant Ray Green, The actual amount of said account 
balance shall be reallocated equitably among the accounts of 
all other Plan participants. 
It is anticipated that the stock appraisal 
referred to in the preceding paragraph will be completed and 
the stock transferred within 120 days, and that a final 
consent judgment will be entered at that time setting forth 
the specifics of that transfer- The appraisal will be 
conducted in the manner set forth below. 
6 (I ft ft £ 7 A 
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The parties shall jointly engage, as neutral 
appraisers, Bruce Brown and Greg Gilbert to conduct two full 
and complete independent appraisals of Harmon City, Inc. In 
the event that either appraiser is unable or unwilling to be 
so engaged, another appraiser will be chosen by the parties 
jointly. Upon receipt of the two appraisals, if the 
appraised values as determined by each of the appraisers are 
within $750,000 of each other, then the enterprise value of 
the corporation will be determined by taking the median of 
the two appraised values (i.e., splitting the difference 
between the two appraised values) , and accepting that median 
as the enterprise value of the corporation. Thus, if the 
appraised values as determined by the appraisers are 
$12,500,000 and $13,000,000, then the $500,000 difference 
between these two values would be divided in half ($250,000) 
and that amount added to the lesser of the appraised values 
to determine the appraised value (in this example 
$12,750,000). 
In the event the appraised values as determined by the 
two appraisers differs by more than $750,000, a determination 
would be made as to whether the difference between the two 
exceeds 30%. That determination would be made by determining 
the median between the two appraised values, calculating 30% 
of that figure, and then determining whether the amount by 
which the two appraisals differ exceeds that figure. By way 
of example, if the appraised values are $13,000,000 and 
$15,000,000, the median between these two figures would be 
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determined ($14,000,000). Then 30% of that median figure 
would be calculated ($4,200,000). It would then be 
determined whether the difference between the two appraised 
values (herein $2,000,000) was less than 30% of the median of 
the two values (herein $4,200,000). 
In the event the difference between the two appraised 
values, utilizing the above-described method is determined to 
be less than 30%, the two appraisers would be instructed to 
meet, either telephonically or in person, and attempt to 
reach a single, mutually agreeable appraised value at or 
between the two appraised values independently determined. 
If the appraisers are unable of their own accord to reach 
such a mutually agreeable appraised value after a reasonable 
amount of discussion and exchange between them they would be 
authorized to jointly select a third appraiser, to meet with 
them and attempt to mediate their differences. It shall be 
the responsibility of the third jointly-selected appraiser to 
determine which of the two appraised values he found to be 
most reasonable and factually supportable. That value would 
then be the value utilized as the enterprise value for 
settlement purposes herein. 
However, the mediator need not select one of the two 
appraiser's values, but may select a different figure between 
those of the two appraisers. The mediator is, however, 
precluded from selecting either a higher or a lower value. 
The appraisers will be instructed that a single, joint 
report including a single mutually agreed upon appraised 
8 
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value is to be issued as a result of the consultations 
between the two appraisers (and the mediator, if necessary) . 
In the event the difference between the two appraised 
values, is determined to be greater than 30%, utilizing the 
above-described method, the two appraisers would be requested 
to meet (either telephonically or in person), and attempt to 
determine whether there was a reasonable and factual basis 
for either or both of their appraised values to be adjusted 
so that they would be within 30% of each other. If the two 
appraisers were able to agree on values within 3 0% of each 
other, then the procedure described in the preceding 
paragraph, respecting the use of a mediator, would be 
instituted in an attempt to reach a single, mutually agreed 
upon value. In the event such agreement, on value less than 
3 0%, could not be reached, then two new appraisers would be 
selected jointly by the parties and the valuation procedure 
set forth above herein reinstituted. 
The two appraisers shall be engaged mutually and issued 
a mutually agreed upon joint letter of instruction to insure 
their neutrality. Each would be provided with all the 
information either of them determined to be necessary to the 
completion of their appraisals; however, neither shall be 
informed of the results of any prior appraisals which have 
been conducted with respect the corporation- The appraisals 
shall be reflective of all facts determined by the appraisers 
to affect the value of the corporate defendant herein, 
including any and all terms of the settlement in this action, 
9
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such as the transfer of property, the note to be given the 
Plan, the $500,000 cash payment, the stock transfer, on the 
put, and the restrictions on corporate management set forth 
in paragraph 11 herein. The appraisers shall be instructed 
to determine an enterprise value for the stock; as a result 
of the terms of the put encompassed in the settlement it will 
not be necessary to determine a minority stock value. If 
determined to be appropriate by either of the appraisers, 
other accepted valuation methodologies may be used. 
Payment of all costs of the above-described appraisal 
process would be borne equally by the defendants herein and 
the Plan, 
The stock to be transferred to the Plan will be from 
authorized shares, but not necessarily already issued shares* 
In the event that shares are transferred to the Plan, whether 
or not previously issued, the per share price will be 
adjusted to reflect any dilution which the transfer of such 
shares would have on a previously determined share price. In 
other words, if a per share value is determined based on the 
number of shares currently outstanding, the per share price 
will have to be adjusted to reflect the dilution caused by 
the transfer of additional shares to the Plan, 
3. Defendant Harmon City, Inc. shall within 30 days of 
the entry of this Order nominate and submit to plaintiff the 
name of a federally or state chartered bank or of a person 
who is registered as an investment advisor under the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 or of an insurance company 
A a /» /. •*.
 r. 
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qualified to manage, acquire, or dispose of any assets of the 
Plan under the laws of more than one State, to serve as the 
Plan trustee and the Plan Administrator. Said nomination 
shall be submitted to the Area Director, San Francisco Area 
Office, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, 71 
Stevenson Street, PO Box 3455, Suite 915, San Francisco, CA 
94119-3455• Unless plaintiff gives its written consent 
otherwise, should the- nominee be a bank, such bank shall be 
one with which none of the defendants has any ownership or 
other significant financial interest, banking or investment 
relationship• Should any defendant have any ownership, 
significant interest in, or banking or investment 
relationship with the nominee Bank, such interest shall be 
fully disclosed in the written nomination. 
Upon receipt of defendants1 nomination and any 
information provided plaintiff pursuant to the preceding 
paragraph, the plaintiff shall approve or disapprove the 
nomination, Approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
Should the plaintiff disapprove defendants1 nomination, 
the defendant shall, within 3 0 days, nominate a second 
candidate whose appointment shall be subject to the same 
approval procedure. In the event the defendants are unable 
to locate any person(s) or entity(s) willing and capable of 
serving as the Plan Trustee and the Plan Administrator, and 
which are acceptable to plaintiff, plaintiff shall within 90 
daysf unilaterally nominate a Plan trustee and a Plan 
Administrator. The person(s) or entity(ies) chosen to serve 
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as Plan Trustee and Plan Administrator shall submit to the 
Court and the parties a written acknowledgement of their 
fiduciary status and of the binding nature of the terms of 
this decree. 
Upon approval by the plaintiff of defendants' 
nomination for Plan Trustee and Plan Administrator, 
defendants shall execute and/or cause other authorized Plan 
officials to execute and provide the nominee(s) with all 
documents necessary to allow the chosen entity, as Plan 
Trustee and Plan Administrator, to take full discretionary 
authority and control over all the assets owned by the Plan. 
The Plan trustee shall have full discretion to engage any 
additional service providers including investment managers, 
to effectively and efficiently manage the assets of the Plan. 
It is anticipated that defendant Harmon's may continue to 
provide participant accounting services to the Plan at no 
expense to the Plan and may continue to make eligibility 
deterainations, benefit determinations, and discrimination 
calculations. However, defendant Harmon's may, at its option 
and with reasonable notice to the Plan Administrator, cease 
to provide such services. Further, the Plan Administrator 
may, at its option and with reasonable notice to defendant 
Harmons, select another service provider to provide 
participant accounting services for the Plan. 
The nominated Plan trustee shall be responsible for the 
appointment of a Plan representative to become a member of 
the Board of Directors of Harmon City, Inc., as set forth in 
12 0 0 0 6 8.1 
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paragraph 8(2) below. This Plan representative is in lieu of 
any representative that would otherwise be elected by the 
Plan in a stockholders election-
4* It is hereby ordered that an independent Plan 
Trustee of the type described in paragraph 3 above shall be 
retained for a period of ten years from the date of this 
Judgment and shall not during that time period be removed 
except with the written consent of the plaintiff or by 
further Order of this Court. 
If the independent Plan trustee resigns, said trustee 
shall notify plaintiff in writing by directing a letter to 
the l rea Director, San Francisco Area Office, Pension and 
Welfare Benefits Administration, 71 Stevenson Street, PO Box 
3455, Suite 915, San Francisco, CA 94119-3455- Plaintiff 
will then notify Harmon City, Inc. of the resignation- As 
soon as possible thereafter, but in any event not later than 
3 0 days from the date Harmon City, Inc. learns of the Plan 
trustee's resignation or inability to act, it shall nominate 
another candidate whose appointment shall be subject to the 
approval procedure set forth herein in paragraph 3. The 
procedure in paragraph 3 shall also be followed if plaintiff 
consents in writing to the removal of said trustee. At the 
end of the ten year period referred to herein, the Plan 
sponsor may designate a Plan trustee pursuant to the Plan. 
Unless otherwise agreed to by Plaintiff, the Plan fiduciary 
shall be required to report to the Plaintiff, on a yearly 
basis, within sixty days after the end of the Plan year, 
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describing those actions taken on behalf of the Plan by the 
independent fiduciary and a brief statement of the reasons 
therefor. 
5. The defendants, their officers, agents and 
employees are permanently enjoined from violating the 
provisions of Sections 404(a)(1) and 406(a) and (b) of ERISA, 
29 U.S-C. section 1001 et seer. 
6. The defendants Midwest, Green, Harmon and Harmon 
City, Inc. are enjoined from acting in any fiduciary capacity 
with respect to any employee benefit plan for a period of ten 
years from the date of this Order. 
7. Defendant Harmon's shall abide by all of the 
conditions set forth in paragraph 8 below or obtain prior 
approval from the appointed Plan Representative on the Board 
of Directors of the Corporation before entering into a 
transaction which would contravene one of these conditions. 
Approval of the Plan representative shall not be unreasonably 
withheld. 
Defendant Harmon's shall be relieved from 
compliance with conditions 1 through 8 of paragraph 8 herein 
when the v.iue of the stock held by the Plan as a result of 
the instant settlement has a value of less than $750,000. 
Further, when the value of the stock held by the Plan is 
reduced to $750,000, the corporation shall have the right to 
call such stock. In the event of the use of such a call the 
corporation would have to pay to the Plan the value of the 
stock at its "most recent appraised value" as defined in 
1 A 
A A r r*
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paragraph 12 herein. Payment for any stock so purchased by 
the corporation would be made in equal periodic payments (not 
less frequently than annually) , with interest at the prime 
rate published by First Security Bank of Utah, N*A. Salt Lake 
City, Utah as of the date of the call, over a period 
beginning not later than thirty days after exercise of the 
call and not exceeding five years. The Plan will retain the 
stock as security until full payment is made* 
3. (1.) The corporation shall not enter into any 
transaction or any combination of transactions in any one 
fiscal year which would result in the sale, liquidation or 
spin-off of corporate assets (other than inventory) in excess 
of twenty five (2 5%) of corporate assets at the time of 
settlement, or that in any five year period during the time 
when this restriction is in effect, would result in more than 
fifty (50) percent of such assets being sold, liquidated or 
spunoff. 
(2 0 A position on the Board of Directors shall 
be offered to the Plan representative designated by the Plan 
Trustee. 
(3-) The corporation shall only engage in 
business activities which are prudent in the normal operation 
of a merchandizing chain and/or grocery super store chain. 
Such normal activities may include, but not be limited to, 
acquisition of land and construction or remodeling of 
buildings for future expansion, and promotion of new and/or 
additional products for retail sale within a store or stores, 
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which merchandise may or may not normally be associated with 
grocery sales. 
(4.) Defendant Harmon's shall not acquire or 
lease any assets for purposes of obtaining additional stores 
until the following financial ratios are met as reflected on 
the yearly audited financial statement: 
Financial Ratio & Percentages 
SOLVENCY 
Debt/Net worth 5:1 
current Assets/ 
Current Liabilities 
Efficiency 
Sales/ 
Total Assets 
Profitability 
Pre-Tax Income/ 
Total Assets 
.80-1 based on book 
inventory having turned 
22 times on book cost of sales 
4:1 
5.0% 
Pre-Tax income 
Net Worth 
T f">3r 10^  
Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the 
acquisition of additional stores when such acquisition would 
have no effect on defendant Harmon's debt/equity ratios if 
the following conditions are met: 
a) Said acquisition is approved by defendant Harmon's 
Board of Directors at a meeting at which the Plan 
representative is present; 
b) An analysis is made and signed off on by the Plan's 
independent auditors, and presented to the Board of 
16 0 0 0 6 8 5 
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Directors, confirming that said acquisition will not affect 
defendant Harmon's debt/equity ratio; 
c) Defendant Harmon1s management has prepared and 
presented to defendant Harmon!s Board of Directors1 a well 
documented business plan including five year projections, 
showing that said acquisition will be advantageous to 
Harmon's and said Plan is approved by the Board; and 
d) During the time period preceding the appointment of 
a Plan representative to defendant Harmon's Board of 
Directorsf, the information set forth in (b) and (c) above 
which is required to be presented at the Board of Directors1 
meeting referred to in subparagraph (a) above will be 
provided to the Plan's attorney for his review* 
(5.) Executive Compensation shall be limited as set 
forth below, subject to the best judgment of Harmon's senior 
management: 
a. Store managers be limited to a base salary of 
$40,000 per annum each plus the CPI plus 5% increase 
limitations. In addition, store managers may be entitled to 
a bonus equal to no more than 4% of the store's pre-tax net 
operating income after all charges. 
b. Departmental managers shall have a $35,000 per 
annum base salary as adjusted by the CPI plus 5% increase 
limitation and each may be entitled to a bonus equivalent to 
no more than 2% of the store's pre-tax net operating income 
after all charges. 
17 
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c. There are nine executive officers who are 
compensated by base salaries and periodic bonuses. The total 
base compensation for this group shall be $365,000 per annum, 
an average of $40,555 per person* This aggregate amount 
shall be allowed to increase by the above-described CPI plus 
5% factors. individuals included in the group will be 
additionally compensated by periodic bonuses as follows: 
i* The President and General 
Manager (one at present) of 
the corporation may continue 
to receive an $8,400 per 
quarter bonus together with 
an annual bonus of $12,000, 
said amounts also subject to 
the annual CPI plus 5% 
increases, 
ii. Vice Presidents (2 at 
present) may receive 
quarterly bonuses in amounts 
equal to no more than 2% of 
the company net operating 
income after all charges• 
iii. Other general officers, 
Secretary/Treasurer, 
Assistant Vice Presidents, 
and Controller may each 
receive quarterly bonuses 
18
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equal to no more than the greater 
of 1% of the company pre-tax net 
operating income after all charges 
or the highest store manager for 
the quarter. 
d- In the event the company elects to change 
its existing policies, the totals of the above-described 
compensation amounts vill be aggregated and management 
may have the option of allocating said totals among the 
various participants in the management group at its discretion. 
e- In the event it becomes necessary to increase 
the Executive and Management staff of the company as a 
result of the addition of new stores or added work requirements, 
employment may be extended and compensation paid at the 
then prevailing rates standard in the grocery industry 
as applicable to chains of a comparable size to Harmons, 
f. Wherein the term HCPI" is utilized herein 
it is intended that the "5LS CPI-U/ U.S. City Average, 
All Items Index*' be the CPI to be utilized in determining 
the amount of such compensation. 
(6.) The corporation shall not accept or 
enter into co-ventures or accept outside equity if such 
action would result in a loss of control of the corporation 
by the current owners* 
(7.) The Harmon family shall not lend any 
additional money to the corporation during the period when 
the terms of this agreement are in effect. 
: t :• i L 
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(8.) The Plan shall have a right of first refusal 
to purchase shares, at the same price as others acquiring 
newly issued shares at that point in time, of the corporate 
stock each time that the corporation proposes to issue 
additional shares from its authorized but unissued shares, as 
well as each time that the corporation proposes to authorize 
and issue shares in addition to those currently authorized. 
This right to purchase shall, however, be limited to only 
that number of shares required to maintain the Plan's 
proportionate equity position in the corporation that exists 
on the date the new issue is to take place. 
Any additional stock which may in the future be 
issued, sold or otherwise transferred by the corporation 
would be transferred only upon receipt by the corporation of 
cash or other assets equal to or greater than the value of 
said stock at the most recent appraised value as defined in 
paragraph 9 below. 
The corporation shall have the right of first refusal 
on any stock held by the Plan or current or former Plan 
participants or their heirs or assigns and which such parties 
wish to offer for sale. 
Except as provided below, any shares purchased pursuant 
to this paragraph (8) , by the corporation, shall be purchased 
at the "most recent appraised value11 as defined in paragraph 
9 below. In the event that the seller of the stock 
determines that it is in his interest, or, in the case of the 
Trustee, in the interest of the Plan, to sell the stock in 
20 
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his possession and he has received a bona fide offer from a 
party unrelated to the corporation or any defendant herein 
which he wishes to accept, then the corporation may exercise 
a right of first refusal at such offering price-
9, (a) The stock placed in the Plan pursuant to the 
settlement agreement with the Department shall be subject to 
a "put" option as follows: Following any distributions of 
such stock by the Plan to an employee, which distribution 
shall be in accordance with the Plan document, such employee 
may "put" such stock to the company at the most recent 
appraised value within sixty days following the date of 
distribution of such stock; if such stock is not "put" to the 
company within such sixty day period, such employee may "put" 
such stock to the company at the most recent appraised value 
during another sixty day period beginning at the start of the 
next plan year of the Plan. If the last day of a sixty-day 
period referred to in the previous sentence falls on a 
weekend or public holiday, the period shall extend until the 
next normal business day. 
The "most recent appraised value" as used in this 
decree shall mean the most recent appraised value pursuant to 
annual appraisals or appraisal updates to be made by an 
independent appraiser selected jointly by the company and the 
Plan trustee, as of the end of each fiscal year of the 
company- In the event that the company and trustee cannot 
agree on an appraiser, either the trustee or the company may 
move the court to appoint or select an appraiser. The 
00 060ft 
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company may, in its sole discretion, pay the purchase price 
for any stock "put" to it under the terms of this paragraph 
in substantially equal periodic payments (not less frequently 
than annually) over a period beginning not later than thirty 
days after the exercise of such put option but not exceeding 
five years* Interest on any unpaid balance shall be at the 
prime rate as published by First Security Bank of Utah on the 
date the put is made. The stock shall be retained by the 
party putting it to the corporation until the full purchase 
price is paid, 
(b) Further, as to individuals whose total 
distribution from the Plan would be $3,500 or less, the Plan 
shall pay such individuals wholly in cash and shall not 
distribute to such individuals any of the stock received as a 
result of this settlement. In recognition thereof it is 
agreed that the Plan may, at the end of each calendar year, 
"put" to the corporation the amount of stock which, in the 
absence of this agreement, would have been distributed to 
those individuals whose total distribution was $3,500 or 
less. The ability to put this stock to the corporation is 
separate and apart from any other "put" agreed to herein. 
The company may, in its sole discretion, pay the purchase 
price for any stock "put" to it under the terms of this 
paragraph in substantially equal periodic payments (not less 
frequently than annually) over a period beginning not later 
than thirty days after the exercise of such put option but 
not exceeding five years. Interest on any unpaid balance 
22 n I r. /- r> A. 
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shall be at the prime rate as published by First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A., Salt Lake City, Utah on the date the put 
is made. The stock shall be retained by the Plan until the 
full purchase price is paid. 
(c) . (i) Further, during the ten year period 
immediately following the signing of this agreement, the Plan 
shall have a "put" up to $300,000 per year, which amount 
shall be cumulated for each of the ten years. To determine 
whether the Plan can exercise its "put", on the last day of 
each calendar year, the Corporation will provide the Plan 
trustee with a statement showing the number of shares and the 
value of the shares which have been put to the Corporation by 
Plan participants during the preceding 364 days of that year, 
as well as the cumulative value of all shares put to the 
corporation by Plan participants during each of the years 
subsequent to the signing of this agreement. 
(ii) In the event that the value of the shares put 
to the corporation by the Plan participants is less than 
$300,000 multiplied by the number of years which have then 
elapsed since the signing of this agreement, the Plan would, 
subject to the provisions of paragraph (iii) below, have the 
option to "put" as many shares of stock to the Company at the 
most recent appraised value as would bring the total value of 
stock "put" to the Company to an amount equal to $300,000 for 
each year subsequent to the signing of this agreement. 
For example, if at the end of the third year subsequent 
to the signing of this agrement, the total value of all stock 
n 0 (J P f; n ? 
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"put" to the corporation by Plan participants in the three 
years subsequent to the signing of this agreement is less 
than $900,000 (3 times $300,000) then the Plan would have the 
option to "put" to the corporation so much stock as would 
bring the total value of stock "put" to the company both by 
Plan participants and the Plan itself to a total of $900,000. 
In the event the total value of stock "put" to the 
corporation by Plan participants exceeded $900,000, the Plan 
would be precluded from exercising any "put". 
The corporation may, in its sole discretion, pay the 
purchase price for any stock "put" to it by the Plan under 
the terms of this paragraph in substantially equal periodic 
payments (not less frequently than annually) over a period 
beginning not later than thirty days after the exercise of 
such put option, but not exceeding five years. Interest on 
any unpaid balance shall be at the prime rate as published by 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.
 r Salt Lake City, Utah on 
the date the put is made. The Plan shall retain the stock 
until the full purchase price is paid. 
(iii) Further, the put described in subparagraph 
(i) shall only be exercisable in a year where the audited 
financial statements of the previous fiscal year reflect that 
the pre-tax net income of the Company exceeds 2 1/2% of gross 
sales. 
In such years, said "put" is exercisable to -the extent 
of $30,000 for each l/10th percent by which the pre-tax net 
24 0 0 P ij G 3 
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income of the Company exceeds 2 1/2% of gross sales, up to a 
limit of $300,000. 
10. Any material breach of any of the terms of this 
Partial Consent Judgment or of the Final Judgment herein, 
shall cause all sums due the Plan from the Corporate 
defendant herein including but not limited to those due 
pursuant to the $500,000 note referred to in paragraph 2 
herein to become immediately due and payable. 
11. Each party agrees to bear its own fees and other 
expenses incurred by such party in connection with any stage 
of this proceeding. __^  
DATED: (jif,UiJ$J, , 1988 
"7 ' • UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
Copies mailed to counsel 8-30-88cn: 
Daniel W. Teehan, Esq. 
Brent D. Ward, U.S. Attorney 
Charles W. Hanna, Esq. 
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq. 
Jeffrey N. Clayton, Esq. 
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The undersigned apply for 
and consent to the entry of the 
preceding Order 
DATED: <*L ,sy & ^ - 1988 
GEORGE R. SALEM 
Solicitor of Labor 
DANIEL W. TEEHAN 
Regional Solicitor 
±#\ \XJLLL^LAJ 
PATRICIA s/^vfelNER 
Attorney 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED: / 1988 
<£*f 
Charles v?. Hanna 
Brown, Smith/ and Hanna 
Attorneys for ?• Ray Green 
Dated: 3/4/&L 
2Gu> j- y^4j^ ,< *^<^
 :^^LS^JI^ $Ldvfest ReSity and Finance, Inc . 
Dated: 0^. /? /?<t8T 
1 \ /tkA^J*^S^\J 
'TERRYJ/HARMON 
i n d v y L p u a i l y and on b e h a l f 
of^^aiymon C i t y , I n c . / for i t s e l f 
and a s P l an A d m i n i s t r a t o r 
Dated: < iV<z*L 
'Attorney for Terry Harmon arffd 
Harmor City/ Inc. 
t . Ray Gg^en 
Harraba City/ Inc. Prof it' Shari] 
'itmiaA.AA.ty Plan 
R6bert M-~ Mor r i s , T r u s t e e i 
Dated: 8 lci~££ ! 
Dated: / 
T rus t ee 
/^RRY^ARMON ^r^ b e n a i t or 
( HARK C I T Y / I N C P l a n j 
AdmLnistcator ! 
JEFFREY CuAY70N1 
A t t o r n s v 
/ / 
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DANIEL W. TEEHAN 
Regional Solicitor 
Office of the Solicitor 
United states Department of Labor 
71 Stevenson Street, Suite 1020 
P*0. Box 3495 
San Francisco, California 94119-3495 
Local Ccmsel: 
Dee V. Benson 
United States Attorney for 
the District of Utah 
IKS, Courthouse Building 
Room 466 
350 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 524-5682 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
:v<a?;:-:;T COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
/ / H A R K - : / . / I M H E R , 
BY / . „ 
D£nJfv CLERK 
0 £ ^ 
Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Labor, 
United States Department of Labor 
(formerly Ann McLaughlin) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Terry Harmon, an individual, 
F. Ray Green, an individual, 
Harmon City, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, and Midwest Realty 
and Finance, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION 
FILE No. 88-C-734W 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
This action was filed by the Secretary of Labor alleging 
that the defendants failed to discharge their responsibilities as 
fiduciaries of the Harmon City, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan ("the 
Plan") in violation of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.c. §1001 et seg. , and seeking 
to enjoin further violations of the Act and to obtain other 
equitable relief. 
0 0 0 C 9 (* 
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1 j  A Partial Consent Judgment was issued by the United States 
2 District Court for the Central District of Utah, the Honorable 
3I David K, Winder, presiding on the 29th day of August, 1988. 
4 8 Since the entry of the aforesaid Partial consent Judgment, 
51 the following have occurred: 
6 1. A plan trustee and a plan administrator have been 
7 I appointed; 
3 J 2. Harmon City, Inc. has transferred Five Hundred Thousand 
9| Dollars ($500,000) in cash to the Plan; 
10 3, Harmon City, Inc. has given to the Plan a provisory 
111 note in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000); 
12| 4* The aforementioned note has been secured; 
13 I 5. The Plan has transferred properties to Harmon City, 
141 Inc., as set forth in pages three (3) through six (6) of the 
i 
151 Partial Consent Judgment; 
16 6. Pursuant to paragraph 2d of the Partial Consent 
17| Judgment, two appraisers were designated and rendered appraisals 
IS { of the fair market value of Harmon city, inc. Bruce Brown of 
19 J Brown-Wright and Associates issued an appraisal report indicating 
201 the total valuation of the corporation to be Twenty-two Million 
211 Eight Hundred and Ninety Thousand Dollars ($22,890,000). Greg 
221; Gilbert of Corporate Valuations issued an appraisal report 
23 I indicating the total value of the corporation to be Nineteen 
24 h Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($19,500,000). Pursuant to 
25 | the above-noted paragraph of the Partial Consent Judgment, the two 
26[j appraisers consulted and determined that the appraised value of 
28,1 2
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Harmon City, Inc. as of July 31
 r 1988 is Twenty-one Million Two 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($21,200,000). Based on the above 
experts' evaluation, it is determined that the appraised value of 
Harmon City, Inc. as of July 31, 1988 is $21,200,000. 
7. Harmon City, Inc. has transferred to the Plan 
$3,000,000 of stock minus the $129,000 adjustment set forth in 
paragraph 2(d) of page 6 of the Partial Consent Judgment, all in 
accord with the terms of the Partial Consent Judgment, a copy of 
which is attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
this Final Judgment be entered by this Court, each party to bear 
its own fees and expenses. 
Dated this 
Copies neiled, 6-21-89jm 
Daniel W. Teehan, Esq. 
Dee Benson, USA 
Charles W. Hanna, Esq. 
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq. 
Jeffrey N. Clayton, Esq. 
7sU day of May 1989 
/ / ^ 
DAVID K." tfltfDER 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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is Judgrpent is hereby consented to: 
64M**-
Charles' W. Hanna 
Brown, Smith, and Hanna 
Attorneys for F. Ray Green 
Dated: 
Midwest aeal"Cy and Finance, 
Inc. 
O' w^'V & >X4?^*-
Dated: /T2t* 20,/fS1? 
HARMON 
fvidually and on behalf 
6%/Hanuon City, Inc. , for itself 
and as Plan Administrator 
Dated: 
Attorney for Terry Harmon and 
Harmon city, inc. 
Harmon City, Ine_ Profit Sharing 
' JEFFREY CLAYTON ^7 
Attorney „ ^-y 
Dated: //?' /7/jZcf />' 
Approved as to form and content, 
Dated! 1989 
F. Ray G/6en 
Dated: J ^ U ^ / ^ J V ? 
Harmon city, Inc. Profit 
Sharing Plan 
Robert M. M o r r i s , T r u s t e e 
Dated: Rcsicmg<rADrTK 14, 1989 T 
Ddn S. C a r r o l l , T r u s t e e 
Dated: Resfeqngd April 14, 1969 
y 
on behajnr"bf 
I n c . , 
i s t r a t o r 
Dated: 
^ ^ ^ 
'KEYL*BANK OF UTAH,/Successor Trustee 
Dated: &~fz>y/gf 
JERRY >G- THQ^ RN, S o l i c i t o r of Labor 
By: o^UxXX&J JffJW 
| DANIEL W. TEEHAN, Regional Solicitor 
I UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
| Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of the United States 
Attorney's Office for the District of Utah, and that a copy of the 
foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid to all 
parties named below, this (4^ day of /U irt c , / 1989. 
Charles W. Hanna, Esq, 
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA 
175 East 400 South 
Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffrey N. Clayton, Esq, 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
10 East South Temple 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Midwest Realty 
3540 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Harmon Cityr Inc. 
C/0 Terry Harmon 
3575 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
<:z£*c\<s r W l j g 
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TABX 
Paul M. Durham (0939) 
Jeffrey M. Jones (1741) 
J. Mark Gibb (5702) 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 850 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
J. 
HLED DISTRICT Getlftt 
Third Judicial District 
r 
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1995 
By 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, MATTHEW HILTON, 
BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON, 
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah 
corporation, MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON, 
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah 
corporation, TERRY HARMON and 
MRS. TERRY HARMON, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY M. 
JONES IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Civil No. 920901436CV 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
JEFFREY M. JONES, being first duly sworn, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years. I have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth herein and would so testify if 
called upon to do so. 
2. I am plaintiff's counsel and have reviewed the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the defendants 
in this action and find several portions to be in error. 
3. The delay in pursuing this case was due, in part, to my 
attention to the case in which Mr. Boyd was sued by his previous 
counsel of record in the present case, Mr. Isom. Judge Frank G. 
Noel issued a memorandum decision in favor of Mr. Isom on June 16, 
1993. I filed Boyd's notice of appeal in Mr. Isom's action on 
December 9, 1993. 
4. In February 1994, I contacted Mr. Boyd regarding a 
meeting which I had with Mr. Kay at court regarding this case. Mr. 
Kay asked me to provide him with a settlement offer from Mr. Boyd. 
I contacted Mr. Boyd and he authorized me to make a proposal to Mr. 
Kay. I then called Mr. Kay regarding the settlement terms proposed 
by Mr. Boyd. Mr. Kay never told me of his clients acceptance or 
rejection of Mr. Boyd's settlement offer. 
5. On June 2, 1994, I filed Boyd's appellant's brief in the 
Isom Action. On or about July 26, 1994, while the matter was in 
the process of being submitted to the Utah Supreme Court, Mr. Isom 
and Mr. Boyd settled the Isom Action. 
6. Defendants in this action have only filed a motion to 
dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint. Further, with the exception 
of Burbidge and Kirton's motion, these motions to dismiss were not 
filed with respect to all claims in this action, but were only with 
respect to the fourth cause of action for securities fraud. 
2 
7. Accordingly, defendants Harmon City, Inc., Matthew 
Hilton, Michael Gottfredson, Nielsen & Senior, Terry Harmon and 
Mrs. Terry Harmon have taken no action with respect to plaintiff's 
First, Second and Third Causes of Action other than to answer the 
Amended Complaint. 
8. There is no evidence of defendants' expense or prejudice 
that is currently before the Court. 
9. There is no evidence of defendants' maintenance of 
professional liability coverage and insurance. 
10. Not all defendants have paid other outside attorneys to 
defend them; lawyers associated with Nielsen & Senior represent 
Nielsen & Senior in this action. 
11. Defendants have not previously requested a scheduling 
conference in this action. 
12. No Orders to Show Cause have been issued or hearings held 
in this case regarding a lack of prosecution until April 6, 1995. 
13. Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 2 does not differentiate 
between the defendants regarding their separate conduct and 
opportunity to move the case along. 
14. Only Kirton and Burbidge filed a Motion to Dismiss all 
causes of action in this case. 
15. Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, and Mrs. Terry Harmon's 
motion to dismiss was only with respect to the Fourth Cause of 
Action. Harmon City, Inc., Terry Harmon, and Mrs. Terry Harmon 
have done nothing with respect to defending or bringing motions 
3 
0 (: G & - 1 
regarding the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action until their 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was filed. 
16. Defendant Nielsen & Senior has done anything other than 
file an Answer to the Complaint and request a partial judgment on 
the pleadings with respect to the Fourth Cause of Action. Nielsen 
& Senior has done nothing with respect to defending or bringing 
motions regarding the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action 
until its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was filed. 
17. Defendant Hilton has done nothing but answer the 
Complaint until his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was 
filed. 
18. Defendant Gottfredson has never served an answer to the 
Complaint. 
19. If given the opportunity, Mr. Boyd will aggressively 
pursue discovery and his claims. 
4 
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FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this day of April, 1995. 
Jelfrefjw. Jones^ Affiant 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of April, 
1995 
NOTARY PUBU8 
STATE OF UTAH 
m^CenmWan&aiw 
MvchtUNf 
KRtSTENICIVOW 
Sa» Late Ciiy.mto m i l _ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
<yy\aAc^ /g, i0!0!! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, this day of 
April, 1995, to the following: 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake T. Ostler, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas L. Kay, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorney for Defendant 
111 East Broadway #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael Gottfredson, Esq. 
15524 Quail Run Drive 
North Potomac, MD 20878 
Glenn C. Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorney for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
jmg\boydhcjj. aff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
SAMUEL L. BOYD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARMON CITY, INC., ET AL., 
Defendant. 
* * * * * 
CASE NO. 920901436 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
APRIL 6, 1995 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
RULING 
* * * 
ORIGINAL 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 9 1995 
By 
~J j DeDirtv Clerk 
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APPEARANCES 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MR. JEFFREY M. JONES, ESQ. 
MR. J. MARK GIBB, ESQ. 
Durham, Evans, Jones & 
Pinegar 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
(Harmon City) 
MR. BLAKE T. OSTLER, ESQ. 
Kirton & McConkie 
Attorneys at Law 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
(Kirton & McConkie) 
MR. THOMAS L. KAY, ESQ. 
Snell & Wilmer 
Attorneys at Law 
111 East Broadway, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
(Matthew Hilton) 
MS. CATHERINE M. LARSON, ESQ, 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorneys at Law 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
(Nielsen & Senior) 
MR. JOHN K. MANGUM, ESQ. 
Nielsen & Senior 
Attorneys at Law 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; APRIL 6, 1995; P.M. SESSION 
* * * 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. The motion 
to dismiss is granted. The court finds that the Meadow 
Land, or Meadow Farm, excuse me, Meadow Fresh Farms case 
is directly on point. 
Specifically, the court finds that there is no 
sufficiently reasonable or viable excuse for the lack of 
diligence. None has been given, and the court can find 
none. 
Given the significant length of time that has 
passed since the cause of action occurred, and since the 
litigation was filed—and I would indicate that there 
appears to be even a two-year period between those two 
dates—the court cannot, in good conscience, deny the 
motion. 
There is an old expression, "Justice delayed is 
justice denied." I am of the opinion that this is a 
phrase that has real and significant meaning when applied 
to actions pending in courts of law. The onus is on the 
defendants, or is not on the defendants, to undertake 
expensive discovery when there has been no action taken by 
the plaintiffs. There has been no action after the filing 
in this complaint by the plaintiffs. The only action 
initiated in these files that I've got, in the three 
ft 0 0 7 9 V 
volumes, since the filing of the complaint, has all been 
on the defendants' part. 
Common sense shows that there is prejudice to 
attorneys in having this sort of thing hang over their 
heads, I take judicial notice of the fact that when six 
attorneys are present in my courtroom and file numerous 
pleadings, that their actions are not free, that their 
actions involve an expenditure of time and energy, and 
therefore prejudice to their respective clients. 
I also take judicial notice of the fact that 
attorneys have malpractice coverage and insurance, and 
what the realities are in maintaining that insurance, and 
in doing the reporting that was necessitated here. 
Delayed resolutions are inherently unfair and 
prejudicial to one defending the same. There have been no 
dispositive motions by the plaintiff, none have been 
filed. There has been no discovery initiated by the 
plaintiff until these motions were before the court. 
There have been no settlement discussions for over a year, 
and no real activity in this case for over two years. 
If the plaintiffs had a viable claim, they had, 
or he had, I should say, three years to pursue the claim, 
and has chosen not to do so. I cannot conclude that the 
plaintiff is, therefore, prejudiced. He has had a forum 
for resolution of the disputes and has chosen not to 
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it. 
Despite all that has been said so articulately 
by counsel on behalf of the plaintiff, it is clear to me 
that the law does not favor unlimited viability of causes 
of action. It simply does not. The action bringing us 
here was not action renewed or brought by the plaintiff. 
The defendants have, again, brought us to court, and it is 
their activity that has generated the majority of the work 
in this case, and all of the activity for the last several 
years. 
I find in favor of the plaintiffs, or excuse 
me, the defendants, in favor of the movants on the three 
motions to dismiss. Who wishes to file the findings and 
the order of dismissal? 
MR. KAY: I'd be happy to, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. And I would ask that 
you're specific with reference to what I have alluded to. 
Do not limit what you put to what I have said, but make it 
consistent with what I have said. 
MR. KAY: If it would be all right, I would 
just like to get a copy of the transcript of your ruling, 
and order that after. 
THE COURT: I'll let you make your arrangements 
with Cecilee, but that's certainly appropriate. Yes, 
counsel? 
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MR. JONES: Your Honor, if I just may clarify, 
this dismissal is not on the merits of the case; is that 
correct, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: I hadn't spoken to that issue. 
Mr. Kay? 
MR. KAY: Our motion was under Rule 41-B, and 
for failure of plaintiff to prosecute or comply, and we've 
asked for it to be with prejudice. And the rule itself, 
41-B says that it operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits unless you indicate otherwise. And I think it 
doesn't make any difference. I mean it totally undercuts 
your ruling if tomorrow he files a new case. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, there has been no 
determination on the merits at all. It cannot be on the 
merits in this case. 
THE COURT: Do you want to speak to the rule? 
MR. JONES: Well, the court- - Yes, that's 
what I'm trying to do in that sense. That the rule says, 
"Unless the court finds otherwise." There has been no 
hearing with regard to any of the merits in this case. 
This is not a hearing with regard to the evidence, this is 
not a hearing on summary judgment where the court has 
weighed the evidence in any fashion. And it should be 
without prejudice. And not on the merits. 
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THE COURT: Counsel, do you want to approach 
and let me look at that section of the code? 
MR, KAY: I'm looking particularly where it 
says, "Unless the court, in its order." 
THE COURT: Thank you. The rule says, and I'm 
referring to the last sentence of subsection B, "Unless 
the court, in its order for dismissal, otherwise specifies 
the dismissal under the subdivision, and any dismissal not 
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an 
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits." 
Based upon that, the dismissal will be with 
prejudice. Counsel, again, I appreciate the excellent 
quality of the oral argument. Thank you for your patience 
in waiting to be heard. Mr. Kay, it goes without saying 
that you will submit to all of the counsel bringing the 
motion, and to counsel for the plaintiff, the findings and 
order you prepare before it comes to me. Is there 
anything further? 
MR. KAY: I don't think so. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; APRIL 6, 1995; P.M. SESSION 
THE COURT: I'm sorry to have kept the next 
group of attorneys waiting. I apologize. 
I am now ready to hear argument on Boyd versus 
Harmon City, et al., 920901436. I am aware that we have 
three different motions to dismiss, all, in essence, 
arguing the same thing from the respective defendants. 
And I understand it's opposed by the plaintiff, and I'm 
happy to hear argument. 
I think I'm generally conversant with the facts 
and the law. Let me get counsel to state their 
appearances for the record. 
MR. JONES: Jeffrey Jones and Mark Gibb for the 
plaintiffs, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Jones, Mr. Gibb. 
MR. KAY: Tom Kay for Brinton Burbidge and 
Kirton, McConkie. 
MR. OSTLER: Blake Ostler for Harmon. 
MS. LARSON: Catherine Larson for Matthew 
Hilton. 
MR. MANGUM: John Mangum and Arthur Nielsen for 
Nielson & Senior. 
THE COURT: Who's going to go first, Mr. Kay? 
MR. KAY: I filed the first motion. 
THE COURT: In any event, you were on your feet 
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first. 
MR. KAY: I have to admit, after listening to 
this last argument, I'm going to quit writing poetry to my 
wife. 
THE COURT: Well, let me just say this, 
Mr. Kay. Whatever the facts are that counsel allude to in 
this case, I'll be happy to hear them after the last. 
MR. KAY: This is our motion under Rule 41-B 
for an order dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute. 
This case, Your Honor, was filed nearly three 
years ago. And it really makes allegations that relate to 
the time period from the spring of 1986 to September of 
1988. 
After this complaint was filed, and this 
complaint, the amended complaint was filed by David Isom, 
then we moved to dismiss, and all of us moved to dismiss. 
We had the hearing on January 15th, 1993. 
Between the time that the case was filed and 
the case was dismissed, Mr. Isom, for whatever reason, 
withdrew as counsel, and for a period of time Samuel Boyd, 
who's also an attorney, represented himself, before 
Mr. Jones and his firm became involved. 
After the motion to dismiss was argued, you 
ruled in February of 1993, that plaintiff's fourth claim 
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should be dismissed, and it was dismissed, and then the 
parties were ordered to answer the amended complaint. 
We filed our answer on March 12th, 1993, and 
brought our current motion in January of 1995. We have 
pointed out the factors that this court needs to look at 
under Rule 41-B for dismissal with prejudice. It's the 
conduct of the parties, the opportunity to move the case 
forward, what each party has done to move the case 
forward, also the difficulty or prejudice to either side, 
and whether injustice may result. 
And Your Honor, I want to just say something 
that we did not put in the briefs, but I think it's 
important where we have a situation where lawyers are 
sued, or other professionals are sued. 
The facts of life, and I can represent the 
facts of life, because I defend a lots of lawyers, the 
facts of life, where you are sued for legal malpractice, 
two things happen. First thing, you have to put your 
carrier on notice. The next time, however long a case 
pends, you have to then put on every application for 
insurance that you have this case pending, that is suing 
you for punitive damages, that it's suing you for untold 
dollars. 
What the underwriting departments of a Home 
Insurance, or another insurance company then do is to set 
000802 
your premium for your insurance for the next year, they 
look at pending claims and wondering, you know, like a 
case like this, what is going to be involved. They take 
that into consideration. 
It also puts a cloud on a lawyer's ability to 
practice. People come into court, they see that there's a 
motion against Brinton Burbidge, or McConkie, or any of 
these other attorneys involved in this case, and it sits 
there. 
Then they also have a deductible, Your Honor, 
that they may pay the first thousand or $10,000 or $20,000 
or $100,000 of any defense costs that are incurred in 
defending this case. 
Well, I bring those things up simply to say, 
Your Honor, that when a lawyer is sued, and then the first 
lawyer withdraws, for whatever reason, the plaintiff 
lawyer represents himself for whatever reason, then a 
third lawyer gets involved, and then, with all three 
attorneys, Your Honor, for over three years, or nearly 
three years, not one single thing happens. 
We come forward, we move to- -
THE COURT: What do you calculate, Mr. Kay, the 
exact timing on the inactivity to be? 
MR. KAY: Well, I would say that from January 
15th, 1993, when we argued our motion to, the motion to 
oooso: i 
dismiss, I do not know anything that the plaintiffs have 
done in this case. 
Now, Your Honor, one of the things they brought 
up- -
THE COURT: You filed- - Pardon me for 
interrupting, but you filed your motion when, again? Was 
in '95? 
MR. KAY: We filed our motion to dismiss early, 
or in the summer, I can't remember. 
THE COURT: '94? 
MR. KAY: No, in '92. We were served in July 
of '92, and so we filed it within thirty days of that 
date. 
THE COURT: And then you reactivated it at what 
point in time? 
MR. KAY: Well, no, then there was motions back 
and forth, and it didn't come on for hearing until January 
of '93. So there were motions back and forth for a period 
of time, and when it got calendared, it was calendared for 
January 15th. So after January 15th, 1993, Your Honor, 
there has been absolutely nothing done by the plaintiffs 
besides coming here and arguing. 
The thing that they brought up, and they said, 
lf0h, but we had settlement negotiations." I want to 
define what happened, Your Honor. I saw Jeff Jones over 
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here, we were over here, not before you, but before 
another judge on separate cases, and I just happened to 
see him. And I said, "When are you going to dismiss that 
lousey case against Kirton, McConkie? You know, either 
get on with it or dismiss." And that was in February of 
1994. 
And he says, "Well, I'll look into it and I'll 
get back to you." So after January of '93 to February of 
'94, that's the only contact, saying they'll look into it 
and they'll get going with it. Nothing happens after 
that, Your Honor. 
We file this case, we file this motion now, in 
January of this year. And so what has occurred is 
absolutely nothing has happened from the plaintiffs from 
the date that this case was filed. They only respond to 
the motion to dismiss. They don't bring any action, they 
don't notice one deposition, they don't give any 
interrogatories. 
We're sitting here with what we think is a 
frivolous case, and we're not going to spend all the time 
and money to then move the case forward, take three years 
of depositions, to then have them say in affidavit there 
are issues of fact. So we do what we do, and we sit there 
and listen, and we ask them, you know, "Get on with it or 
dismiss it," and they don't do anything. And so that's 
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what has happened, Your Honor. And I think this is the 
perfect case. 
And so what happens after we file this motion, 
Your Honor? Is that then they file, you know, a hundred 
interrogatories to everybody. Then they say, "Let's have 
a scheduling order. Let's get on with this thing. We're 
raring to go.11 And I just think that that is so 
inappropriate, to have this cloud- -
THE COURT: And so that everyone understands, 
I'm not going to consider anything that occurred by way of 
activity after the January of '95 motion was filed, for 
purposes of resolving this motion. 
MR. KAY: But Your Honor, for all of the 
criteria and factors that you have to look at under 41-B, 
all of them weigh in favor. Injustice would only occur if 
the plaintiffs were allowed to do what they have done, or 
lack of what they have done, for three years, and then to 
prolong what these attorneys and other people who have 
been sued in this case have to prolong, so we would submit 
it on that basis. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. You may 
proceed, Mr. Ostler. 
MR. OSTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Kay, I 
think, has done a very adequate job, but there are just 
two other factors that I think the court ought to be aware 
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of. 
Mr. Kay, because he's been retained by the 
firm, really hasn't been involved with all of the facts 
that give rise to this case. This is really something 
that goes all the way back to 1986. There have been 
threats made since that time. 
THE COURT: Just so I'm clear, Mr. Ostler, 
refresh me, I've obviously had a lot going on today. 
MR. OSTLER: I represent Harmon City, Inc. 
THE COURT: That's helpful. 
MR. OSTLER: The nature of this case was that 
Mr. Boyd wanted to buy Harmon City, Inc., it never 
happened, and he's complaining about a transaction that 
never went through. 
His real claim is, "Well, gee, you really 
didn't intend to sell me your store, and I made trips to 
Salt Lake City, and you owe me for all of the expenses 
that I incurred in doing that.1' The claim is, is that my 
clients were simply going through the motions for more 
than eight months, and expending thousands and thousands 
of dollars of their own, in something that they ;just had 
no interest in, which is ludicrous on its face. 
But shortly after this thing fell apart, after 
intense negotiations over months, the claim is made, 
"You'd better notify your carrier." This is Mr. Boyd. 
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"Notify your carrier, because I#m going to bring a suit.11 
And we don't see a suit for several years. 
THE COURT: When did this notice occur, verbal 
notice? 
MR. OSTLER: In 1987, Your Honor. And we have 
a string of letters, one in '87, one in #89, telling us 
again, we'd better pay or he's going to sue. And then in 
'91 he finally does something. And nothing has happened. 
Now, there may have been even a 
conversation—this is the second thing—between Mr. Kay 
and the attorneys for the plaintiffs. There has been 
absolutely no conversations, we haven't been contacted 
even once about this case on anything by the plaintiffs. 
No settlement discussion, no request to see whether we can 
get this thing moving, no request for depositions, 
absolutely zero communication during that entire period of 
time. 
These plaintiffs have done nothing. The only 
action in this case has been taken by the defendants to 
try to resolve the groundless suit, Your Honor. And I 
felt those two things were important for the court to 
understand. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Ms. Larson. 
MS. LARSON: Thank you. Your Honor, I 
represent Matthew Hilton in this matter. And with respect 
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to cocounsel's arguments, I don't have much more to offer. 
Just to say that after the complaint in this matter was 
filed in 1992, Matthew Hilton did respond by filing an 
answer. And with respect to Matthew Hilton's position, no 
activity's taken place since that period of time. 
To my knowledge, no settlement negotiations 
have taken place- -
THE COURT: And that's since what time, again, 
Ms. Larson? 
MS. LARSON: Since our answer was filed in 
August of 1993. We were not a party to the motion to 
dismiss brought by Burbidge and Kirton, McConkie, and so 
until the current motion to dismiss has come before the 
court, no activity has taken place with respect to 
Mr. Hilton. 
THE COURT: So while Mr. Kay has alluded to at 
least one contact, from your client's perspective, there's 
been no contact or discussion concerning settlement for 
over two and a half years? 
MS. LARSON: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else you'd like to say? 
MS. LARSON: No, I do not. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, you've got three 
illustrious attorneys in the back row, there. Mr. Mangum? 
MR. MANGUM: Thank you, Your Honor. And I will 
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be brief, I would submit that, really, for all of the 
defendants, looking at it functionally, there has been no 
activity initiated by plaintiff since the amended 
complaint was filed in either January or July of 1992. 
The only things that any defendant did, including Nielsen 
and- - Nielsen & Senior answered, then Nielsen & Senior 
waited while Mr. Kay pursued his motion for dismissal of 
one or more of the claims. When he prevailed, we filed 
the same motion, it was not opposed, and then we sought 
leave to amend the complaint, which Mr. Jones stipulated 
to. But plaintiff has not initiated anything in this 
action since the amended complaint was filed, and that's 
been nearly three years. 
I do have to say, and the only thing that is 
unique at all about Nielsen & Senior, is that Mr. Jones 
was once a partner of ours at Nielsen & Senior. And 
perhaps more as an accommodation to us, he did make one 
phone call for settlement. That was more than two years 
ago. That was promptly rejected, if I'm not mistaken, 
that was December of #92 or early January of '93. 
THE COURT: I guess if he stands up and makes a 
brilliant argument you're going to take credit for having 
trained him; is that right? 
MR. MANGUM: If we could. But as I read the 
case law, and the standards are set forth, there's not 
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much doubt what plaintiff has to establish. 
But let me just read one sentence from the 
Meadow Fresh case, which we cited in addition, the Meadow 
Fresh Farms case, in addition to the cases cited by the 
other defendants. One sentence. "In sum, a plaintiff, in 
attacking a dismissal for failure to prosecute, must offer 
a reasonable excuse for its lack of diligence." And while 
that's the standard on appeal, I submit that it also has 
relevance here at this level. We have not seen any 
reasonable excuse for taking no initiative to move this 
case forward. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Wait a minute, two 
more. Are they going to say anything? 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, I rest on what my 
partner has said. 
MR. BURBIDGE: I likewise will rely on what 
Mr. Kay, my attorney, has said. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. JONES: I am very grateful to take credit 
for Mr. Nielsen's training, Your Honor, if the court 
denies the motion, and I acknowledge that fine training. 
THE COURT: You're taking credit for training 
Mr. Nielsen? 
MR. JONES: No, his training of me. I'm 
grateful to acknowledge his fine training. 
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THE COURT: We all feel that way, even those of 
us who have only watched him at work. 
MR. JONES: As well we should, a fine teacher. 
Your Honor, I'd like to address, I think, the 
real substantive points, here. And I'd like to start 
first with the issue of, have there been settlement 
discussions? Secondly, I'd like to address what has 
actually happened in the interim. Third, I'd like to 
address whether or not there is any prejudice to the 
defendants as a result of the delay. And fourth, what 
injustice would result if the court did dismiss the claim. 
First of all, with regard to settlement 
discussions, and with all due respect to Mr. Mangum's 
recitation of the settlement discussions that took place 
with Nielsen & Senior, those, in fact, did occur in 
January of 1993. I had two, excuse me, one telephone 
conversation with Mr. Nielsen in which I discussed with 
him the fact that I had been approached about taking this 
case, and inquired of him his feelings if I were to do so. 
THE COURT: And when was that, again? 
MR. JONES: That was in January of 1993. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JONES: Subsequently, after he expressed 
absolutely no hesitation or concern vis-a-vis our prior 
relationship, or my relationship formerly with his firm, I 
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then had a meeting with him in his office where we 
discussed the substance of a settlement proposal that 
Mr. Boyd had authorized me to make to him. I presented to 
him a dollar amount, and terms under which Mr. Boyd would 
be willing to settle. 
Mr. Nielsen told me expressly that he would 
discuss the matter with those that he, with whom he had 
to, and that he would respond. 
THE COURT: And this was still January of '93? 
MR. JONES: I don't have the date of that. I 
believe it was probably February of '93. It was some time 
later. And I've looked, Your Honor, I don't have notes 
with regard to that particular conversation. Except that 
it did take place in his office, and I do have notes with 
regard to the amounts that were authorized by Mr. Boyd. 
Mr. Nielsen then called me back some time later, in 
response to my telephone call, and declined the offer. 
The second settlement discussions took place in 
February of 1994. Those discussions took place with 
Mr. Kay on behalf of Mr. Burbidge and the Kirton, McConkie 
firm. Mr. Kay is correct that he and I ran into each 
other in court, we talked about the case. He indicated 
some interest in seeing if there was a way his clients 
could be dismissed. We talked about settlement then. 
On February 10, 1994, I sent a memorandum to 
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Mr. Boyd with regard to my conversation with Mr. Kay, and 
asked that he call me about it. He did so. We discussed 
again the terms under which Mr. Boyd would be willing to 
dismiss Mr. Kay#s clients. 
And I then called Mr. Kay. And I related to 
Mr. Kay what those terms were. Again, a precise dollar 
amount which, if paid, Mr. Boyd would accept as 
satisfaction of his claims. Mr. Kay's response to me was, 
,fI don't think so. But I will get back to you." I have 
never heard back from Mr. Kay, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you to follow up. Did 
you initiate discovery? Did you call Mr. Kay? Did you 
send follow up letters? 
MR. JONES: I did not, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: None of those things. 
MR. JONES: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And can you tell me why? Because I 
think it does come back, as counsel points out, to a 
reasonable excuse for the lack of diligence. And I 
understand, counsel, that attorneys' actions are, in large 
part, driven or dictated by what clients are willing to 
pay for, and what clients direct you to do. But can you 
explain to me why nothing was done? 
MR. JONES: Your Honor, I can give you two 
reasons. The first is the fact that the lawsuit arose 
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between Mr. Isom and Mr. Boyd. Mr. Isom sued Mr. Boyd 
with respect to his representation of Mr. Boyd in this 
case initially. That lawsuit took until approximately- -
I'm looking at Mr. Gibb, because I don't recall precisely. 
I believe it was last summer, July or August, to resolve. 
Frankly- -
THE COURT: That's a separate action. 
MR. JONES: That's absolutely correct. But in 
terms of a reason, Your Honor, Mr. Boyd's attentions and 
hours were focused on resolving that lawsuit, which was 
tried in the early part of the year last year, and then 
was resolved during the pendency of an appeal. And my 
best recollection is, is that would have been the late 
s\immer or early fall of 1994. 
THE COURT: All right. And at that point in 
time did you initiate discovery, or additional settlement 
discussions? 
MR. JONES: Did not, Your Honor. That matter 
was resolved. We had some financial arrangements then to 
make with Mr. Boyd with regard to proceeding with this 
case. Those were not accomplished, frankly, until 
recently. And clearly after the motion to dismiss was 
filed. So the substantive reason for the inactivity in 
the case relates to the separate case brought by Mr. Isom. 
I point out again, however, Your Honor, that 
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been made, expressly in Mr. Kay's argument and in 
Mr. Ostler's argument, both admitted that they simply 
waited. Both admitted that they did nothing to move 
forward with the case. Both admitted that they did not 
undertake any action in the case at all to defend against 
the claims, or try, if they believed the claims to be 
meritorious, to assemble the evidence and establish that 
for the court. 
THE COURT: Well, they have filed repeated 
motions. The motions that occurred several years ago and 
then the most current motions, which bring us to the 
hearing today. 
MR. JONES: But none of those go to the merits, 
Your Honor, if they believe these are frivolous. 
THE COURT: It goes to the merits to move to 
dismiss. 
MR. JONES: Well, the dismissal has nothing to 
do with the merits of the case. 
THE COURT: I understand what you're saying, 
but if there is no case, that's fairly significant. 
MR. JONES: I understand that in terms of the 
case as a whole. But in terms of if they believed that 
the claims are frivolous, and they can prove that, they 
have undertaken nothing on their part. And that, I 
believe, is important, because that's what both 
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Westinghouse and Meadow Fresh say, that the court should 
take a look at what both sides have done. 
If these claims really are lacking in merit, if 
they're not substantive, then they can proceed, likewise, 
to take depositions, obtain documents, and do, as was done 
in the case just argued to the court, bring a motion for 
summary judgment and show that the case is lacking in 
merit. 
That, of course, is different than the 
procedural event that there has been two years of 
inactivity in terms of pleadings or discovery process. 
And that is a significant point. 
In Westinghouse, the court said, "Consideration 
should be given to the conduct of both parties, and the 
opportunity each has had to move the case forward." And 
what they have done about it, and also what difficulty or 
prejudice may have been caused to the other side. And 
most important, whether injustice may result from 
dismissal• 
The court goes on to say, "We're not impressed 
that the defendants themselves were overly diligent, or 
manifest any particular haste in getting the pretrial 
discovery procedures completed and on with trial." 
happened 
The Supreme 
on both sides. 
Court 
The 
mandates 
Supreme 
a look at 
Court says, 
what has 
"We have 
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to look at what both parties have done." Granted, and 
it's clear that there has been no pretrial discovery or 
other process in this case for two years initiated by the 
plaintiff. But that needs to be balanced against what the 
defendants have done, under Westinghouse. And in this 
case, they have likewise done nothing. 
I make that point, Your Honor, because that 
goes directly to their claim of prejudice. If there were 
prejudice that they were suffering, if there was some 
significant damage or injury that was occurring to them as 
a result of the pendency of these cases, one would expect 
them to do something to prove that the claims against them 
were meritless, or lacking in any substance in order to 
remove, as Mr. Kay says, the cloud of this particular 
litigation. 
With regard to the claim of malpractice, 
disclosure. My experience is, whether or not you have 
been the subject of a suit is the inquiry that is made in 
connection with a malpractice application. That is, every 
malpractice application I have ever seen, or been asked to 
fill out, says, "Have you ever been the subject of a 
lawsuit?" Not, "Are you now the subject of a lawsuit 
dealing with professional negligence?" 
The analysis that is made, in my experience, by 
malpractice insurers, is, "What is a person's past 
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history?H And whatever is outstanding then is the subject 
of the prior policy. It's not going to make a 
considerable or significant difference. 
The inquiry with regard to what suits are now 
pending or may have been pending in the past is to help 
the underwriters understand whether that person is the 
subject of many suits, or has been, and may give a greater 
insight into the degree of care that is engaged in, or 
utilized in that person's practice. Whatever is then 
pending is already the subject of an existing policy. 
Now, with regard to this claim that one of the 
other claims that was made in the pleadings is the 
evidence is stale. That's a conclusionary statement. 
There are no facts to support that. There's no claim that 
a witness has died that cannot now testify. There's no 
claim that a warehouse containing documents has been 
burned, there's, and documents destroyed. There's no 
claim that evidence isn't available. 
There's no question that these claims arose 
several years ago. And fundamentally it's no more stale 
today than it was two years, ago because the events took 
place in the late 1980s. 
And finally, Your Honor, with regard to their 
claim of prejudice that they've suffered an unnecessary 
delay, that, again, is a conclusionary statement that is 
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belied by the fact that they have not affirmatively done 
anything to remove that delay, or to cause the case to 
move along in order to be relieved of the burden of this 
litigation. 
Now, if I may, I would turn, finally, to the 
question of the injustice that will result. Mr. Boyd 
negotiated a deal with the Harmon shareholders to buy 
Harmons for $20 million. That deal included express 
language, written by Mr. Hilton, that during, until the 
closing they would not negotiate with anyone else for the 
sale of their shares. It also included the express 
requirement that they disclose all material facts with 
regard to Harmons, to its business, to its assets and 
liabilities. 
Based upon those representations, Mr. Boyd 
engaged lawyers, accountants, and engaged Citicorp, an arm 
of the Citicorp Bank in New York, to provide asset 
financing, or asset-based financing for the transaction. 
He paid very substantial fees in order to 
pursue the due diligence necessary to close the 
transactions to lawyers, accountants, and Citicorp. On 
the day of the closing he learned for the first time two 
important facts. 
First, that Mr. Terry Harmon had gone out and 
purchased most of the shares from several of the 
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shareholders during the term of the deal, in direct 
violation of the provisions of the purchase agreement, 
such that Mr. Harmon at that time, then, controlled a 
majority of the shares of Harmons, and was taking a 
position on behalf of Harmons that he would not close the 
transaction. 
Secondly, on that date, Mr. Boyd learned for 
the first time that the Department of Labor was asserting 
a significant violation of the ERISA statutes with regard 
to the Harmons pension and profit sharing plan for a 
liability in excess of from five to $6 million. That has 
subsequently been admitted by the Harmons defendants. As 
a result of that, the Harmons defendants refused to 
cooperate, and refused to close the transaction. 
Mr. Boyd is entitled to recover, has two 
remedies, or seeks two kinds of damage. The first being 
the cost and expenses incurred, and the second being the 
loss of the benefit of his bargain in this case. The gain 
he would have had, had he been able to purchase at the 
time that he entered into the agreement. 
Now, Your Honor, in summary, while there is no 
question that the case has been inactive for two years, 
and while there is no question that the plaintiff has not 
moved the case along in that time period, there is also no 
question that neither have the defendants. And then when 
0 0 0 8 2^ 
the court looks at the critical elements, the most 
critical elements of prejudice and injustice, there is no 
showing, I see no affidavits, I see no factual statements 
that say, "We have been prejudiced by the pendency of this 
lawsuit, and the failure to prosecute." 
Secondly, there would be significant injustice 
to Mr. Boyd. He invested several hundred thousand dollars 
in expenses, and he lost the benefit of a bargain that 
could have meant many millions of dollars of profit and 
gain to him and his family. 
THE COURT: Then why hasn't he done anything in 
the last two years? 
MR. JONES: I've given the court the only 
reasons that exist with regard to that. But Your Honor, 
that injustice to him is still significant. It may be 
delayed, he now may be gearing up in a delayed fashion to 
move forward. But what real damage has resulted? What 
real injury have they suffered? There is no showing of 
real injury. And they have not proceeded. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this, counsel. If 
somebody filed what amounts to a malpractice action 
against you, and it was pending for some three, four, or 
five years, would you feel that there was no disadvantage 
to you in having that hanging over your head? 
MR. JONES: Well, if it were five years, and I 
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could measure that in terms of increases in my malpractice 
premiums, or some other measurable and identifiable 
defect, yes. But Your Honor, the claim's been pending two 
years, the last activity- -
THE COURT: The claim's been pending two years? 
MR. JONES: I'm sorry, the suit has been 
pending three years. The last activity in terms of moving 
this case forward was two years ago. And two years, I do 
not believe, of inactivity is a sufficiently long time 
period. Especially when they haven't produced affidavits 
or other evidence to establish real prejudice or injury. 
Yes, I understand their claim, and yes, I 
understand that, and I would certainly acknowledge as a 
lawyer that I would not want to have to disclose any 
claims with regard to a malpractice application. But 
there are other defendants in this case. Mr. Harmon and 
the other individual Harmon defendants, who, in fact, 
don't have that prejudice at all, and who can't make that 
argument at all. 
THE COURT: With reference to the Harmons, or 
maybe it's Hilton, there's no allegation that there was 
even any settlement negotiations? 
MR. JONES: With Mr. Hilton I believe that is 
correct. To my knowledge there have been no settlement 
negotiations. 
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THE COURT: What possible basis are you 
providing me with to deny the notion as to the Hiltons? 
MR. JONES: Only, Your Honor, that there's no, 
they have not shown any prejudice. And again, if the 
court is inclined to say, "Because it's two years, I'm 
going to absolutely cut it off at two years, and that's 
just fundamentally too long," then there's very little 
that I think I can offer. Because I'm not going to stand 
here and try to tell the court that something with regard 
to Hilton has happened in two years that is really 
substantive. I can't, the facts don't support it. I 
certainly wouldn't try to. 
But what I'm suggesting to the court is, even 
though there have been two years of inactivity, Mr. Boyd 
is now committed to proceed forward, and there's evidence 
of that in the record, despite the fact that the court is 
not giving that particular consideration for purposes of 
this motion. 
But my point to the court is, if the defendants 
cannot articulate elements of damage, prejudice, or loss 
with more particularity than has been done, here, a cloud 
of litigation, the annoyance of being named as a 
defendant, and unnecessary delay, which is all that 
they've said, I think that the court ought to give these 
parties their day in court. And that's what both Burnett 
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and Meadow Fresh says. The very reason for the existence 
of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be 
heard, and to do justice between them. 
The fact that there is some delay in this case 
does not mean, even if it's two years, that that ought to 
be, in and of itself, the basis for dismissal, when they 
have not given the court any substantial reasons for 
prejudice, injury, or loss. We'd submit it on that basis. 
(REPORTER'S NOTE: The Court's Ruling has been 
previously transcribed, and can be found in another 
volume.) 
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